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EXPANDING THE REACH OF THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT'S
ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS
Gregory Scopino*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Many of the world's largest banks have, over the past few years,
paid billions of dollars to settle multiple civil and criminal government
enforcement actions and private lawsuits alleging that bank employees
conspired with their competitors to stifle competition in the derivatives
markets and fix the benchmarks for, among other things, interest rates
and foreign exchange rates that serve as critical reference points and
price components to everything from trillions of dollars in consumer
loans to financial derivatives.' Derivatives, so named because their value
derives from a reference asset, rate, or other item,2 include futures
contracts, which are agreements to purchase or sell commodities for
delivery in the future at prices that are determined at the initiation of the
contracts,3 and swaps, which are agreements to swap (exchange)
payment streams at regular intervals based on different factors or

* Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Special Counsel, Division
of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight ("DSIO"), U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC"). The research presented in this Article was authored by a CFTC employee
writing in his personal capacity and not writing in his official capacity as a CFTC employee. The
analyses and conclusions expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the
views of other members of the DSIO, other CFTC staff, the CFTC itself, or the United States. I
would like to thank Frank Partnoy, James Kwak, Tom C.W. Lin, Michael A. Carrier, Sharon E.
Foster, George A. Hay, Zachary D. Clopton, and Andrew Verstein for their feedback.
1. For an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of the settlements for such actions, see infra
Tables 1-12.
2. See Kelly S. Kibbie, Dancing with the Derivatives Devil: Mutual Funds' Dangerous
Liaison with Complex Investment Contracts and the ForgottenLessons of 1940, 9 HASTINGS Bus.
L.J. 195, 196 n.1 (2013) ("Derivatives are broadly defined as financial instruments whose value is
derived from other variables (referred to as 'reference assets' or 'underliers').").
3. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulationof Commodity Futures Prices-The Unprosecutable
Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 282 n.1 (1991).
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formulas.4 Over-the-counter ("OTC"), meaning not traded on an
exchange, derivatives have been a lucrative business for large, global
banks, which have tended to dominate many derivatives markets,
sometimes even to the point of oligopoly. 6
By forming cartels to rig benchmarks that served as components of
the prices of derivatives, banks could reduce the amounts they had to
pay their trading counterparties, such as pension funds, municipalities,
and university endowment funds, or increase the amount their
counterparties had to pay them.' For example, in a typical fixed-forfloating interest rate swap, one person pays a fixed interest rate at
regular intervals in exchange for a floating interest rate that resets
periodically based on a benchmark interest rate, such as a specified
percentage above the U.S. dollar London interbank offered rate
("LIBOR").8 Accordingly, moving LIBOR up or down would
correspondingly increase or decrease the amount that the counterparty
paying the floating leg of an interest rate swap would have to pay. 9 Even
moving LIBOR by a small amount, such as one basis point-or one
hundredth of a percent (0.01 %)-can significantly impact swap payment
amounts.'o Although many people are aware of how LIBOR and other
benchmark interest rates affect the payment amounts in connection with
trillions of dollars in home loans, student loans, and credit card debt,"
4. MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 29-33 (rev. 2d ed. 2011).
5. See ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO
FORWARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 1 (2d ed. 2010).
6. See infra Part M.A.

7. See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682-83
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Banks C1.49
Billion for Participating in Cartels in the Interest Rate Derivatives Industry (Dec. 4, 2013), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-13-1208_en.htm ("The levels of these benchmark rates may affect

either the cash flows that a bank receives from a counterparty, or the cash flow it needs to pay a
counterparty under interest-rate derivatives contracts.").

8. See Adjustable Rate and Home Equity Conversion Mortgages-Additional Index, 72 Fed.
Reg. 40,048, 40,049 (July 20, 2007) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 203 and 206) (providing the
&

definition of a swap and giving an example of an interest rate swap); 31 SAMUEL WILLISTON
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 78:18 (4th ed. 2009) (describing an
interest rate swap).

9. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 2016).
10.

For example, a derivatives trader could make as much as $3 million due to moves of one

basis point in LIBOR. Philip Stafford et al., ICAP Agrees to Pay f55m to Settle Libor Claims, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/885dc438-2522-1 le3-9b22-00144feab7de.
11.

Sharon E. Foster, Harm to Competition and the Competitive Process:A CircularCharade

in the LIBOR Antitrust Litigation, 10 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REv. 91, 91-92 (2014) ("Libor is an
interest rate benchmark used by about 75% of interest rate sensitive financial products around the

world. Control of the benchmark equates to control of the price of interest."); Liam Vaughan, Libor
Lowballing Never Ended as Global Probes Accelerated, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2014, 7:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-08/libor-lowballing-never-ended-as-global-

probes-accelerated ("Libor is used in more than an estimated $300 trillion of securities, from
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the public is understandably less informed about the role of benchmark
interest rates in calculating the payment streams for interest rate swaps
and other interest rate derivatives. But make no mistake, the markets for
derivatives are an important part of the global economy. The market for
OTC interest rate derivatives is enormous, with OTC interest rate
derivatives contracts totaling $384 trillion in 2015 ($289 trillion of
which were swaps) and representing seventy-eight percent of the OTC
derivatives market. 12
During the relevant time, LEBOR was supposed to represent the
average interest rate at which a designated panel of banks could borrow
13
unsecured funds in the interbank market in London. Panels of banks
with approximately eleven to eighteen members submitted LIBOR
numbers each day that were supposed to reflect the rate at which the
banks could borrow unsecured funds in the interbank market in the
relevant currency. 14 LIBOR and related benchmark interest rates are
issued daily for multiple currencies, including U.S. dollar, euro, and yen,
in fifteen tenors (durations for interest rates), ranging from overnight to
twelve months, with one, three, and six months being the most common
tenors referenced in LIBOR-indexed derivatives and transactions."
Under the rules that governed LIBOR submissions at the time, each
panel bank was to independently submit an interest rate based upon its
own knowledge of market conditions and its ability to borrow. The
submissions were to remain confidential until after LIBOR was
computed and published, at which point all sixteen individual
submissions would be published with the final daily rate." Although the
various LEBOR interest rates were set jointly, the banks were horizontal
competitors in selling and buying derivatives and other financial
instruments that were premised, to some extent, on LIBOR." As a result,
the benchmark interest rate-rigging conspiracies and schemes by banks

interest-rate swaps to mortgages and student loans.").
12. MONETARY & EcoN. DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE:
OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2015, at 3 (2016), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_

hyl605.pdf.
13. Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 764.
14. The U.S. dollar LIBOR having a panel of sixteen banks. Id. at 765.
15. See In re RP Martin Holdings Ltd., CFTC No. 14-16, 2014 WL 2003211, at *3 (May 15,
2014).
16. Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 765-66. From 1986 to February 1, 2014, LIBOR was set under the
auspices of the British Bankers' Association ("BBA") a private trade association for the financial-

services sector in the United Kingdom. See id at 765; In re RP Martin Holdings, 2014 WL
2003211, at *3 n.3.
17. Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 766.
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violated U.S. antitrust laws through "the warping of market factors
affecting the prices for LIBOR-based financial instruments."' 8
From approximately 2005 to 2012, employees at several of the
world's largest banks and interdealer brokers conspired internally, with
their co-workers, and externally, with employees at competing banks
and interdealer brokers, to rig LIBOR and other benchmark interest rates
of various tenors and currencies by coordinating their submissions to
panels that set those rates." The employees communicated through
emails, electronic instant messages, and telephone calls, with the
electronic communications containing many abbreviations, trader jargon,
misspellings, grammatical errors, varying degrees of capitalization, and,
in some cases, expletives.2 0 Derivatives traders routinely asked LIBOR
submitters at their own banks and competing banks to change the
interest rates that would be submitted to LIBOR-setting panels.21 The
traders would seek to fix LIBOR rates and other benchmarks when they
had derivatives trading positions that were scheduled to reset and whose
payment amounts were tied to the benchmarks.22 Additionally, during
the financial crisis, some bank LIBOR submitters artificially lowered
LIBOR rates out of fear that submitting high rates would indicate
the banks that employed them could not borrow unsecured funds
from other banks at low interest rates and, therefore, were on shaky
financial footing.2 3
One of the most active conspirators in rigging LIBOR and related
benchmark interest rates was Tom A.W. Hayes, who was the senior yen
trader for the Tokyo office of the Swiss bank, UBS AG ("UBS"), and
later for Citibank, during much of the relevant time period.24 Hayes is
18. Id. at 776.
19. See DAVID Hou & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT
No. 667, LIBOR: ORIGINS, ECONOMICS, CRISIS, SCANDAL, AND REFORM 6-10 (2014), https://www.

newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staffreports/sr667.pdf; Ben Protess & Mark Scott,
Guilty Plea andBig Finefor Bank in Rate Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2013, at Bl.
20. See Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Banks Admit Scheme to Rig Currency Price, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2015, at Al; Lorcan Roche Kelly & Suzi Ring, The Most Cringeworthy Chat
Messages from the Deutsche Bank Libor Transcripts, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2015, 9:39 AM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0 4 -23/the-most-cringeworthy-chat-messages-fromthe-deutsche-bank-libor-transcripts.
21. Brooke Masters, ErrantBanks Perfect the Waiting Game, FIN. TIMES (May 27, 2016),
https://next.ft.com/content/6f786722-2400-1le6-aa98-dbleOlfabcOc.
22. See, e.g., In re ICAP Eur. Ltd., CFTC No. 13-38, 2013 WL 5409329, at *16-18, *33-34
(Sept. 25, 2013).
23.

Hou & SKEIE, supranote 19, at 6.

24. In the CFTC settlements with UBS, Citibank, and other entities, Hayes is not named but
simply referred to as the "Senior Yen Trader" at UBS or Citibank depending on the period
referenced. See, e.g., In re UBS AG, CFTC No. 13-09, 2012 WL 6642376, at *12 (Dec. 19, 2012).
Hayes's identity was revealed, however, during his criminal trial and in news reports on the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss2/12
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currently serving an eleven-year prison sentence in the United Kingdom
for rigging benchmark interest rates during his time at UBS and
Citibank. 25 Examples of electronic conversations that Hayes had with
employees at interdealer brokers and competing banks, which were
made public in settlements between government authorities and UBS,
Citibank, and other financial institutions, illustrate how the bank and
interdealer broker employees colluded to rig benchmark interest rates.
For example, on January 19, 2007, Hayes communicated with a trader at
a competitor bank: "hi..., bit cheeky but if you know who sets your
libors and you aren't the other way I have some absolutely massive
[three-month LIBOR] fixes... . Anytime i [sic] can return the favour let
26
me know as the guys here arepretty accommodatingto me." The trader
27
at the competitor bank responded: "I will try my best." On April 20,
2007, Hayes asked a trader at a competitor bank: "i [sic] know i [sic]
only talk to you when i [sic] need something but if you could ask your
guys to keep [the three-month LIBOR] low wd [sic] be massive help as
long as it doesn't interfere with your stuff.

.

. mate did you manage to

28

spk [sic] to your cash boys?" The other trader responded to Hayes:
"yes u [sic] owe me. .. ."29 Then, on June 29, 2007, Hayes contacted the
same trader: "if you could go high from monday [sic] for next week that
wld be graet [sic] as i [sic] have 1.5 [trillion] notionalfixings in [sixmonth LIBOR] next week! ie [sic] 75 [million Japanese yen] a [basis]
32
1
point."30 The trader replied: "wow ok then."" As one last example, on
benchmark interest rate-rigging scandal. See, e.g., David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, Clubby
London Trading Scene Fostered Libor Rate-Fixing Scandal, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2013, 7:37
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323296504578396670651342096; Lindsay
Fortado, Libor Trader Tom Hayes Denied Appeal, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), https://next.ft.com/
Liam Vaughan,
content/d4b7b30e-e52b-11e5-bc31-138df2ae9ee6#myft:notification:daily-email;
Don't 'Put It in Writing,' Hayes Told Colleague at Citigroup, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3, 2015,

8:49 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-03/don-t-put-it-in-writing-hayes-toldcolleague-at-citigroup.
25. Masters, supra note 21.
26. In re UBSAG, 2012 WL 6642376, at *16.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *17.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Indeed, this Article only provides a small sampling of the types of inappropriate chat
messages, emails, and recorded conversations by bank and interdealer broker employees in
connection with the benchmark rate-rigging scandals. For further examples of such
communications, see the various settlement agreements between the CFTC and banks infra
notes 489-504 and accompanying text; and see also ERIN ARVEDLUND, OPEN SECRET: THE
GLOBAL BANKING CONSPIRACY THAT SWINDLED INVESTORS OUT OF BILLIONS 36-45 (2014); and
BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS

250-52 (2015).
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September 18, 2008, Hayes shared a communication with a Deutsche
Bank trader, who also was the yen LIBOR submitter, "you got any ax on
[six-month yen LIBOR] fix tonight?"33 The Deutsche Bank tradersubmitter responded, "absolutely none but I can help."34 Hayes asked,
"can you set low as a favor for me?"3 5 The trader-submitter answered,
"done," to which Hayes said, "i'll [sic] return favour when i [sic] can
just ask."36
The misconduct was not limited to Hayes. In an electronic chat on
March 22, 2005, a Deutsche Bank U.S. dollar LIBOR submitter
explained how he would be willing to manipulate benchmark interest
rates for a trader in New York:
[I]f you need something in particular in the libors i.e. you have an
interest in a high or a low fix let me know and there's a high chance
i'll [sic] be able to go in a different level. Just give me a shout the day
before or send an email from your blackberry first thing.
One trader with the Royal Bank of Scotland summed up the situation as
such: "It's just amazing how Libor fixing can make you that much
money . .. it's a cartel now in London."38 In another instant message
conversation, a LEBOR submitter at the Royal Bank of Scotland agreed
to accommodate an internal request for lower LIBOR submissions and
then compared himself to "a whores [sic] drawers" because he moved
his LIBOR submissions up and down depending on the LIBOR rate
requests that he received.39
Although many of the participants of the benchmark rate-rigging
schemes worked for global systemically important banks, or their
affiliates, two London-based interdealer brokers, ICAP Europe Limited
("ICAP") and RP Martin Holdings Limited ("RP Martin"), played
pivotal roles in facilitating the benchmark rate-rigging cartels.40
Interdealer brokers did not sit on the panels that determine benchmark

33. In re Deutsche Bank AG, CFTC No. 15-20, 2015 WL 1874880, at *16 (Apr. 23, 2015).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Deutsche Bank's London Subsidiary Agrees to Plead
Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-plead-guilty-connection-long-runningmanipulation.

38. Ben McLannahan, US Court Opens Doorover Libor Claims, FIN. TIMES (May 23, 2016),
https://next.ft.com/content/874120ce-2135-11 e6-aa98-dble01fabc0c.
39. Dealbook, The Things Traders Say, R.B.S. Edition, N.Y. TtIEs (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:32 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/the-things-traders-say-r-b-s-edition/?_r-0.
40. See In re RP Martin Holdings Ltd., CFTC No. 14-16, 2014 WL 2003211, at *4-5 (May
15, 2014); In re ICAP Eur. Ltd., CFTC No. 13-38, 2013 WL 5409329, at *5-8 (Sept. 25, 2013).
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interest rates, but they interacted with employees at different banks on a
daily basis in their capacity as interbank intermediaries, that assist banks
in finding buyers and sellers for financial products at other investment
banks or dealers, which made them ideal conduits for market
information for their bank clients.4 1 As a result, interdealer brokers such
as ICAP and RP Martin were perfectly situated to help their favored
bank clients manipulate benchmark interest rates by asking LIBOR-rate
submitters at other panel banks to move their benchmark interest rate
submissions up, down, or hold them steady.42 To benefit the derivatives
trading positions of Hayes, who was one of RP Martin's most important
clients, RP Martin brokers encouraged submitters on panel banks to
skew their yen LIBOR submissions in exchange for beer, sandwiches,
and even entertainment in Las Vegas. 43 Hayes gained the loyalty and
cooperation of RP Martin brokers by making payments to them via
"wash trades" (illegal under both U.S. securities and derivatives laws) 44
in which Hayes would be the opposing counterparty on identical trades
with others that resulted in a financial nullity for the counterparties but
that generated significant commissions for RP Martin yen brokers.45
The RP Martin brokers and Hayes openly discussed payoffs in the
form of commissions from wash trades in exchange for the RP Martin
brokers helping Hayes manipulate LIBOR by influencing the LIBOR
submissions of other banks.46 In one recorded telephone call on
September 18, 2008, Hayes promised to pay an RP Martin broker with
wash trades commissions worth $50,000, or even $100,000, if the RP
47
Martin broker helped to keep the six-month yen LIBOR low.
Specifically, Hayes said:
Mate, right, listen. I don't care right just get me any f*cking trade
which pays you basically today, mate. If if [sic] you keep [six-month
41. Kara Scannell et al., Court PapersReveal Libor Broker Called Banks 'Sheep,' FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Sept. 26, 2013, at 19; Stafford et al., supra note 10; Philip Stafford, Q&A: Interdealer
Brokers, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/038943a6-25bb-Ile3-8ef600144feab7de.
42. In re RP Martin Holdings, 2014 WL 2003211, at *2, *18; James Moore& Oliver Wright,
'Let's Discuss Kickbacks over Lunch': Tory Donor's Firm Fined £55m over Libor Fixing,
INDEPENDENT (UK) (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/letsdiscuss-kickbacks-over-lunch-tory-donors-firm-fined-55m-over-libor-fixing-8839198.html.
43. See Caroline Binham & Gina Chon, RP Martin Fined$2.3m in Libor Probe, FIN. TIMES
(May 15, 2014), https://next.ft.com/content/e6aa5f8c-dc2a- 1e3-a33d-00144feabdcO.
44. See Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price
of Futures Contracts?Policing Marketsfor Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67
FLA. L. REv. 221, 265-68 (2015).
45. In re RP Martin Holdings, 2014 WL 2003211, at *12-13.
46. Id.
47. Id. at**12.
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LIBOR] unchanged today, yeah ... I will f*cking do one humongous
deal with you. All right? . . . Like a 50,000 buck deal, whatever. . . I
need you to keep it as low as possible. All right? If you do that . .. I'll
pay you, you know, $50,000, $100,000, whatever it whatever [sic] you
48
want. All right?"

After receiving that call on September 18, 2008, from Hayes, the RP
Martin yen broker contacted a yen LIBOR submitter at another bank and
asked him to lower his yen LTBOR submission for the day: "ifyou could
get [six-month yen LIBOR submission] a little lower today, I've got, um,
someone that's going to do a huge trade with me today if the if the [sic]
[six-month yen LIBOR] don't [sic] go up too much."49 Needless to say,
this was not how yen LIBOR submissions were supposed to be
determined. As this Article discusses, above, a bank's yen LIBOR
submission was supposed to represent the rate at which the bank could
borrow unsecured funds in yen in the interbank market.
Hayes also was an important client of the interdealer broker ICAP,
and brokers at ICAP likewise helped Hayes collude with other banks to
rig benchmark interest rates. ICAP brokers communicated on a daily
basis with the banks that participated in the yen L1BOR panel and
offered to buy LIBOR submitters at banks Indian curries, champagne,
and steak in exchange for help rigging yen-denominated benchmark
interest rates for the benefit of Hayes's trading positions. 0 For example,
on October 23, 2006, one ICAP broker told another broker: "[I]f
possible keep [three-month LIBOR] the same and get [six-month
LIBOR] as high as you can. My guy has an enormous fix on Wednesday
in [six-month LIBOR] and will want it as high as possible." One yen
broker at ICAP, who named himself, "Lord Libor," told his supervisor
that he should be compensated for help rigging LIBOR, saying, "How
about some form of performance bonus per quarter from your .. . bonus
pool to me for the libor service." 52 The supervisor suggested that he take
his subordinate to lunch: "As for kickbacks etc., we can discuss that at

48. Id.
49. Id. at**13.

50. See In re ICAP Eur. Ltd., CFTC No. 13-38, 2013 WL 5409329, at *9-11 (Sept. 25, 2013)
(describing email exchanges between Hayes, referred to as "Senior Yen Trader," and other brokers
at the bank); ICAP Libor Rigging Scandal Emails: Curry or Ferrari, M'Lord?, TELEGRAPH

(U.K.) (Sept. 25, 2013, 4:28 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/libor-scandal/10334143/
ICAP-Libor-rigging-scandal-emails-Curry-or-Ferrari-Mlord.html. ICAP brokers also helped rig
benchmark interest rates for traders at other banks, although Hayes was clearly one of their most
important clients during the relevant time. In re ICAP Eur. Ltd., 2013 WL 5409329, at * 12-13.
51. Lina Saigol & Gina Chon, Libor: The Email Trail, FIN. TIMEs (Sept. 25, 2013), https://
www.ft.com/content/cefd67a0-25df-1 1 e3-aee8-00144feab7de.
52. In reICAPEur. Ltd., 2013 WL 5409329, at *16-17.
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lunch and I will speak to [Hayes, the Senior Yen Trader at UBS] about it
next time when he comes up for a chat." 53 Lord Libor's demands appear
to have been met, as later he began receiving regular quarterly payments
of more than E5000.54 As the examples have shown, ICAP brokers
would, inter alia, ask employees at LIBOR panel banks-either LIBOR
submitters or those who knew the LIBOR submitters-to skew their rate
submissions." In short, ICAP brokers frequently coordinated with
derivatives traders at yen LIBOR panel banks to manipulate the official
yen LIBOR fixings for certain tenors by getting panel banks to make yen
LIBOR submissions at rates that would benefit the positions of
derivatives traders who, like Hayes, were ICAP's clients. 6 During the
relevant time, ICAP received two million euros in brokerage fees from
Hayes." By colluding with other banks and interdealer brokers to fix the
benchmark interest rates that served as components of the prices of
interest rate swaps and other derivatives, the competitor banks and their
interdealer broker accomplices had engaged in a horizontal price-fixing
cartel.s Such cartels are strictly prohibited under U.S. antitrust laws.59
Cartels involving some of the world's largest banks also are
accused of stifling competition in the market for credit default swapswhich are swaps "whose payoffs are derived from the occurrence or
non-occurrence of a 'credit event' of some reference entity or entities,
such as the bankruptcy of an identified corporation" 60-and of rigging

53.
54.

Id. at**17.
Kara Scannell et al., Court Papers Tell How 'Lord Libor' Wanted More, FIN. TIMES

&

(Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.ft.com/contentabd442fO-2600-1 1e3-8ef6-00144feab7de.
55. In reICAPEur. Ltd., 2013 WL 5409329, at *12-14, *33-34.
56. Id. at *34.
57. Caroline Binham et al., 'LordLibor' Trio Put ICAP at Heart of Rate-Rigging Scandal,
FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 2013, at 1.
58. Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 771 (2d Cir. 2016) ("LIBOR forms a
component of the return from various LBOR-denominated financial instruments, and the fixing of
a component of price violates the antitrust laws."); see Foster, supra note 11, at 102 ("LIBOR
manipulation determines price by collusive, nonfree market agreements-it is horizontal price
fixing."); Sharon E. Foster, LIBOR Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 DEPAUL Bus.
COM. L.J. 291, 292 (2013).
59. See 1 JULIAN 0. voN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST COUNSELING AND LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES § 7.04[1] (rev. ed. 2016) ("Agreements among competitors to fix prices are illegal per
se regardless of whether the set price is a maximum or minimum, a stabilized price, an element of
price, a method of pricing, a price to bid, a price set by a settlement agreement, a joint selling
arrangement, or a rate-making agreement."); see also Simon Twigden et al., LIBOR Claims: A
Silver Bullet or a Nuclear Assault?, 7 DIsP. RESOL. INT'L 55, 59 (2013) ("Cartels are considered the

most egregious form of illegal conduct under competition law."). Additionally, if competition as to
one component of a price is removed by collusive conduct, this is viewed as improperly
"extinguishing one form of competition among the sellers." Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (per curiam).
60.

Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives:A Twenty-First Century Understanding,43 LOY. U. CHI.
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another interest rate benchmark, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA") fix (collectively "ISDAfix"),6 as well as
benchmarks for foreign exchange ("forex") rates62 and the price7s of gold
and silver.6 3 Government authorities across the globe have brought civil
and criminal actions against the perpetrators of these schemes, generally
invoking antifraud and antitrust statutes.6 4
The first government regulator to investigate and pursue financial
entities that were rigging benchmark rates was the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC"),65 the U.S. regulator of the markets for
futures, swaps, and other derivatives pursuant to the Commodity
Exchange Act ("CEA").6 6 The CFTC settled the first LIBOR benchmark
rate-rigging case with Barclays in 2012.67 At the time of this writing,
nine financial entities have reached settlements with the CFTC for
rigging LIBOR and related benchmark interest rates, and six have settled
with the CFTC for rigging forex benchmark rates.68 To be sure, British,
Swiss, Japanese, and European Union authorities, not to mention the
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), have also reached settlements with
banks and other financial entities for rigging these benchmarks,6 9 but
the CFTC has been at the forefront of efforts to investigate and

L.J. 1, 22 (2011).
61. See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 175 F. Supp. 3d 44, 51-52
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).
62. See, e.g., In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 58688 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Corkery & Protess, supranote 20; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Five Major
Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fivemajor-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas.
63. See Jonathan Stempel, Deutsche Bank Settles U.S. Gold, Silver Price-FixingLitigation,

REUTERS (U.K.) (Apr. 14, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-deutsche-bank-lawsuitmetals-idUKKCN0XB2B8.
64. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 62.
65. The CFTC is the equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), but it
regulates the markets for futures, options on futures, commodity options, swaps, and certain other
derivatives. See generally 2 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES

REGULATION § 4.03 (3d ed. 2004). Congress created the CFTC under the appropriately named
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). See 135 CONG. REc. 20350-51 (1989) (statement of Rep.
Smith). Like the SEC, the CFTC can bring civil enforcement actions against those who violate the
CEA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Enforcement: Office of the Director,
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Enforcement/

OfficeofDirectorEnforcement (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
66. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2012)).
67. See In re Barclays PLC, CFTC No. 12-25, 2012 WL 2500330, at *26-36 (June 27, 2012).
68. See infra Tables 1-2.
69.

Caroline Binham & Alex Barker, Euribor Fines Reveal Vital Pieces to Scandal's Puzzle,

FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2013), https://next.ft.com/content/4bd70dle-5ce8-11e3-a558-00144feabdcO.
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civilly prosecute misconduct involving benchmarks that serve as
components of the prices of derivatives.
The existence of rampant benchmark rigging has caused authorities
and commentators to consider if the existing laws and regulations need
to be changed, or new paradigms considered, to better prevent and
combat benchmark rate-rigging and other cartel-like, anticompetitive
conduct in the financial markets.70 At present, the primary civil
enforcement tools that the CEA gives the CFTC include provisions
granting the agency broad authority to bring enforcement actions against
fraud-based wrongdoing and derivatives market price manipulation.7 1
Although the cartels came to light several years after the U.S. Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank Act"), an overlooked
provision of that Act could be an effective tool to address the problem of
anticompetitive conduct that affects the prices of swaps and other
derivatives. Specifically, Congress amended the CEA to add section
4s(j)(6), labeled "Antitrust Considerations," which prohibits swap
dealers 72 and major swap participants 73 (collectively "swap entities")
from "adopt[ing] any process or tak[ing] any action that results
in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or impos[ing] any material
anticompetitive burden on trading or clearing." The purpose of this
Article is to analyze existing civil enforcement action provisions in the
CEA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, to determine whether
70.
(2015).
71.

See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 250-71
See infra Part V.

72. See 7 U.S.C. § la(49)(A) (2012) (defining the term "swap dealer" as "any person who (i)
holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in swaps; (iii) regularly enters into swaps
with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account; or (iv) engages in any
activity causing the person to be commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in
swaps"). There are currently 105 business entities that are provisionally registered as swap dealers.
See Swap Dealer (SD) and Major Swap Participant (MSP) Directory, NAT'L FUTURES ASS'N,

https://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa-registration/NFA-directories.HTML (follow "Swap Dealer (SD)
and Major Swap Participant (MSP) Directory" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). Included on
the list of registered swap dealers are many business entities affiliated with the world's largest
global banks, including Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P.
Morgan, and Morgan Stanley. Id.
73. See 7 U.S.C. § la(33)(A) (defining the term "major swap participant" as including "any
person who is not a swap dealer," but who either "maintains a substantial position in swaps for any

of the major swap categories as determined by the [CFTC]" or "whose outstanding swaps create
substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of

the United States banking system or financial markets"). As a general matter, major swap
participants include "entities like the hedge fund [Long Term Capital Management] and AIG's
financial products subsidiary." 156 CONG. REc. S5922 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (written statement
of Sen. Lincoln). At one point they were two provisionally registered major swap participants, but

both withdrew their registration when they fell below the minimum swaps trading threshold to
require registration.
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these statutory and regulatory provisions are likely to be an effective
means to combat anticompetitive conduct in the markets for swaps and
other derivatives. To properly evaluate the status quo, one must
scrutinize section 4s(j)(6), and the (more or less) identically-worded
which was promulgated to implement
CFTC Regulation 23.607,
section 4s(j)(6), as well as the CEA's existing enforcement authority. To
be clear, Regulation 23.607 did not take effect until June 14, 2012, and
therefore was not an available enforcement tool for the CFTC when
most of the conduct in the benchmark rate-rigging scandals took place.
Indeed, the CFTC has not yet, at the time of this writing, brought an
enforcement action under section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607. But in
deciding how best to protect the financial markets from such schemes in
the future, one must determine whether section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation
23.607 are likely to help the CFTC to address anticompetitive conduct in
the markets for derivatives or whether the CFTC needs additional, or
different, tools to do so. This analysis inevitably must be conducted
with an eye toward what has been revealed about the benchmark raterigging cartels and other recent examples of anticompetitive conduct
by derivatives dealers and traders. Given the concentrated, even
oligopolistic nature of some markets for derivatives,7 6 the possibility that
a handful of dominant derivatives market participants could collude to
harm competition (or attempt to harm competition) in the future is real.
Thus, analyzing the tools that Congress has given the CFTC that can be
used to combat anticompetitive conduct is an important endeavor.
At first glance, the antitrust considerations in section 4s(j)(6) and
Regulation 23.607 seem to hold promise because their language appears
broader than that found in existing antitrust law prohibitions. For
example, section 4s(j)(6) explicitly prohibits the imposition of material
anticompetitive burdens,77 which is a phrase that is not used in existing
antitrust law, but which appears to even forbid anticompetitive conduct
that would not reach the level of creating unreasonable restraints of trade
or other traditional antitrust harms. Unfortunately, however, section
4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607 only apply to the 100 or so business
organizations that are CFTC-regulated swap entities.7 ' As a result,
section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607 cannot be used to punish
wrongdoing by natural persons who are employees of swap entities,
74.
75.
Rules, 77
76.
77.
78.

17 C.F.R. § 23.607 (2016).
See Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties
Fed. Reg. 20,128 (Apr. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23).
See infra Part 1H.A.
See 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)(6) (2012).
See infra Part VI.C.
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affiliates of swap entities that are not themselves swap entities, and other
independent business organizations and individuals that are not CFTCregulated swap entities, such as interdealer brokers. These are significant
gaps. Because the benchmark-rigging scandals involved business
organizations and natural persons that were not CFTC-regulated swap
entities, section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607 would not have been
entirely effective at combatting the benchmark-rigging cartels if they
had been in effect when the relevant conduct occurred.
In addition, further analysis reveals that antifraud and
antimanipulation claims are imperfect vehicles with which to combat
anticompetitive conduct because both require proof of something that is
not necessary for proving most traditional antitrust causes of action. 9
Antifraud claims require proof of a misrepresentation and price
manipulation claims require proof that the perpetrator acted with the
specific intent to create an artificial price.s But one can harm
competition (or engage in conduct with such a propensity) without
making misrepresentations, and most antitrust causes of action do not
focus on intent, but on the effects of the allegedly anticompetitive
conduct on the relevant market. While the specific facts of the
benchmark rate-rigging cases have been amenable to civil enforcement
under antifraud and antimanipulation legal theories, there is no guarantee
that future anticompetitive schemes in the markets for derivatives will
fall within the ambit of those two types of causes of action. Therefore,
because fraud-based and price manipulation claims most probably
cannot reach all types of misdeeds that are prohibited by the antitrust
laws, the availability of a broad antitrust cause of action would be a
useful expansion of the CFTC's existing enforcement regime.
Accordingly, the CFTC would benefit from having the scope of
section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607 expanded to reach all personswithout regard to whether they are swap entities-who cause, or attempt
to cause, unreasonable restraints of trade or material anticompetitive
burdens in the markets for derivatives. Because it is unlikely in the
current political climate that Congress will act to expand a Dodd-Frank
Act provision such as section 4s(j)(6), t the CFTC should use its existing
authority to promulgate a regulation that would expand the reach of the
79.

See infra Part VIL.D.

80.
81.

See infra notes 459-63 and accompanying text.
See Peter Schroeder, GOP Chairman: Banks Are Facing 'Regulatory Waterboarding,'

HILL (Mar. 15, 2016, 11:57 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/273044-hensarling-vows-doddfrank-replacement (explaining that House Financial Services Committee Chair Jeb Hensarling
"accused the Obama administration of engaging in 'regulatory waterboarding' when it comes to
monitoring banks" when he stated, "I will not rest until Dodd-Frank is ripped out by its roots and
tossed on the trash heap of history").
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antitrust considerations in Regulation 23.607 to cover any person who
engaged in conduct that harmed competition (or had the propensity to do
so) in the markets for derivatives. Doing so would be an incremental,
structural improvement in the CFTC's existing enforcement regime.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the CEA and the
regulations promulgated thereunder, with an emphasis on the explicit
references to antitrust principles and considerations in the CEA and
CFTC Regulations.82 Part III provides a brief overview of U.S. antitrust
laws and jurisprudence, with an emphasis on section 1 of the Sherman
Act of 1890.83 Part III also discusses the applicability of antitrust law in
addressing concerns related to the oversight of systemically important
banks, many of which are CFTC-regulated swap dealers; additionally,
Part IV discusses some antitrust laws and systematically important
banks. 84 Part V describes the two primary existing types of enforcement
actions that the CFTC can bring to combat misconduct in the markets for
swaps and derivatives: fraud-based causes of action and price
manipulation claims." Part VI analyzes the language of section 4s(j)(6)
and its implementing rule, CFTC Regulation 23.607.86 Part VII explains
why the status quo is imperfect and why section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation
23.607 are insufficient to prevent conduct that harms competition (or has
the propensity to harm competition) in the swaps market." Part VII
argues, inter alia, that the CFTC's existing enforcement arsenalantifraud and price manipulation claims, supplemented with section
4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607-is too narrow. As mentioned, antifraud
and price manipulation claims are unlikely to reach all antitrust harms,
and because Regulation 23.607 only applies to swap entities, many
categories of market participants, such as brokers, are beyond the reach
of Regulation 23.607.
The Article concludes that Regulation 23.607 as currently written
likely will be an ineffective tool to combat anticompetitive behavior in
the markets for derivatives and that the CFTC should expand the reach
of the CEA's antitrust considerations by promulgating a regulation that
broadly prohibits any person from taking any action that results in
unreasonable restraints of trade or imposes material anticompetitive
burdens on the derivative markets." This is the first article to thoroughly

82.
83.
84.

See infra Part H.
See infra Part IIl.
See infra Parts llI-IV.

85.
86.

See infra PartV.
See infra Part VI.

87.

See infra Part VI.

88.

See infra PartVM.
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scrutinize the text of the Dodd-Frank Act's antitrust considerations for
swap entities and the first article to argue for a regulation that would
provide the CFTC with broad civil enforcement authority pursuant to the
CEA's antitrust considerations.
II.

ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS IN THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT

Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which former President
Obama signed on July 21, 2010, to address shortcomings in the existing
financial regulatory framework that had become apparent during the
financial crisis, including, but not limited to, the lack of regulatory
oversight for the OTC derivatives markets.89 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank
Act90 amended the CEA,91 which is the law that regulates futures,
options on futures, commodity options, and certain other derivatives, to
establish a comprehensive new regulatory framework for swaps and
security-based swaps.92 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC received
authority to regulate swaps, 93 and the SEC received regulatory authority
over security-based swaps. 94 "Generally, swaps are derivative financial
products that have underlying assets that, inter alia, are commodities,
interest rates, government securities, and broad-based security
indices." 95 Security-based swaps, on the other hand, are based on single
securities, loans and reference assets, or narrow-based security indices.96
89. See 156 CONG. REC. S5820 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley) ("I rise
to address the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill and to share the reasons it makes a great deal of
sense to restore the lane markers and traffic signals to our financial system-lane markers and
traffic signals that were ripped away carelessly, thoughtlessly over the course of a decade and led to
the economic house of cards that melted down last year, doing enormous damage to America's
working families... . What really happened? It can be summed up in two words: irresponsible
deregulation."); see also 156 CONG. REc. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Stabenow).
90. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1641 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
91. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2012)).
92. See Lynch, supranote 60, at 13 n.48; Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-CounterDerivatives:A
New Era ofFinancialRegulation, 17 LAW& BUS. REV. Am. 279, 281-82 (2011).
93. See CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTUREs TRADING COMM'N, http://www.
cftc.gov/consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/index.htm (providing the definition of a
"swap") (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
94. See Sharma, supra note 92, at 282; CFTC Glossary, supra note 93 (providing the
definition of a "security-based swap").
95. Gregory Scopino, Regulating Fairness: The Dodd-FrankAct's FairDealingRequirement
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,93 NEB. L. REV. 31, 40 (2014).
96. See 7 U.S.C. § la(35)(A) (defining a "narrow-based security index" as, inter alia, one that
consists of nine or fewer securities). The term, "broad-based security index," is not defined in the
CEA, but CFTC Regulation 41.1(c) defines it as any group or index of securities that is not narrow-
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Congress created the CFTC in 1974,97 modeling the agency after the
SEC 98 and granting the new agency broad rulemaking authority. 99
As part of its comprehensive regulatory scheme for swaps
transactions under the CEA, the Dodd-Frank Act also created two new
types of regulated intermediaries; namely, the aforementioned swap
entities (for example, swap dealers and major swap participants).10 0
Because there are no provisionally registered major swap participants,
discussion concerning the CFTC Regulations governing these two
newly-created categories of intermediaries will focus on swap dealers.
The vast majority of provisionally registered swap dealers are banks.101
Accordingly, the CFTC's Dodd-Frank Act mandated regulations for
swap dealers are modeled on bank regulations. 102 More precisely, swap
dealers are, generally speaking, large banks or bank affiliates, as the
swap dealer registration requirement does not kick in until an entity
engages in at least $8 billion notional in swaps in one year.103 The
based. 17 C.F.R.

§ 41.1(c)

(2013); see also Arthur W.S. Duff& David Zaring, New Paradigms and

FamiliarTools in the New Derivatives Regulation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 677, 689 (2013) ("Title

VII [of the Dodd-Frank Act] splits oversight of the derivatives market between the CFTC and SEC,
although the division is rather uneven-the CFTC's purview reaches the broader swath of current
and future products. The SEC has been given responsibility over 'security-based swaps,' which
include instruments that reference nine or fewer securities. All other swaps are subject to CFTC
oversight." (footnotes omitted)); NORA M. JORDAN ET AL., ADVISING PRIVATE FUNDS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REPRESENTING HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS AND THEIR

ADVISERS

§ 4:6

(2016-2017 ed. 2016) ("The Dodd-Frank Act amended the Commodity Exchange

Act to include an expansive definition of the term "swap.").
97. History of the CFTC: CFTC History in the 1970s, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING

COMM'N, http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_1970s (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
98.

Michael S. Sackheim, Administrative Enforcement of the Federal Commodities Laws by

the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 445, 445 (1982) (describing
the CFTC as "an independent federal regulatory agency modeled in the image of the [SEC]").
99. See 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5).
100. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,638, 80,638-39 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 23, 155) (stating that Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act "to reduce risk" by, inter
alia, "[p]roviding for the registration and comprehensive regulation of swap dealers and major swap

participants").

The Dodd-Frank Act also created two SEC-regulated types

intermediaries-"security-based

of financial

swap dealers" and "major security-based swap participants."

However, analysis of SEC regulation of security-based swap entities is beyond the scope of this
Article.
101. See Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties
Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 20,128, 20,195 & n.193 (Apr. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3,
23).
102. See id. at 20,129 ("[T]he [CFTC] observes that many of its final regulations are modeled
on prudential regulations and supervision. Thus the two regimes would be broadly consistent.").
103. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg)(4) (2016). The trigger amount is supposed to decline to $3 billion in
December 2017. There is some political opposition to allowing that to happen, however. In
December of 2015, "Congress passed non-binding instructions to the [CFTC directing the agency
to] propose a rule maintaining the swap dealer threshold at $8 billion a year or higher." Neil Roland,
Congress Directs CFTC to Keep $8 Billion Swap Dealer Threshold Rather Than Let It Fall, MLEX
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$8 billion notional in swaps threshold requirement for being considered
a swap dealer may very well be a large part of why no individuals have
registered as swap dealers.'0
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the CEA, swap
entities, just like other categories of market participants (such as
commodity trading advisors and commodity pool operators),os must
register with the CFTC." The CFTC has delegated administration of its
registration function to the National Futures Association ("NFA")-the
self-regulatory organization ("SRO") for the U.S. derivatives industry
that oversees the registration of intermediaries in the markets for
derivatives. 107 One difference between swap entities and other categories
of CFTC-regulated intermediaries is that the CEA does not require the
associated persons ("APs")-that is, derivatives salespeople and the
supervisors of salespeople t '-of swap entities to register. 109 Some of
the banks (or their affiliates) that have settled lawsuits with U.S. and
foreign authorities for manipulating benchmark interest rates or forex
benchmark rates also are provisionally registered with the CFTC as
swap dealers. 1 0
With the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress expressly sought to subject the
behavior of swap entities to an interwoven network of internal and
external business conduct standards and rules.111 For example, section
731 of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 4s to the CEA, which

(Jan. 28, 2016), http://mlexmarketinsight.com.
104. See Swap Dealer (SD) and Major Swap Participant(MSP) Directory, supra note 72. The

word, "person," for purposes of the CEA and CFTC Regulations includes individuals and business
entities. See 7 U.S.C. § la(38); 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(u). Technically, because a swap dealer is defined as
"any person" that meets certain requirements (including the requirement of engaging in at least $8

billion notional in swaps), an individual could, theoretically, fall within the ambit of the swap dealer
definition, but that has not happened thus far.

105. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6(k), (m).
106. Id. § 6s(a)(1).
107. See Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2613, 2619
(Jan. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23, 170) ("[T]he [CFTC] intends to delegate its
full registration authority under the CEA and its regulations to NFA with respect to applicants for
registration, and registrants, as [a swap dealer or major swap participant]."); Performance of
Registration Functions by National Futures Association with Respect to Swap Dealers and Major

Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2708, 2709 (Jan. 19, 2012) (providing a CFTC Notice and Order
"authorizing NFA . .. to perform the full range of registration functions under the CEA and the

[CFTC's] regulations with regard to [Swap Dealer]s and [Major Swap Participant]s" (footnote
omitted)).
108. See 7 U.S.C. § la(4)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(aa).
109. Dual and Multiple Associations of Persons Associated with Swap Dealers, Major Swap
Participants and Other Commission Registrants, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,788, 20,788 (Apr. 8, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 3, 23).
110. See infra Table 10.
111. Scopino, supranote 95, at 47.
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describes the business conduct standards for swap entities.112 The DoddFrank Act's business conduct standards for swap dealers include, inter
alia, a prohibition on fraud and manipulation,1 13 a requirement to
disclose to counterparties "information about the material risks and
characteristics of [swaps]," 114 and a duty "to communicate in a fair and
balanced manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith." 15
Section 4s(j) requires swap entities to comply with specific, enumerated
duties.116 For example, swap entities must monitor their trading in swaps
to prevent violations of applicable position limits. 1 Likewise, swap
entities must "establish robust and professional risk management
systems.""' On April 3, 2012, the CFTC published in the Federal
Register final regulations for Part 23 of the CFTC's Regulations to
implement, inter alia, the Internal Business Conduct Standards mandated
by section 4s(f), (g), and (j) of the CEA. 119
Numerous provisions in the CEA, including some that were added
to the statute by the Dodd-Frank Act, explicitly refer to antitrust law and
principles. Section 3(b) of the CEA1 20 states that it is the purpose of the
CEA, inter alia, "to promote responsible innovation and fair competition
among boards of trade, other markets and market participants."1 2 1
Section 15(b) of the CEA states as follows:
The [CFTC] shall take into consideration the public interest to be
protected by the antitrust laws and endeavor to take the least
anticompetitive means of achieving the objectives of this chapter, as
112. See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734 (Feb. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 4, 23).
113. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1)(A).
114. Id § 6s(h)(3)(B)(i).
115. Id. § 6s(h)(3)(C); Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants with Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9805. For an in-depth discussion of the fair dealing
rule, see Scopino, supranote 95.
116. As mentioned previously, the Dodd-Frank Act also amended the securities laws to impose
similar duties on security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap participants. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(j)(6) (2012) (listing antitrust considerations for security-based swap entities).
But, analysis of the regulation of security-based swap entities is beyond the scope of this Article.
The anticompetitive conduct described in the beginning of this Article was done by swap dealers
and their accomplices (as opposed to security-based swap dealers) and primarily affected the
markets for swaps and other derivatives that are regulated by the CFTC (as opposed to the markets
for security-based swaps and other types of securities that are regulated by the SEC). There have
been no reports of the SEC participating in any of the benchmark rate-rigging investigations or
settlements.
117. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)(1)(A).
118. Id § 6s(j)(2).
119. Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties Rules, 77
Fed. Reg. 20,128, 20,128 (Apr. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23).
120. 7 U.S.C. § 5(b).
121. Id.
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well as the policies and purposes of this chapter, in issuing any order
or adopting any [CFTC] rule or regulation. . ., or in requiring or
approving any bylaw, rule, or regulation of a contract market or
22
registered futures association.1

In short, section 15(b) of the CEA directs the CFTC to look to
federal antitrust laws, statutes, and jurisprudence to guide its analysis of
competition issues arising under the CEA.1 23 The few cases addressing
section 15(b) have held that the CFTC is not bound to adopt or approve
the least competitive means as long as it has considered fully the
competitive implications of its actions and those of any alternative
124
Additionally, other
course of action in implementing its objective.
referring to
explicitly
not
although
Act,
Dodd-Frank
sections of the
in the
competition
to
enhance
the antitrust laws and principles, sought
OTC swaps markets by requiring "that most swaps trade on open
and competitive platforms" that are similar to exchanges, but called
swap execution facilities ("SEFs"),1 25 that offer impartial access to all
26
market participants.1
As with any regulatory regime, certain features of the U.S.
regulation of futures and other derivatives serve to limit competition to
some extent.1 27 For example, generally speaking, to place trades on the
122.

Id.

§ 19(b).

antitrust laws." Id.

Section 15 of the CEA is labeled "[c]onsideration of costs and benefits and

§ 19.

123. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65,

§ 2.12

(stating that section 15(b) of the CEA

directs "the [CFTC] to 'take into consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust

laws as well as the policies and purposes of [the CEA] in issuing any order or adopting any [CFTC]
rule or regulation, or in requiring or approving any bylaw, rule, or regulation of a contract market'
(quoting Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the

H. Comm. on Agric., 93d Cong. 183 (1974))).
124. See, e.g., Am. Stock Exch., Inc. v. CFTC, 528 F. Supp. 1145, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Rosenthal v. Bagley, 450 F. Supp. 1120, 1124-25 (N.D. 111. 1978).
125. A SEF is a trading system or platform created by the Dodd-Frank Act "in which multiple
participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple
participants in the facility or system, through any means of interstate commerce." 7 U.S.C. § la(50).

126. See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 Fed. Reg.
33,476 (June 4, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 37); see also DENNIS KELLEHER ET AL.,
BETTER MKTS., POLICY BRIEF, STOPPING WALL STREET'S DERIVATIVES DEALERS CLUB: WHY
THE CFTC MUST ACT Now TO PREVENT ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE DERIVATIVES TRADING
REFORMS THAT THREATEN SYSTEMATIC STABILITY AND HARM CONSUMERS 2 (2016), http://www.

bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Better%20Markets%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20Stopping%
20Wall%2OStreet%E2%80%99s%20Derivatives%20Dealers%20Club.pdf ("These reforms were
intended to end the large dealers' oligopolistic control over the swaps market and introduce greater
competition and pre-trade price transparency, ultimately strengthening the swaps marketplace,

reducing systemic risk and lowering costs for all market participants in the process.").
127. This is common to regulation in general, and financial regulation in particular. See
Lawrence J. White, Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for Antitrust, in
COMPETITION AS PUBLIC POLICY 65, 67 (Charles T. Compton et al. eds., 2010) ("[T]here has been a
longstanding tension between the operation of financial regulation and the promotion of
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futures and other derivatives exchanges, a person must either have
access to those markets through a CFTC registrant or be one.128 Further,
the CEA requires that most trading in futures contracts must take place
on CFTC-regulated exchanges, officially called designated contract
markets ("DCMs").12 9 With few exceptions, only a member of a DCM
can actually place trades on that DCM, which means that, as a practical
matter, most persons must place trades on DCMs through futures
brokers-i.e., futures commission merchants ("FCMs")-that are
members of DCMs. 13 0 The exchange-trading requirement dates back to
the beginning of federal regulation of futures trading with the Grain
Futures Act of 1922 ("Grain Futures Act"). 13 ' The belief was that
moving all trading onto federally regulated futures exchanges would
curb market manipulation schemes and other improper trading practices
because the DCMs, in their role as SROs, would police their own
markets for misconduct.12 Section 5 of the CEA describes the regulatory
obligations of exchanges-in the form of twenty-three "[c]ore
[p]rinciples"-both initially upon receiving a designation as a contract
market and on an ongoing basis thereafter.133
The core principles were a product of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 ("CFMA"), which was designed to
implement a "principles-based" regulatory framework for exchanges,
trading platforms, and clearinghouses regulated by the CFTC.'34 The
CFMA amended the CEA to require DCMs and clearinghouses-called,
competition.").
128. See Gregory Scopino, PreparingFinancialRegulationfor the Second Machine Age: The
Need for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.

439, 467
129.
130.
131.

& n.102.
See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65,
See id. § 1.06[1].
See2 id. § 3.02[1].

§

1.04[1].

132. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L.

319, 339-41 (2003); see also I JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 1.04[3] (stating that, for an
applicant seeking to receive CFTC approval to be a DCM "[t]he most important focus ... is on the
ability of an applicant for contract market designation to show that it has adequately provided for
the prevention of conduct that would interfere with the ability of the market to reflect true economic

conditions"); Scopino, supra note 128, at 467-68.
133. See 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
134. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A398 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see, e.g., Core Principles and Other
Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,612 36,665 (June 19, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16, 38); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 1.17; 23 JERRY W.
MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND

COMMODITIEs LAW

§ 2:43,

Westlaw (database updated 2015); Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate

Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation,

Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 390-94 (2005).
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("DCOs")-to meet the
"derivatives clearing organizations"
Although the Dodd-Frank
principles."'
core
the
by
out
requirements laid
Act changed a great deal about how derivatives are regulated, it left the
core principles largely intact and, as will be discussed in greater detail
below, even expanded their use to govern new categories of market
platforms. Each core principle imposes a specific duty or duties upon
those subject to its strictures. 1 36 For example, Core Principle 4 for
DCMs states that exchanges must "have the capacity and responsibility
to prevent manipulation [and] price distortion .. . through market
surveillance, compliance, and enforcement practices and procedures."13
Core Principle 9 states that "[t]he board of trade shall provide a
competitive, open, and efficient market and mechanism for executing
transactions that protects the price discovery process of trading in the
centralized market of the board of trade."1 38 Further, DCMs themselves
adopt rules requiring their members to comply with the core principles
and CFTC Regulations.1 3 9
The CEA has similar core principles for DCOs. For example, Core
Principle D for DCOs dictates that each DCO "ensure that the
derivatives clearing organization possesses the ability to manage the
risks" of its business.140 Core Principle P requires DCOs to "establish
and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the decision4
making process of the derivatives clearing organization."' ' To ensure
compliance with the core principles, the CFTC periodically conducts
examinations of DCMs, DCOs and other business entities that operate
derivatives market infrastructure, and, based on the results of the
examinations, makes recommendations concerning how the derivatives
market infrastructure providers could better meet their obligations under
the relevant core principles. 142
The CFMA's original core principles for exchanges and
clearinghouses required those entities to give thought to antitrust
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Hazen, supra note 134, at 394.
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(4).
Id.
Id. § 7(d)(9).

139.

See, e.g., CHI. BOARD OF TRADE, CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULEBOOK

§§

534, 539.A,

&

http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CBOT/I/5/5.pdf; see also Scopino, supra note 128, at 468
n.109 ("CME Group is a Chicago-based corporation that owns several major DCMs, including the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange ('CME'), New York Mercantile Exchange ('NYMEX'), and Chicago
Board of Trade ('CBOT').").
140. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(D).
141. Id. § 7a-1(c)(2)(P).
142. See Rule Enforcement Reviews of Designated Contract Markets, U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/

dcmruleenf (last visisted Dec. 19, 2016); see also Scopino, supra note 44, at 238-40.
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considerations before adopting any rules or taking any actions. The
Dodd-Frank Act slightly modified the wording of these antitrust
considerations core principles. 143 For example, Core Principle 18 for
DCMs originally stated that "[u]nless necessary or appropriate to
achieve the purposes of [the CEA, DCMs] shall endeavor to avoid-{A)
adopting any rules or taking any actions that result in any unreasonable
restraint of trade, or (B) imposing any material anticompetitive burden
on trading on the contract market." 1" The Dodd-Frank Act moved DCM
Core Principle 18 to 19 and changed the wording, to state that "[u]nless
necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of [the CEA], the board
of trade shall not-(A) adopt any rule or taking [sic] any action that
result in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or (B) impose any material
anticompetitive burden on trading on the contract market."l 45 Thus, the
Dodd-Frank Act provides that exchanges "shall not" engage in the
activities prohibited by subsection (A) and (B), whereas the CFMA of
2000 had stated DCMs must "endeavor to avoid" doing so. 14 6 The move
by Congress from "shall endeavor to avoid" to "shall not" seems to point
toward a desire for greater observation of, or stricter adherence to,
antitrust considerations by exchanges.
Under the CFMA, Core Principle N for DCOs stated as follows:
Unless appropriate to achieve the purposes of [the CEA], the
derivatives clearing organization shall avoid-(i) adopting any rule or
taking any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or
(ii) imposing any material anticompetitive burden on trading on the
contract market. 147

143. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(N).
144. Id. § 7(d)(18) (2000) (current version at id. § 7(d)(19) (2012)).
145. Id. § 7(d)(19) (2012) (emphasis added).
146. See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 Fed.
Reg. 36,612 36,657 (June 19, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16, 38) ("The Dodd-Frank
Act renumbered former Core Principle 18 as Core Principle 19, and in all other respects, maintained
the statutory text of the core principle. As noted in the DCM NPRM, the Commission believed that
the existing guidance to this Core Principle remained appropriate. Accordingly, other than to codify
the statutory text of Core Principle 19 into proposed § 38.1000, the Commission did not propose
any amendments to the pre-existing guidance under part 38."); see also Core Principles and Other

Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,572, 80,601 (Dec. 22, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16, 38) ("Current Core Principle 18 governs the antitrust obligations of
DCMs. The Dodd-Frank Act renumbered this core principle as Core Principle 19, but in all other
respects the statutory text of the core principle is the same. The Commission believes that the
existing guidance to this Core Principle remains appropriate." (footnote omitted)). This disregards
the change from "endeavor to avoid" to "shall not."

147. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A398 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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Under the CFMA, the wording of Core Principle N was slightly different
from the DCM's then-Core Principle 18, which said "unless necessary or
appropriate" and "shall endeavor to avoid." The Dodd-Frank Act
amended Core Principle N to "conform[] the standard for DCOs with the
standard applied to DCMs under Core Principle 19"148 by changing the
wording of Core Principle N to state that "[u]nless necessary or
appropriate to achieve the purposes of [the CEA], a derivatives clearing
organization shall not (i) adopt any rule or take any action that results in
any unreasonable restraint of trade; or (ii) impose any material
anticompetitive burden."l49 In short, the Dodd-Frank Act stated that a
DCO could violate the strictures of subsections (i) or (ii) of Core
Principle N if necessary or appropriate-as opposed to prior wording
that doing so would be permissible only if it was "appropriate." It is hard
to see this as much of a change, however, because if an action is
absolutely necessary to achieve the purposes of the CEA, then it
probably also would be considered appropriate to take that action,
regardless of the anticompetitive impact that action might have. The
Dodd-Frank Act also changed "shall avoid" to "shall not." Lastly,
subsection (ii) was modified to prohibit a DCO from imposing any
material anticompetitive burden-period. Under the CFMA, subsection
(ii) of Core Principle N prohibited clearinghouses from imposing "any
material anticompetitive burden on the contract market" (i.e., on the
futures exchange).' The elimination of the prepositional phrase, "on the
contract market," broadens the scope of subsection (ii) of Core Principle
N. Additionally, CEA section 5b(c)(3) states that a DCO "may request
the [CFTC] to issue an order concerning whether a rule or practice of the
applicant is the least anticompetitive means of achieving the objectives,
purposes, and policies of this chapter."'
The Dodd-Frank Act also amended the CEA to establish core
principles to govern newly created categories of market infrastructure
entities-the (aforementioned) SEFs and swap data repositories
("SDRs"). 152 The core principles for SEFs and SDRs reference
antitrust considerations. For example, Core Principle 1 ("Antitrust
Considerations") for SDRs states that "[u]nless necessary or appropriate
148. Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg.
69,334, 69,407 (Nov. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 29, 39, 140).
149. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(N).
150. Id. § 7(d)(19)(B) (emphasis added).
151. Id. § 7a-l(c)(3).
152. SDRs as registered entities created by the Dodd-Frank Act "that collect[] and maintain
information or records with respect to transactions or positions in, or the terms and conditions of,

swaps entered into by third parties for the purpose of providing a centralized recordkeeping facility
for swaps."Id. § la(48).
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to achieve the purposes of this chapter [of the CEA], a swap data
repository shall not (A) adopt any rule or take any action that results in
any unreasonable restraint of trade; or (B) impose any material
anticompetitive burden on the trading, clearing, or reporting of
transactions."
Likewise, Core Principle 11 for SEFs states that
"[u]nless necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this chapter
[of the CEA], the swap execution facility shall not (A) adopt any rules or
tak[e] any actions that result in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or
(B) impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading or
clearing.""' The congressional focus on the continued viability of the
antitrust laws-for new categories of market entities or otherwise-is
not entirely surprising. Indeed, section 6 of the Dodd-Frank Act (labeled
"Antitrust Savings Clause") states that "[n]othing in [the Dodd-Frank
Act], or any amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to modify,
impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws, unless
otherwise specified."'
The Dodd-Frank Act also amended the CEA to allow the CFTC to
promulgate regulations that explicitly outline to DCMs, DCOs, SEFs,
and SDRs the specific manner in which they must act to comply with
core principles. 15 6 This was a change from the CFMA, which was a
deregulatory statute that was, at least partially, premised on the idea of
regulating by open-ended principles and not prescriptive rules.' The
CFTC adopted regulations to implement the antitrust considerations core
principles, but these regulations largely just replicate the language in the
CEA. For example, CFTC Regulation 49.19 states that, "[u]nless
necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of the [CEA], a

153. Id. § 24a(f)(1).
154. Id. § 7b-3(f)(1 1). This provision of the Dodd-Frank Act appears to have a typographical
error in that it uses the word, "taking," where it should be "take."
155. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 6, 124
Stat. 1376, 1390 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012)). Congressman John Conyers, Jr. also
stated that the Dodd-Frank Act was not intended to repeal or limit the antitmust laws. 156 CONG.
REc. E1347-48 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).
156. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(ii) ("Subject to any rule or regulationprescribed by the
Commission, a derivatives clearing organization shall have reasonable discretion in establishing the
manner by which the derivatives clearing organization complies with each core principle."
(emphasis added)); id. § 7b-3(f)(1)(B) (providing similar language for SEFs); id. § 24a(a)(3)(B)
("Unless otherwise determined by

the Commission by rule or regulation, a swap

data

repository. . . shall have reasonable discretion in establishing the manner in which the swap data
repositories complies with the core principles in this section." (emphasis added)).
157.

See, e.g., Brooksley Born, Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial

Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 231, 237 (2011); Brian M. McCall, Gambling on Our Financial
Future: How the Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is a Safer Bet to Prevent

Another FinancialCollapse, 46 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1347, 1393-94 (2014).
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registered [SDR] shall avoid adopting any rule or taking any action that
results in any unreasonable restraint of trade; or imposing any material
58
anticompetitive burden on trading, clearing, or reporting swaps."'
Similarly, Regulation 39.23 states that "[u]nless necessary or appropriate
to achieve the purposes of the [CEA], a [DCO] shall not adopt any rule
or take any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of trade, or
impose any material anticompetitive burden." 59
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act gave the CFTC the authority to
specifically delineate the scope, and meaning, of the antitrust
consideration core principles by granting the CFTC explicit rulemaking
authority in connection with the core principles for DCMs. For example,
CEA section 5(d)(1)(A) states that to be designated as a contract market
and maintain a designation, "a board of trade [must] comply with any
core principle . .. and any requirement that the [CFTC] may impose by

rule or regulation pursuant to [CEA section 8a(5)]."l60 Likewise, CEA
section 5(d)(1)(B) states that DCMs shall have reasonable discretion in
complying with the core principles "[u]nless otherwise determined by
the [CFTC] by rule or regulation."l61
Unfortunately, the CFTC has not used that authority to provide
much by way of guidance about the antitrust consideration core
principles. Take, for instance, Appendix B to Part 38, which is labeled,
"Guidance on, and Acceptable Practices in, Compliance with Core
Principles,"l 62 and Appendix B to Part 37, which governs SEFs, has the
same title. 163 Neither Appendix provides much guidance, both merely restate the language of the antitrust considerations core principles and refer
to CEA section 15(b). For example, the subsection (a)---"Guidance"for Core Principle 19 for DCMs in Appendix B to Part 38 states
as follows:
An entity seeking designation as a contract market may request that the
[CFTC] consider under the provisions of section 15(b) of the [CEA],
any of the entity's rules, including trading protocols or policies, and
including both operational rules and the terms or conditions of
products listed for trading, at the time of designation or thereafter. The
[CFTC] intends to apply section 15(b) of the [CEA] to its

§§

158. 17 C.F.R. § 49.19(b) (2016).
159. Id. § 39.23.
160. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(A). Sections 5(d)(1)(A) and 8a(5) of the CEA are codified at 7 U.S.C.
7(d)(1)(A) and 12a(5), respectively.
161. Id. § 7(d)(1)(B).
162. 17 C.F.R. § 38, app. B, at 764 (2016).
163. Id. § 37, app. B, at 725. There is no such appendix to Part 39, which governs DCOs.
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consideration of issues under this core principle in a manner consistent
with that previously applied to contract markets. 164
Subsection (b)-"Acceptable Practices"-is left blank, with
nothing more than the bracketed word "Reserved."l6 5 Appendix B of
Part 37 uses identical language in its respective subsections (a) and
(b).1 6 6 The first antitrust considerations core principles, which governed
DCMs and DCOs, were products of the CFMA of 2000, but
unfortunately "there is little legislative history to provide guidance in the
many interpretive questions that may arise" under the CFMA.'67 The
CFTC, for example, does not appear to have ever stated that the
strictures of section 15(b) of the CEA's required the CFTC to reject a
DCM's proposed rule or policy. It is like a circle of nothingness-one
thing points to another but none of them has any content.
As mentioned, the Dodd-Frank Act also expanded the CFTC's
regulatory authority over swap entities to include consideration of the
antitrust laws, under the theory that the small group of "too big to fail"
financial institutions whose behavior significantly contributed to the
financial crisis also had the potential to harm competition in the financial
sector' (Congress also may have believed that the traditional U.S.
164. Id. § 38, app. B, at 771.
165. Id. The opening of Appendix B states that, "[w]here provided, acceptable practices
meeting selected requirements of core principles are set forth in paragraph (b) following guidance"
and that "[t]he acceptable practices are for illustrative purposes only and do not state the exclusive

means for satisfying a core principle." Id.
166. Id. § 37, app. B, at 725.
167.

§ 38,

1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65,

app. B, at 764.

§ 1.17;

see also id. at 315 n.8 ("Many commentators

have decried the sparse legislative history of the [CFMA]." (quoting Mark D. Young, Twenty
Questions on the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, 34 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 89,

92 (2001))).
168. 156 CONG. REc. E1347 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).

&

("But 'too big' also places our nation at significant risk in another respect-and that is the risk of
harm to competition, when a marketplace becomes concentrated in the hands of so few competitors
that consumers no longer have meaningful choice, and the healthy influence of competition on
price, quality, and innovation is lost. It is therefore essential that the antitrust laws, the laws
protecting our economic freedoms against monopolization, anticompetitive restraints of trade, and
undue market concentration remain in place. They are needed to ensure that the heightened
regulatory supervision the new law contemplates, as well as our response to any future financial
system emergency, do not inadvertently lead to an even more concentrated marketplace--with
companies that are even bigger, with more market power, and with less incentive to be responsive to
the consumers they are supposed to serve, and leaving less opportunity for new entry and
innovation."); see also MATTHEW P. HENDRICKSON ET AL., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER
FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, GEORGETOWN AND FORDHAM GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIA
Focus ON TRENDS IN CARTEL ENFORCEMENT, MERGER CONTROL, IP AND FINANCIAL SERVICES

2 (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Georgetown-and_
Fordham GlobalAntitrustLawSymposia.pdf ("Miguel de la Mano, director general for the
Internal Market of the [European Commission], argued that a lack of oversight by antitrust
regulators contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, and that government responses, although
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authorities had not adequately dealt with anticompetitive behavior in the
financial sector in the years leading up to the financial crisis).
Specifically, section 4s(j)(6) states as follows:
Unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this chapter,
a swap dealer or major swap participant shall not-(A) adopt any
process or take any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of
trade; or (B) impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading
or clearing.169
Regulation 23.607 was part of a group of regulations that the CFTC
promulgated to implement section 4s(j) of the CEA, which was added to
that statute by section 731 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 170 Regulation 23.607
(Antitrust Considerations) states as follows:
(a)

No swap dealer or major swap participant shall adopt any process
or take any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of
trade, or impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading
or clearing, unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act.
(b) Consistent with its obligations under paragraph (a) of this section,
each swap dealer and major swap participant shall adopt policies
and procedures to prevent actions that result in unreasonable
restraint of trade, or impose any material anticompetitive burden
on trading or clearing.17 1
Proposed Regulation 23.607 was published in the Federal Register
on November 23, 2010; the final rule, which the CFTC adopted as
proposed, was published in the Federal Register on April 3, 2012, with
an effective date of June 14, 2012.172 In the notice of proposed
rulemaking, the CFTC stated that Regulation 23.607 "would implement
[the stated] prohibitions by requiring that the swap dealer or major swap
participant adopt policies and procedures that would prevent
unreasonable restraint of trade or the imposition of a material

necessary, have created market imbalances between large and small firms-including the fact that
only institutions 'too big to fail' can rely on taxpayer subsidies.").
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(j)(6) (2012).
170. See Regulations Establishing and Governing the Duties of Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,397, 71,397 (proposed Nov. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
23); id. at 71,398 ("Section 731 of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the CEA by inserting after section
4r a new section 4s that sets forth registration and regulatory requirements, including a variety of
business conduct standards and duties, with which swap dealers and major swap participants must
comply to maintain registration as a swap dealer or major swap participant.").
171. 17 C.F.R. § 23.607 (2016).
172. Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties Rules, 77
Fed. Reg. 20,128 (Apr. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23).
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anticompetitive burden on trading or clearing."l73 In the final rule
release, the CFTC stated that Regulation 23.607 both (1) "prohibit[s]
SDs and MSPs from adopting any process or taking any action that
results in any unreasonable restraint of trade or imposes any material
anticompetitive burden on trading or clearing, unless necessary or
appropriate to achieve the purposes of the CEA," and (2) "require[s] SDs
and MSPs to adopt policies and procedures to prevent such actions."l 74
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association ("SIFMA")
argued that Regulation 23.607 did more than simply require SDs and
MSPs to adopt policies and procedures for compliance with the
regulation, but "impos[ed] a blanket prohibition" against violating the
rule "(unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of the
17
"SIFMA expressed the concern that, given the counterparty
CEA)."s
rescission and private right of action provisions of the CEA, this
prohibition could introduce additional private liability that is
unnecessary in light of the enforcement authority of the [CFTC] and
antitrust authorities and existing private rights of action under the
antitrust laws." 1 76 The CFTC was not swayed by SIFMA's arguments:
"Having considered SIFMA's comments, the [CFTC] is adopting the
rule as proposed. The blanket prohibition in [Regulation] 23.607(a) is
taken directly from the statutory provision and appropriately implements
the prohibition in section 4s(j)(6) of the CEA." 7 7
One matter worth noting is that Regulation 23.607, like section
4s(j)(6) and the antitrust considerations core principles throughout the
CEA, does not make any reference to prohibiting attempts to adopt any
process or take any action that results in unreasonable restraints of trade
or attempts to impose material anticompetitive burdens on clearing or
trading. This is different from many other CEA provisions that explicitly
target both successful and attempted improper conduct. For example,
CFTC Regulation 180.1(a)(1) broadly makes it unlawful to, inter alia,
"[u]se or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud.""'

173. Regulations Establishing and Governing the Duties of Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, 75 Fed. Reg. at 71,401.
174. Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties Rules, 77
Fed. Reg. at 20,144.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1) (2014).
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BRIEF ANTITRUST LAW OVERVIEW

Given that at least eight provisions of the CEA are explicitly
concerned with safeguarding the interests protected by the antitrust laws,
such as prohibiting actions that result in unreasonable restraints of trade
or impose material anticompetitive burdens in the markets for
derivatives,179 a brief overview of U.S. antitrust law is helpful to put the
numerous references in the CEA to antitrust principles in the proper
context." "Antitrust law is the law of competition. Competition in the
marketplace generally improves the lives of consumers by expanding
output and reducing the price of products and services, as well as by
increasing quality and innovation.""' Generally speaking, the term,
"monopoly," refers to circumstances in which the relevant market is
dominated by a single firm.182 An oligopoly is a situation in a market or
industry in which there are few participants.' 83 With monopolies, wealth
is transferred from consumers to producers, with the monopolists
obtaining supranormal profits'84 and having less "pressure to innovate or
otherwise be efficient."185
179. See 7 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2012) (stating that the purpose of the CEA is to promote "fair
competition"); id. § 6s(j)(6) (listing antitrust considerations for swap entities); id. § 7(d)(19) (listing
antitrust considerations through core principle for designated contract markets); id. § 7a-1(c)(3)
(providing the "least anticompetitive means" language); id. § 7a-1(c)(2)(N) (listing antitrust
considerations core principle for derivatives clearing organizations); id. § 7b-3(f)(11) (listing
antitrust considerations core principle for swap execution facilities); id. § 19(b) (requiring the CFTC
to consider antitrust laws); id. § 24a(f)(1) (listing antitrust considerations core principle for swap
data repositories).
180. See, e.g., Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2254
(2013) ("U.S. competition laws are known as 'antitrust' because they were designed as measures
against the nineteenth-century trusts."). To emphasize, this is only meant to be a brief, concise
overview of some of the primary concepts in U.S. antitrust law. As mentioned above, the primary
objectives of this Article are (1) to analyze the Antitrust Considerations in the CEA and CFTC
Regulations, and (2) to propose a mechanism through which those Antitrust Considerations could
serve as the theoretical basis for civil enforcement actions targeting anticompetitive conduct in the
derivatives markets.
181. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 885,
886 (2012).
182. See Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41
(D.D.C. 2013).
183. See 1 KALINOWSKI, supra note 59, § 7.04[4].
184. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 73 n.9 (5th
ed. 2004).
185. Id. at 73; see 3 FREDERICK K GRITTNER, WEST'S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
§ 3002 (2016) ("The owners of a monopoly have the power, as a group, to set prices, exclude
competitors, and control the market in the relevant geographic area. U.S. antitrust laws prohibit
monopolies and any other practices that unduly restrain competitive trade. These laws are based on
the belief that equality of opportunity in the marketplace and the free interactions of competitive
forces result in the best allocation of the economic resources of a nation. Moreover, it is assumed
that competition enhances material progress in production and technology while also preserving
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The federal antitrust laws are largely encompassed in several key
statutes. 18 6 The first federal antitrust statute enacted was the Sherman
Act of 1890 ("Sherman Act"). 87 The Sherman Act has two sections:
section 1 prohibits agreements, combinations, or conspiracies that
unreasonably restrain trade," and section 2 prohibits monopolizations,
attempted monopolizations, and conspiracies to monopolize.189 In 1914,
Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") and
the Clayton Act.' 90 Section 5 of the FTC Act, which can only be
enforced by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), prohibits unfair
methods of competition, which include antitrust violations.1 91 Judicial
precedent has generally interpreted section 5 of the FTC Act as covering
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 19 2 The Clayton Act
prohibits certain specific kinds of conduct.193 For example, section 3 of
the Clayton Act addresses the potential anticompetitive harm of
exclusive-dealing and tying arrangements, which also are potentially
violative of the Sherman and FTC Acts. 19 4 Because section 1 is directed
at unreasonable restraints of trade from contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies, it only targets group conduct; that is, conduct by two or
more persons.195 Section 2, however, can be invoked to combat
democratic, political, and social institutions.").
186. See 10A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 4981 (rev. vol. 2011).

187.

Royce Zeisler, Note, Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why the FTC Should

Use Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 266, 271-72.
188. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, combination.... or

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
189. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, ... or conspire with any other person . .. to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of [violating the antitrust laws]. Id. § 2; see Leslie, supra note

181, at 887-88.
190. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2012)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l)-(2); Zeisler, supra note 187, at 270-83.
192. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
1:23 (4th ed.); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis:
The Prospectfor Antitrust Responses to the "Too-Big-to-Fail" Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP.

§

& FIN. L. 261, 297-98 (2011).
193. See Foster, supra note 11, at 95 ("The Clayton Act is broad and leaves much of its
practical effect to judicial interpretation.").
194. Section 3 of the Clayton Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14, and section 5 of Federal Trade
Commission Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45.
195. See Julie K. Robberson, Antitrust Law-Supreme Court Holds That a Wholly-Owned
SubsidiaryIs Incapableof Conspiringwith Its Parent Corporation Under Section ] of the Sherman

Act: Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 59 TUL. L. REv. 781, 782 (1985); Joseph R.
Coker, Comment, Saving Otter Tail: The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Electric Power Post-

Trinko, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 231, 234 (2005).
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anticompetitive behavior by a single person or entity, (that is, a
monopolist or attempted monopolist) or by several persons or entities.' 96
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[a]ntitrust laws in general, and
the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise"
and that "[tihey are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is
fundamental to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."l 97
This Article primarily focuses on section 1 of the Sherman Act (and, as
discussed above, the CEA's antitrust considerations)."'
Examples of types of actions that have been held to violate U.S.
antitrust laws include bid rigging,' 99 group boycotts,2 00 tying
arrangements and bundled discounts,20 ' horizontal price fixing,2 02 and
market division by competitors. 20 3 Under antitrust law, it is not
necessary to establish actual competitive harm, just the probability. 2 0
Remedies for antitrust violations can include damages, injunctions
prohibiting specific conduct, divesture from (or dissolution of) certain
lines of business, and, in rare cases, the breakup of a company, not to
mention criminal sanctions. 20 5
196.

Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law,

119 YALE L.J. 726, 728 n.6 (2010).
197. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
198. As part of its plea deal with the DOJ to settle a case involving allegations that it
&

participated in a cartel of banks to rig foreign currency exchange rates, Citigroup paid $925 million,
which was "the largest single fine ever imposed for a violation of the Sherman Act." Corkery
Protess, supra note 20 (describing how bankers colluded to rig foreign exchange benchmarks via
chatrooms named, "the cartel," and "the mafia," and made comments such as, "the less competition
the better").
199. Bid rigging is per se illegal under the antitrust laws. See 1 KALINOWSK, supra note 59,

§ 7.04[2][e].
200. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 435-36 (1990); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1959).
201. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1979). For more
about tying arrangements, see Samuel Noah Weinstein, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 17

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 273, 276 (2002).
202. As mentioned, horizontal price fixing is strictly prohibited. See 1 KALINOWSKI, supranote
59, § 7.04[1] ("Furthermore, because price is such a sensitive issue, a horizontal agreement may be
inferred from certain kinds of independent conduct, from some kinds of information exchanges
coupled with other conduct, and from certain types of price signaling in industries susceptible to
cooperative oligopoly."); see also id § 7.04[2][d] ("Price may have many material components,
including discounts, credit terms, trade-in allowances, and down payments. Agreements to fix
material components of price have been held to constitute illegal price fixing.").

203. See Leslie, supra note 181, at 890.
204. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1986); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
205. See Robert E. Litan, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. Prrr. L. REv. 429, 433 (2001)
("Normally speaking, there should be a presumption in favor of conduct remedies in antitrust cases,

since company breakups are much like the death penalty of antitrust: they should be reserved for the
most serious situations where abuse has occurred and there is no other way to restore effective
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The antitrust laws can be enforced by the Antitrust Division of the
DOJ, the FTC, the states, and private plaintiffs.206 Only the DOJ can
bring criminal antitrust actions.2 0 7 The broad array of persons and
entities that can enforce the antitrust laws, from private individuals to
state attorneys general, creates a beneficial "competition" for antitrust
enforcement that "mitigates problems" associated with (among other
things) "agency capture" and ensures that there are "many sets of eyes
on potential problems."208 As a practical matter, however, private civil
antitrust enforcement has been greatly limited in recent years by the
expansion of the use of rule of reason, as opposed to per se, standards for
evaluating antitrust claims (discussed in more detail below), enhanced
pleading requirements under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,209 and
antitrust injury requirements for private plaintiffs.210
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that (potentially) anticompetitive
conduct must be judged under one of two (possibly three) standards: per
se or rule of reason. 2 1 1 A "narrow category of conduct" has been held to
be per se illegal, while most types of conduct are judged under a "more
permissive" rule of reason standard that involves detailed analysis of the
purportedly anticompetitive conduct and its effects.212 Rule of reason
review typically results in "nearly all conduct" escaping liability.2 13 In
competition to the market."); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century:

The Matter of Remedies, 91 GEO. L.J. 169, 171 (2002) ("On the civil side, much antitrust remedy
law consisted of imposing cease and desist orders. The guilty firm was told that its behavior violated
the law and was required to discontinue the behavior that was the subject of the enforcement action
and perhaps some similar though not identical behavior."); Spencer Weber Waller, The Past,
Present, and FutureofMonopolization Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 13-16 (2009).

206.
207.

Leslie, supranote 181, at 889.
Id.

208.

See Max Huffman & Daniel B. Heidtke, Behavior Exploitation Antitrust in Consumer

Subprime Mortgage Lending, 4 WM. & MARY POL'Y REv. 77, 97-98 (2012) (quoting commentators
who have referred to the "decentralized and largely uncoordinated" enforcement of antitrust laws in
the United States as being a "crazy quilt of enforcement mechanisms"); see also Michael Skapinker,
Bankers Still Need a 'Bashing'-As Do the Rest of Us, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), https://
next.ft.com/content/5d2l 161 8-b3a4-1 1 e5-b147-e5e5bba42e5 1 (arguing that "[b]ecause regulators
sometimes fail to do what they should" other parts of government and society, such as "legislative
committees, the media, consumers, campaigners [and] researchers" need to monitor global banks
and other large businesses for wrongdoing).
209. 550 U.S. 544, 564-70 (2007).
210. See Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in

US. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 591, 610-13 (2012); C. Paul Rogers III, The
Incredible Shrinking Antitrust Law and the Antitrust Gap, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 67, 68-80

(2013); A. Benjamin Spencer, UnderstandingPleadingDoctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009).
211. The Supreme Court2009 Term-Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 400-01 (2010).
212. Id. at 400-01; see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("[Miost antitrust claims
are analyzed under a 'rule of reason . . . .').
213. The Supreme Court2009 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 211, at 401; see also Thomas
C. Arthur, A Workable Rule ofReason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the FederalCourts, 68
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recent years, the Court appears to have sometimes applied a "quick
look" rule of reason standard "that foregoes the original rule's extensive
inquiry by shifting the burden of proof on the defendant to provide
evidence that certain presumptively anticompetitive acts did not create
economic harm in violation of section 1."214 The general trend in modem
antitrust law jurisprudence has been for courts to expand the scope of
conduct that is analyzed by the permissive rule of reason standard, and
to narrow the set of conduct considered per se illegal.2 15
Generally speaking, conduct that falls within the ambit of a per se
rule is deemed to be illegal without the need for significant analysis into
the objectives and effects of the conduct.216 Importantly, however, a
court must determine that the conduct in question is of the type that is
governed by the per se rule. For example, horizontal agreements among
competitors to fix prices, whether to eliminate a type of discount or
otherwise, are per se illegal, 217 as are horizontal agreements among
competitors to divide territory or markets.218 Even more, horizontal
price-fixing agreements are illegal, regardless of the mechanism used to
implement them. 219 Because price fixing is a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, an agreement by competitors to fix prices is illegal
regardless of the market share of the conspirators or the likelihood that
the price-fixing agreement would actually harm competition because the
law bans price-fixing agreements regardless of "whether or not the

ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 349-50 (2000); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule ofReason and the
Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 474 (2012); Andrew I. Gavil,
Moving Beyond Caricatureand Characterization:The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S.

CAL. L. REv. 733 (2012); Markham, supranote 192, at 264-65.
214.

The Supreme Court2009 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 211, at 401.

215. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918) (holding that the futures
exchange rule did not violate antitrust laws); Rogers, supra note 210, at 73-80 (discussing how the
scope of per se rules narrowed and the scope of rule of reason widened); see also Markham, supra
note 192, at 264 (referring to "the ever-narrowing reach of modem antitrust law" and that "[a]s

currently interpreted by the courts, U.S. antitrust law is a shadow of its original self').
216. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 50
(2009) ("Certain restraints of trade are unreasonable per se and therefore illegal under section I of
the Sherman Act, without the necessity of an elaborate inquiry into the precise harm that they have

caused or the business excuse for their use. Some types of restraints of trade have such a predictable
and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit, that
they are deemed unlawful per se." (footnotes omitted)).
217. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980) (per curiam).
218. Palmer v. BRG ofGa., 498 U.S. 46,49 (1990).
219. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("[T]he
machinery employed by a combination for price-fixing is immaterial."). The antitrust laws have
been construed to prohibit schemes that result in an "anticompetitive effect either of the violation or

of the anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
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[conspiring] firms have any hope of success."220 Put simply, an
agreement to fix prices, without more, constitutes a violation,22 1 as it is
"immaterial whether the agreements were ever actually carried out,
whether the purpose of the conspiracy was accomplished in whole or in
part or whether the effort was made to carry the object of the conspiracy
into effect."222 All price-fixing agreements are strictly "banned because
of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the
economy."223 More tellingly, "[e]ven though the members of the pricefixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that
they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly
interfering with the free play of market forces" 22 4 because "interference
with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful per se." 225
"Prices are fixed when they are agreed upon," but this is interpreted
broadly, such that "[p]rice fixing ... is more than the establishment of
uniform prices [b]ecause any interference with the setting of prices by
free market forces is unlawful, conspirators do not have to adopt rigid
prices in order to be guilty of price fixing."226 Therefore, even if prices
are not fixed inflexibly, but within a range, or even maintained or
stabilized, that is still price fixing.227 For example, setting minimum or
maximum prices is price fixing.228 Additionally, a credit-fixing
agreement, in which a group of companies abandons prior practice of
establishing credit for retailers but instead demands payments in cash in
advance or on delivery is price fixing.229 Even more, agreements to fix
220. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir.
1995); see Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 226.
221. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 180, 224-25 n.59 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402 (1927); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913); United
States v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th Cir. 1977).
222. Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n of No. Cal. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1960)
(quoting Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. at 402). In addition to proving the existence of an
agreement to fix prices, the government also must prove that one or more of the conspirators'
activities was in or affected commerce. United States v. Cargo Serv. Stations, Inc., 657 F.2d 676,
683-84 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 295-96 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981).
223. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 226 n.59.
224. Id. at 221.
225. United States v. Container Corp. of Amer., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
226. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair TradePractices § 70 (2009);
see id. § 98 ("A restraint is horizontal if it is imposed by agreement among competitors.").
227. Id. § 70.
228. Id.
229. Id; see Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648-50 (1980) (per curiam)
(explaining that credit is a component of the price of a product and, therefore, an agreement to
eliminate credit is a form of per se unlawful price fixing); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,
232 F.3d 979, 987-89 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a scheme to manipulate a benchmark that
measured bulk cheese auction prices, which was used as a component of the government-mandated
minimum price for milk, would constitute an anticompetitive conspiracy that harmed milk buyers);
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or rig a component of a price constitute price fixing.230 This proposition
holds true for conspiracies and agreements to rig benchmark interest
rates and forex benchmark rates that serve as components to the prices of
derivatives and other financial instruments.231 In some instances, "trade
associations and industry institutes that perform[] legitimate functions"
have been used to facilitate illegal price-fixing schemes by "serv[ing] as
232
cartel organizers and enforcers."
Beyond horizontal price-fixing cartels, mechanisms that involve
competitors communicating or joining together is viewed with suspicion
under the antitrust laws. For example, "joint ventures among competitors
are of antitrust concern because they 'provide for an opportunity for
participants to discuss and agree on anticompetitive terms, or otherwise
collude anticompetitively, as well as a greater ability to detect and
punish deviations that would undermine the collusion. "'233 The U.S.
government generally is suspect of regular, direct competitor exchanges
234
of price information and prosecutes, such actions as price fixing.
"[P]rivate standard-setting by associations comprising firms with
horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted ... under the
antitrust laws only on the understanding that [the standard-setting] will
be conducted in a nonpartisan manner offering procompetitive
benefits." 235 The lesson from these principles is that trade groups and
Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 262, 272-73 (D. Conn. 2003)
(stating that a conspiracy to inflate the price of butter, which was a component of minimum milk
prices, would constitute an anticompetitive conspiracy that harmed milk buyers); see also Sugar
Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 597-602 (1936) (holding that cartels can violate the
antitrust laws by using otherwise legal, cooperative activity to effectuate price fixing conspiracies).
230. See KnevelbaardDairies, 232 F.3d at 987-89; Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc., 253 F. Supp.
2d at 272-73.
231. See, e.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 771 (2d Cir. 2016) (examining
LIBOR and related interest rate-rigging); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 175 F.
Supp. 3d 44, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (examining ISDAfix benchmark interest rate-rigging); In re
Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(examining forex benchmark rate-rigging).
232. Leslie, supra note 181, at 890; see 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and
Unfair Trade Practices § 99 ("The rule that horizontal agreements among competitors involving
territorial or customer restrictions are illegal per se is applicable to an agreement among a group of
competitors who comprise a cooperative association." (footnote omitted)). For a discussion of joint
ventures and antitrust law, see Gregory J. Werden, The Application to the Sherman Act to Joint
Ventures: The Law After American Needle, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 251, 254-60 (2011); and Thomas
A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis ofJoint Ventures After the Supreme Court's DagherDecision,
57 EMORY L.J. 735, 767-78 (2008); and see also 1 LouiS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN
ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 4:38 (4th ed.).
233. WILLIAM M. HANNAY, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE
ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:42 (2015-2016) (quoting FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEPT. OF
JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.31(b) (2000)).

234. See, e.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 356-68 (5th Cir. 2008).
235. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 506-07 (1988); see also
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professional associations are not immune from antitrust liability, even if
the groups and associations also serve some legitimate purposes. For
example, attorney bar association minimum fee schedules for legal
services can constitute illegal price fixing under the Sherman Act.23 6
IV.

ANTITRUST LAW AND SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS

A bank is systemically important if, because of its size, complexity
or interconnectedness with other financial institutions, its failure would
cause significant disruption to the financial system.2 37 Systemically
important banks also have been colloquially referred to as banks that are
too big to fail.238 The U.S. banking sector consolidated significantly
when banks failed during the financial crisis, which resulted in the
formation of a small group of global, systemically important banks.239
The markets for many types of OTC swaps and derivatives are
dominated by oligopolies24 0 that consist of a handful of large, swapBroadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308-10 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing some
procompetitive benefits of private standard-setting).
236. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83, 788-92 (1975) (holding that
county bar association's minimum fee schedule recommending minimum amounts to be charged by
attorneys for title examinations constituted illegal price fixing); United States v. Or. State Bar, 385
F. Supp. 507, 516-17 (D. Or. 1974); cf FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
435-36 (1990) (holding that court-appointed criminal defense lawyers in private practice who had
engaged in a boycott to receive higher compensation had engaged in an unreasonable restraint of
trade).
237. See Addressing SIFIs, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policydevelopment/systematically-important-financial-institutions-sifis (last visited Dec. 31, 2016); see
also Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-ServiceInstitutions and Monopoly Power, 60 CATH. U.
L. REv. 357, 370-72 (2011) (defining systemic financial-service institutions).
238. Andru E. Wall, The 2009 Stress Tests: A Model for PeriodicTransparentExaminations of
the Largest Bank Holding Companies, 128 BANKING L.J. 291, 332 n.82 (2011) ("Systemically
important is a more precise term than 'too big to fail' as an institution's failure could have
catastrophic results not just because of its size, but also because of its complexity or
interconnectedness with other financial institutions.").
239. See Donald I. Baker, From Philadelphia National Bank to Too Big to Fail:How Modern
Financial Markets Have Outrun Antitrust Law as a Source of Useful Structural Remedies, 80
ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 362 (2015) (noting that, as a result of consolidations in the banking industry,
"we can now see how these very big mergers were creating fewer players that really mattered,
thereby facilitating cartel-like understandings among LIBOR, foreign exchange, and other index
traders that would come to light later"); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System ofRegulation
Is Needed to Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015
MICH. ST. L. REv. 249, 252-54, 256-57 ("The financial crisis of 2007-2009 and its aftermath have
accelerated a consolidation trend that has transformed the U.S. banking system during the past three
decades.").
240. Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of
Antitrust, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 91 (2015) ("Banking has become a true oligopoly in the
United States."); Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An ErsatzAntitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1387 (2011) ("[Seventy-seven
percent] of banking assets are held by 1.4% of banks.").
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dealing banks.24 1 Several of the banks that have been implicated in the
benchmark-rigging scandal are institutions (or their affiliates) that have
been designated by regulatory authorities as systemically important (too
big to fail).242 While the too big to fail problem generally has been
24 3
viewed as not-in and of itself-also being an antitrust problem, bank
mergers that occurred when financial institutions failed during the
financial crisis ended up causing some markets to be dominated by a few
large business entities, which made it easier for "cartel-like" practices to
occur. 2 44 Concerns about the oligopolistic structure of the market for
241. Katy Burne, CFTC to Propose Swaps Anonymity, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2015, at C3
("Five banks-Barclays PLC, Citigroup Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.-handle 65% of all client trading in interest-rate swaps, according to
researcher Greenwich Associates."); see Michael Greenberger, Diversifying Clearinghouse
Ownership in Order to Safeguard Free and Open Access to the Derivatives Clearing Market, 18

FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245, 251 (2013) ("When Dodd-Frank passed, 90% of swaps were
traded through the world's ten largest banks; swaps trading generated approximately $60 billion in
revenue a year for these banks. ... [T]he five largest commercial banks-JP Morgan Chase, Bank
of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and HSBC-accounted for approximately 96% of the total
banking industry's notional amounts and 85% of the industry's net credit exposure in the derivatives
market." (footnotes omitted)); see also KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 126, at 1 ("Today, just four
Wall Street dealers-the broker arms of the largest banks on Wall Street that intermediate client
trading-still control more than 90 percent of the U.S. [over-the-counter] derivatives markets,
which have a notional value of almost $200 trillion."); Byungkwon Lim & Aaron J. Levy,
Contractual Framework for Cleared Derivatives: The Master Netting Agreement Between a
Clearing Customer Bank and a Central Counterparty, 10 PRATT'S J. BANKR. L. 509, 509 (2014)

("[T]he OTC derivatives market is dominated by a limited number of 'highly interconnected'
dealers ..... (quoting JAMES K. JACKSON & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42961,
COMPARING G-20 REFORM OF THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS 7 (2013))).

242. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text and Tables 1-12.
243. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 239, at 362 (arguing that antitrust law is an inappropriate
vehicle to address too big to fail concerns but noting that "we can now see how these very big
mergers

were

creating fewer players

that really mattered,

thereby

facilitating

cartel-like

understandings among LIBOR, foreign exchange, and other index traders that would come to light
later"); Markham, supra note 192, at 305-16 (arguing that, while antitrust law could address some
issues associated with Too-Big-to-Fail institutions, "antitrust law alone is not the cure"). But see
Bogus, supra note 240, at 81-85; Foster, supra note 237, at 359 ("[A]nother financial crisis can be
mitigated through the application of antitrust law .... ); Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Fail-Too
Small to Compete: Systemic Risk Should Be Addressed Through Antitrust Law but Such a Solution

Will Only Work if It Is Applied on an InternationalBasis, 22 FLA. J. INT'L L. 31, 50-61 (2010);
Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 240, at 1392 ("Rather, our view is that breaking up the banks is
fully justified on the grounds that such a breakup would make the economy safer and more stable by
limiting or eliminating the proclivity of regulators and elected officials to engineer massive bailouts
of the largest financial institutions whenever a financial crisis appears. We recognize, however, that
our plan involves a sea change in the current U.S. approach to antitrust policy.").

244. Baker, supra note 239, at 372 ("[B]y becoming so few in number, these big institutions
have enhanced the ability of their employees to engage in the nefarious quasi-conspiratorial
manipulation of LIBOR, foreign exchange, and the other key indices-which determine the prices
at which numerous lenders and borrowers have dealt with each other around the globe."); see also
Albert A. Foer & Don Allen Resnikoff, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and 'Too Big to. . .,' 15 J.
BANKING REG. 299, 300 (2014) (arguing that "the Antitrust Division [of the U.S. Department of
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OTC swaps and other derivatives date back to at least 2009.245 At the
time of this writing, there are 105 provisionally registered swap dealers
and no major swap participants,24 6 but, despite that fact, the markets for
specific categories of OTC swaps and other derivatives tend to be highly
concentrated, with five or so swap-dealing banks representing ninety
percent or more of certain markets in some cases.2 4 7 Notwithstanding the
recent trend towards bank consolidation, many OTC derivative markets
Justice] be consulted on all matters that are likely to substantially affect the structure of the financial
services industry, including the economic implications of the undue concentration of economic

power"). For a general discussion of how the banks consolidated during the financial crisis and
antitrust issues related to consumer banking, see David Cho, Banks "Too Big to Fail" Have Grown

Even Bigger, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2009, at Al, noting that four banks-J.P. Morgan Chase,
Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America-"issue one of every two mortgages and about two of
every three credit cards."

245. For example, in 2009, "Theo Lubke, who headed the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York's efforts to reform the private derivatives market" stated that "[i]t is simply unacceptable in
today's environment that the design and structure of the OTC derivatives market can be controlled
by a handful of large dealers." Matthew Leising & Shannon D. Harrington, Goldman Sachs Hires
N.Y Fed's Lubke, Point Man on Swaps Reform, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 15, 2010; see ROBERT E. LITAN,
INITIATIVE ON Bus. & PUB. POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS' CLUB AND
DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORM: A GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS AND OTHER INTERESTED

PARTIES 13-17 (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0407_derivatives_
litan.pdf; Matthew Leising, Fed Seeks End to Wall Street Lock on OTC Derivatives, BLOOMBERG,
May 6, 2009; Matthew Leising & Shannon D. Harrington, Wall Street Dominance of Swaps Must
End, Brokers Say, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 16, 2010; see also Karen Brettell, Banks More Open to
Futures as Derivatives Rules Set In, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.reuters.

com/article/us-futures-exchanges-swaps-idUSBRE89UlF720121031

("Many of the world's largest

banks that dominate the $648 trillion privately traded derivatives markets have been resistant to
attempts to launch competing listed products, in order to protect lucrative profits associated with
their effective oligopoly in over-the-counter credit, interest rate, and equity derivatives markets.").
246. See Swap Dealer (SD) and Major Swap Participant (MSP) Directory, supra note 72

(providing a link to a spreadsheet that lists provisionally registered swap dealers and major swap
participants). To put the 105 number in some context, several major banks have multiple entities
that are provisionally registered swap dealers. For example, Goldman Sachs has 9 swap dealer

affiliates, and 11 if you count two business entities affiliated with J. Aron & Company, which is the
commodities risk management division of Goldman Sachs. See id.
247. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES: THIRD QUARTER 2015, at tbl. 1-12 (2015), https://www.

occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dq315.pdf. Some interpretations of
market data view the biggest four dealers-J.P. Morgan Chase, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, and Bank
of America-as controlling as much as ninety-one percent of the U.S. OTC derivatives markets.
KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 126, at I n.3 (referencing data from the third quarter of 2015 Office of

the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) report on bank derivative activities). The International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has argued that "the OCC measure covers only
institutions based in the U.S. so does not take account of the global nature of derivatives activity,"
which makes the report incomplete because "only six of the fourteen most active global [OTC]
derivatives dealers . .. are based in the U.S." DAVID MENGLE, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N,
ISDA RESEARCH NOTES: CONCENTRATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES AMONG MAJOR DEALERS 1-2

(2010); see also id at 2 (also noting that the OCC quarterly reports "do not capture the U.S.
activities of non-U.S. dealers"). ISDA contended that this market structure resulted in a 'loose

oligopoly' in which effective collusion is impossible." Id.
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have been highly concentrated for some time. For example, about a
decade ago, in the first quarter of 2005, five banks accounted for ninetyfive percent of the total notional amount of derivatives in the banking
system, with the largest twenty-five banks accounting for ninety-nine
percent of derivatives in the system. 248 Similarly, a 2012 analysis of the
market for credit default swaps and other credit derivatives stated that
"[t]he credit derivatives market shows a very high degree of
concentration and that high level of concentration has persisted since
1998," which "raises the possibility of collusion, market manipulation,
and monopolistic pricing practices." 24 9
The Appendix to this Article contains several tables that illustrate
the extent to which financial institutions that have settled government
enforcement actions or private lawsuits alleging benchmark rate-rigging
conspiracies or other antitrust violations also are (1) systemically
50
important banks or (2) provisionally registered swap dealers. 2 The
tables in the Appendix show that several large banks appear to be
recidivists, insofar as anticompetitive conduct is concerned, having
settled multiple private lawsuits or government enforcement actions
251
concerning anticompetitive conduct in the markets for derivatives.
While several of the world's largest banks and their accomplices
were being investigated by global authorities in connection with rigging
LIBOR and related interest rate benchmarks, different employees at
252
many of those same banks also were rigging forex rate benchmarks.
The opaque forex market is dominated by the currency traders from a
few large banks, with Deutsche Bank, Citibank, Barclays, and UBS
accounting for more than half of the market. 253 As with bank
248. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES: FIRST QUARTER 2005, at 1 (2005), https://www.occ.gov/

topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/dql05.pdf ("Holdings of derivatives continue
to be concentrated in the largest banks."). In the first quarter of 2005, the banks with the most

derivative contracts were (in order) J.P. Morgan Chase Bank NA, Bank of America NA, Citibank
National Association, Wachovia Bank National Association, and HSBC Bank USA National
Association. Id. at tbl. 10.
249. Donald R. van Deventer, The Credit Default Swap Market and Anti-Trust Considerations,
KAMAKURA CORP. (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:22 AM), http://www.kamakuraco.com/Blog/tabid/231/Entryld/

371/The-Credit-Default-Swap-Market-and-Anti-Trust-Considerations.aspx.
250. See infra Tables 9-11.
251. See infra Tables 7, 9, 12.
252. See, e.g., In re Barclays Bank PLC, CFTC No. 15-24, 2015 WL 2445059, at *2 (May 20,
2015) ("[S]ome of this conduct occurred during the same period that Barclays was on notice that the
CFTC and other regulators were investigating attempts by certain banks to manipulate [LIBOR] and

other interest rate benchmarks."); In re UBS AG, CFTC No. 15-06, 2014 WL 6068389, at *2 (Nov.
11, 2014); In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-03, 2014 WL 6068386, at *2 (Nov. 11, 2014).
253. Daniel Schafer et al., Forex in the Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, at 9; see Verstein,
supra note 70, at 238 ("The interbank tier [of the forex market] is essentially an invitation only
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manipulation of benchmark interest rates, the scale of those impacted by
the forex benchmark rigging is potentially enormous because the rigging
of forex benchmarks manipulated the currency exchange rates that were
used to settle billions of dollars in currency trades, thereby harming
"almost every company and individual in the financial markets."254
Unlike LIBOR and other benchmark interest rates, banks rigged
forex benchmarks that were determined based on actual currency trades
that were executed on Thompson Reuter's electronic brokerage during a
two-minute window every day, 255 as opposed to being set by
submissions from banks that were selected to be members of interest
rate-setting panels. Accordingly, to rig forex rate benchmarks, banks
coordinated their trading activity in different currencies with the
objective of moving the value of those currencies up or down.25 6 In the
forex benchmark scandal, traders at different banks communicated in
chatrooms to share information about client orders for foreign currencies
and coordinate trades to move the forex benchmark rates between
several different currencies, such as the U.S. dollar to the British pound,
or the euro to the dollar.2 57 The chatrooms had names such as the Cartel,
the Bandits' Club, and the Mafia.258 Some of the chatrooms were
invitation only and, in deciding whether to invite other forex traders,
chatroom participants openly discussed whether the prospective
chatroom member would "add huge value to this cartel."2 59
Forex cartel members in the U.S. dollar-Brazilian real market
agreed to jointly boycott local Brazilian currency brokers. In a chat from
market.... The result is striking: the top four banks conduct 50.4% of customer volume. In the spot
market (market for immediate delivery), ninety-eight percent of market share goes to ten firms.
Crucially, only transactions in the interdealer market count in determining currency benchmarks."
(footnote omitted)).
254. Steve Mufson & Jonnelle Marte, 5 Big Banks to Pay More Than $5 Billion to Settle
Charges, WASH. POST, May 21, 2015, at A12. Plaintiffs in the private Foreign Exchange
Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation include a municipal board, pension plans, investrifent funds,
and the like, all of whom purchased forex-related financial instruments priced at or by the WM/R
Fix. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
255. Verstein, supra note 70, at 235 ("The leading benchmarks of foreign currency exchange
are derived from a tiny subset of trades. Specifically, the leading benchmarks are derived from
trades mostly executed by a dozen sophisticated intermediaries during a narrow band of time, that
are consciously submitted or omitted based on the effect on the benchmark.").
256.

In re ForeignExch. BenchmarkRates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d at 587.

257. Chad Bray, The Things Traders Say, Foreign Exchange Addition, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/the-things-traderssay-foreign-currency-exchange-edition/?_r=O.
258. See Mark Odell, Trader Transcripts: 'If You Ain't Cheating, You Ain't Trying,' FIN.
TIMES (May 20, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/eac637ae-fefb-1 1e4-84b2-00144feabdcO.
259. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-04, 2014 WL 6068387, at *5 (Nov. 11,
2014).
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October of 2009, a Royal Bank of Canada trader wrote, "everybody is in
agreement in not accepting a local player as a broker," and a Barclays
forex trader responded, "yes, the less competition the better." 2 60 In one
electronic chat among employees of J.P. Morgan Chase, Citibank, and
UBS concerning whether to invite a trader from Barclays Bank to join
the forex benchmark "cartel," the chat participants wondered if the
Barclays trader would not talk about the cartel with others. 26 1 The UBS
trader emphasized that this was an important issue because he did not
"want other numpty's in mkt [sic] to know" about the cartel.262
The rigging of forex benchmark rates worked as such: one trader in
the cartel would build a large position in a currency and unload it during
the fixing period in an attempt to move prices, while traders from other
banks would join in with their own trades in the same direction, with
coordination achieved through chatroom conversations. 263 Because the
forex benchmarks were determined by trades executed on a specific
venue during a two-minute closing period (i.e., the specified time period
during which an average price is produced), cartel members were able to
manipulate the forex benchmarks by engaging in a practice known as
"banging the close" in which they bought or sold a large amount of
currency during the closing period when the forex benchmark rates were
fixed. 264 Additionally, forex cartel members also would front run, or
trade ahead, of customer currency orders, which meant that bank forex
traders would trade their banks' own proprietary positions before
executing their customers' large market-moving orders for trades so that
the bank could take positions to its benefit at the detriment of the
customer. 26 5 Lastly, forex cartel members would seek to push the market
by "painting the screen" by placing "fake orders"-i.e., orders for
currencies that were not actually executed (or intended to be executed)with other banks to create the illusion of trading activity in a given
direction to move rates prior to the closing period.2 66
Based on the description of it, painting the screen appears to be a
form of spoofing (i.e., placing orders for trades with the intent to cancel
260. Odell, supranote 258.
261. ForeignExchange Benchmark Case: In re Barclays Bank PLC Examples ofMisconduct in
Private Chat Room, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N (May 20, 2015), http://

www.cfic.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/fxbarclaysmisconduct52015.pdf
262.

Bray, supra note 257.

263. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581, 587-88
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Corkery & Protess, supranote 20.
264. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d at 588; Odell, supra
note 258.
265. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d at 587-88.
266. Id. at 588.
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them before they are executed, which is illegal under the CEA).267
Indeed, all three of these trading practices referenced above-front
running, banging the close, and spoofing/painting the screen-are illegal
under the laws governing securities and markets for derivatives if
performed by traders acting on their own.268 Here, however, because
these trading strategies were performed jointly in collusion with forex
market competitors (i.e., by competing banks acting as a unified trading
bloc), the conspiracy constituted a horizontal price-fixing cartel and
therefore would run afoul of U.S. antitrust laws.2 69
The largest antitrust fines ever obtained by the DOJ were the more
than $5 billion in fines that were levied in 2015 against five of the
world's largest banks-namely, J.P. Morgan Chase, Barclays, Citigroup,
UBS, and the Royal Bank of Scotland-in connection with the banks'
settlement of allegations that they had formed a cartel to rig foreign
exchange benchmark rates. 270 The DOJ required five banks to agree to
parent-level guilty pleas for rigging forex benchmark rates. 27' Four of
the banks pleaded guilty to violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 72
UBS pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud because its rigging of
forex benchmark rates was found to violate its earlier non-prosecution
agreement for rigging benchmark interest rates.273 The demand for
parent-level guilty pleas was a change in DOJ policy compared to the
settlements connected with the rigging of LIBOR and related benchmark
interest rates. There, for example, foreign subsidiaries of Deutsche Bank,
the Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS-namely, DB Group Services UK
Limited, UBS Securities Japan Company Limited, and RBS Securities
267. See Gregory Scopino, Preventing Spoofing: From Social Norms
Prosecutions, 84 U. CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 18-21).

to

Criminal

268. Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed "Pinging" and "Front
Running" in the FuturesMarkets, 47 CoNN. L. REV. 607, 674-75 (2015).
269. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates AntitrustLitig., 74 F. Supp. 3d at 596. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York was ruling on a motion to dismiss and assumed, for
purposes of that motion, that the allegations in the complaint were true. The complaint alleged, inter
alia, that forex traders at several of the world's largest banks used various electronic
communications platforms to share market-sensitive information with rivals, including price
information as well as volume and direction of customer orders, before the forex benchmark rate
fixings, and agreed in chatrooms and instant messages to engage in collusive trading strategies to
manipulate the forex benchmark rates determined at such fixings. Id. at 587-88.
270. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 62; see also Record Fines for Currency

Market Fix, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32817114. In total, the
five banks paid about $5.7 billion to settle the foreign exchange rate-rigging case. See Dean
Starkman & Jim Puzzanghera, 5 Global Banks to Pay $5.7 Billion in Fines over Currency

Manipulation, L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2015, 6:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bankscriminal-fines-2015052 1-story.html.
271. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supranote 62.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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Japan Limited-each pleaded guilty to wire fraud, as opposed to the
parent companies of the banks. 274 The CFTC also reached settlements
with the six banks that settled forex benchmark rate-rigging allegations
with the DOJ.275 For several of those banks, participation in the scheme
to rig forex benchmark rates violated earlier settlements that had
resolved cases involving accusations that they had rigged benchmark
interest rates. 27 6 For UBS, it was the third criminal settlement in
six years.277
Even more, twelve global banks, in conjunction with Markit Group
Limited-a market data and information provider-and ISDA-a trade
association for swaps market participants-agreed in 2015 to pay
approximately $1.9 billion to settle antitrust allegations that they acted to
prevent competition in the market for credit default swaps. 278 Further, in
2016, Deutsche Bank became the first global bank to settle a private
antitrust lawsuit alleging an anticompetitive conspiracy by global banks
to rig the benchmarks for gold and silver. 2 79 Deutsche Bank's settlement
274.

See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 37; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, RBS

Securities Japan Ltd. Sentenced for Manipulation of Yen LIBOR (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.

gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2014/302785.pdf; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, UBS Securities
Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of L1BOR
Benchmark Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2012/

290478.pdf.
275. See infra Table 2. Prudential banking regulators also have fined banks for improprieties
associated with forex trading. See infra Tables 3-4.
276. For example, Barclays and UBS admitted that their involvement in a cartel to rig foreign
exchange rates violated their earlier settlements regarding the rigging of benchmark interest rates.

Aruna Viswanatha, Banks Pay $5.6 Billion to Settle US. Probe, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2015, at 1.
277. Mufson & Marte, supranote 254, at A12.
278. See infra Table 7. More specifically, "[a] dozen of Wall Street's biggest banks
agreed . .. to settle accusations that they conspired to prevent competition in the credit-derivatives

markets" by allegedly delaying credit derivatives "from being openly traded on exchanges, where
prices would be more transparent." Katy Bume, Swaps Suit Payout Is Windfallfor Funds, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 11, 2016, at C3; see also Karen Brettell, Banks' PressureStalls Opening of US Derivatives
Trading Platform, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-

derivatives-banks-idUSLINOQWIT220140827

("The first interdealer trading platform aimed at

opening up credit derivatives markets to new competition has hit roadblocks due to resistance from
some banks that dominate such trading, according to several people familiar with the
situation. ... Several hedge fund managers that had planned to join [a competing] credit platform
received phone calls from multiple banks that indicated that they would stop trading with them or
send them unfavorable pricing if they joined an interdealer venue."); Katy Bume, Banks Finalize

$1.86 Billion Credit-Swaps Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2015, 11:14 AM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/wall-street-banks-in-credit-swaps-settlement-1443708335
[hereinafter Bume, Banks
Finalize $1.86 Billion Credit-SwapsSettlement].

279. Stempel, supra note 63 ("The plaintiffs accused Deutsche Bank of conspiring with Bank
of Nova Scotia (BNS.TO), Barclays Plc (BARC.L), HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA.L) and Societe
Generale (SOGN.PA) to manipulate prices of gold, gold futures and options, and gold derivatives
through twice-a-day meetings to set the so-called London Gold Fixing. They also accused Deutsche
Bank, HSBC, and ScotiaBank of a similar conspiracy to manipulate silver prices by rigging the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 12

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

616

[Vol. 45:573

of the private U.S. antitrust lawsuit comes two years after Barclays was
fined by U.K. authorities after it was revealed that a Barclays trader had
manipulated the London Gold Fix.2 80 At the time, the repeated instances
of benchmark-rigging conspiracies prompted the EU's then competition
commissioner, Joaquin Almunia, to suggest that "perhaps manipulation
[of benchmarks] is not the exception but the rule."28 1 Again, as the
Appendix to this Article illustrates, during the past few years, many of
the same large banks, including Deutsche Bank and Barclays, appear to
have been involved in several different cartels to fix benchmark rates or
otherwise stifle competition in the markets for derivatives.282
The all-too-common banker schemes to rig benchmark rates and
stifle competition raise more than just antitrust law issues. Systemic risk
has been defined as circumstances in which an exogenous shock
simultaneously causes or contributes to the failure of multiple significant
financial institutions.2 83 Banker misconduct has been so pervasive that
banking regulators have stated that, because the corporate culture inside
many global banks appears to condone unethical and illegal conduct for
the sake of profits, bank culture is one source of systemic risk.284
Regulators also have stated that the repeated instances of misconduct
justify increased scrutiny of financial entities and stiffer punishments for
errant banks.2 85 William C. Dudley, president of the Federal Reserve
daily Silver Fix.").
280. See Daniel Schafer et al., Barclays Fined £26m for Trader's Gold Rigging, FIN. TIMES
(May 23, 2014), https://next.ft.com/content/08cafa70-e24f-lle3-a829-00144feabdcO (stating that
the London Gold Fix "is used by everyone from central banks to jewelers and gold miners to set a
reference price for bullion"); see also Ralph Atkins & Henry Sanderson, Swiss Regulator Probes
Banks' Possible Precious Metals Collusion, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://next.ft.com/

content/4f35c914-65ba-11e5-9846-de4O6ccb37f2.
281. Schafer et al., supranote 280 (alteration in original).
282. See infra Tables 1-12.
283.

Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 673 (2010).
284. See Poor Bank Culture a Stability Risk; Work Needed-Fed's Dudley, REUTERS (Nov. 5,
2015, 8:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-fed-dudley-idUSLIN1301J620151105 ("The
culture within big banks remains a possible source of financial instability seven years after the worst
crisis since the Great Depression, and more work is needed to reform the underlying causes of Wall
Street misconduct, a top Federal Reserve official said."). In an October 2014 meeting with bankers,
Michael C. Dudley, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that "[a]n
'apparent lack of respect for law, regulation and the public trust' persists" that reflects "deep-seated
cultural and ethical failures," and that "the consequences of cultural and ethical failures in [large,
complex and interconnected firms] are also more severe and harmful to the economy." William C.
Dudley, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture
and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/speeches/2015/dudl 51105.html.
285.

Christopher Condon, Fed's Tarullo Warns Banks to Curb Culture of Bad Behavior,

BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-20/fed-starullo-says-wall-street-misconduct-disturbingly-regular.html ("'Ifbanks do not take more effective
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Bank of New York, has stated that repeated banker misconduct is
grounds for breaking up a (presumably unmanageably large) bank.2 8 6
V.

EXISTING OFFENSES UNDER THE CEA

To determine if the CFTC needs additional authority to combat
anticompetitive conduct, one must first understand the scope of the
CFTC's existing enforcement arsenal. By and large, there are two main
categories of wrongdoing under the CEA (and regulations promulgated
thereunder): (1) fraudulent activity and (2) manipulative and disruptive
trading practices. 28 7 The prohibitions against manipulative and disruptive
trading practices also, generally speaking, seek to combat
anticompetitive activity, 288 but the underlying causes of action differ in

&

steps to control the behavior of those who work for them, there will be both increased pressure and
propensity on the part of regulators and law enforcers to impose more requirements, constraints, and
punishments,' [Governor of the Federal Reserve Daniel Tarullo] said in the text of his remarks.");
see also id. (""Where there is significant incidence of behavior that violates laws or regulations, or
runs afoul of supervisory guidance, then we will need to consider some combination of tougher
sanctions, additional regulation, or more intrusive supervisory oversight,' [Tarullo] said."); Sam
Fleming & Chris Giles, The City ofLondon Faces More Than 'a Few Bad Apples,' FIN. TIMES (Oct.
27, 2014, 11:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/db35a3b4-7914-11e4-b518-00144feabdcO.
html (stating that some proposals to address repeated bank misconduct included "tougher penalties
on staff who breach internal guidelines, more intrusive electronic surveillance of trading floors, and
more established procedures for protecting whistleblowers" along with "harsher regulation,
including imposing higher capital charges on firms that fall foul of rules").
286. See Ryan Tracy & Victoria McGrane, Fed Tells Banks to Shape Up or Break Up, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 21, 2014, at Cl ("Mr. Dudley raised the specter of breaking up big banks, saying if firms
don't prove they can comply with the law 'the inevitable conclusion will be reached that your firms
are too big and complex to manage effectively. In that case, financial-stability concerns would
dictate that your firms need to be dramatically downsized and simplified so they can be managed
effectively."'); see also Editorial, How Bankers Are Paid Is Now Everyone's Business, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4d72a5a8-6e52-lle4-bffb-00144feabdcO.html
(stating that the bank forex benchmark rate-rigging scandal has "left shareholders, customers and
regulators wondering how to stop banks from repeating such appalling practices" and that "[iun the
end, banks may only regain the confidence of regulators and customers once they have been split
into smaller, more coherent units").
287. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 1.15[1] ("The principal focuses of the [CEA] and
the overall regulatory scheme, however, can be categorized generally as (1) protection of the
markets from manipulative or other anticompetitive behavior and (2) protection of the users of the
market from improper conduct by their agents and fiduciaries."). Note that the CFTC, in bringing
civil enforcement actions against alleged violators of CEA antifraud provisions, does not have to
prove reliance. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 41,403 (July 14,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
288. See Sharon Brown-Hruska, Market Manipulation in the Energy Markets, FUTURES
DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2003, at 1 ("[M]anipulation is treated in a similar fashion to a violation
of our antitrust laws. . . . Proof of manipulation involves elements similar to those found in antitrust
law .... ); Jerry W. Markham et al., Market Manipulation-FromStar Chamber to Lone Star,
FuTuREs & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2003, at 7 ("The concept of monopoly was related to the
focus on the manipulation of prices.").
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some ways from traditional antitrust law causes of action. The CFTC's
Division of Enforcement investigates and civilly prosecutes alleged
violations of the CEA and CFTC Regulations.28 9
A.

Market Manipulationand Disruptive Trading Practices

A discussion of market power manipulation, 29 0 also known as price
manipulation,29 is a good place to begin a discussion of enforcement
causes of action under the CEA because preventing price manipulation
has been one of the primary purposes of the federal regulation of futures
and other derivatives since the U.S. government began overseeing these
markets in 1922 with the Grain Futures Act.292 From the beginning of
U.S. regulation of futures markets, federal law has outlawed
manipulation without defining it. 29 3 As a result of the lack of a concrete
statutory definition, the legal theories underlying price manipulation
claims have largely been shaped by judicial decisions, which have
acknowledged that "[t]he methods and techniques of manipulation are
limited only by the ingenuity of man." 2 94 Throughout much of the
history of U.S. derivatives regulation, federal law and regulators largely
have been viewed as ineffective at preventing and punishing
manipulation.295 Under current law, section 9(a)(2) of the CEA prohibits
any person from manipulating the price of a commodity in interstate
commerce, a futures contract, or a swap. 296 "[CIlassic market
manipulation" schemes, which commonly were referred to as "corners"
or "squeezes," had clear parallels to conduct that would run afoul of the

289.
290.

Enforcement: Office ofthe Director, supranote 65.
See Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation:Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence,

31 ENERGY L.J. 1, 3-6 (2010) (distinguishing types of "market power manipulations" from "fraudbased manipulations").
291. Some sources use the phrases, "market-power manipulation," or "market manipulation,"
while others use the phrase, "price manipulation" to focus on the fact that manipulative schemes

distort the price or prices of financial products. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted
Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76
Fed. Reg. at 41,407 (using the phrase, "price manipulation").
292. See Markham, supra note 3, at 298-303; Comment, The Delivery Requirement: An
Illusory Bar to Regulation of Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171, 171 n.2

(1963); see also Scopino, supra note 44, at 259-60.
293. 23A JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS
UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 9:17.50, Westlaw (database updated 2015).

294.

Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).

295.

See generally Markham, supra note 3.

296. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012). Section 6(c) and (d) of the CEA authorizes the CFTC to file a
complaint and impose, inter alia, civil monetary penalties and cease and desist orders if the CFTC
believes that a person has manipulated or attempted to manipulate the market price of any

commodity, futures contract, or swap (or has violated any of the provisions of the CEA). See 7
U.S.C. §§ 9(4)(A), (10}-(1 1), 13b.
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antitrust laws, in that corners and squeezes generally involved
circumstances in which a person (or persons) bought or otherwise
controlled all or a substantial portion of the deliverable supplies
of a commodity and the related futures contracts for a particular
delivery date.2 97
To succeed on a claim for price manipulation, the CFTC must show
that: (1) the defendant had the ability to influence market prices, (2) an
artificial price existed, (3) the defendant caused the artificial price, and
(4) the defendant specifically intended to cause the artificial price.298
"An artificial price is a price that 'does not reflect basic forces of supply
and demand."' 299 To satisfy the specific intent element, the CFTC must
prove that the defendant "acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or
conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the
market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and
demand."1 3 " Some authors have called intent the "essence" 301 and even
the "determinative element"3 02 of a price manipulation claim.
As mentioned, it has been noted that market manipulation claims
share some characteristics with antitrust claims. For example, under
CEA section 6c(a), the CFTC may enjoin any person who "is restraining
trading," and "[t]his phraseology suggests a nexus between manipulation
and the forms of activity proscribed by the federal antitrust laws."3 03
Other commentators have observed the connection between the price
manipulation cause of action under the CEA and causes of action
brought pursuant to the antitrust laws. 3 ' For example, a leading
297.

CLAIMS

13 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION, & OTHER

§ 15:8,

Westlaw (database updated 2016) (explaining "Market-Power Manipulations");

Markham et al., supranote 288.

298. CFTC v. Pamon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
299. Id. at 246 (quoting In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 1025, 1044 (N.D. ill.
1995)).
300. Id. at 249 (quoting In re Energy Transfer Partners Nat. Gas Litig., No. 4:07-cv-3349, 2009
WL 2633781, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2009)).
301. 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 293,
"the essence of a manipulation claim").

§ 9:17:50

(stating that the element of intent is

302. 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 5.05[l] (quoting Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v.
Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1953)); George A. Davidson, Squeezes and Corners: A
Structural Approach, 40 BUS. LAW. 1283, 1289 (1985) ("In practice, the only important issue is
intent.").
303. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 1.15[2].
304. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market ManipulationLaw: A (Very) CriticalAnalysis
and A ProposedAlternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 945, 968 (1994) ("Parallel to the structure of
an antitrust case, the demonstration of causation in manipulation cases has proceeded in two steps:

(1) definition of the relevant market and (2) presentation of evidence that the accused manipulator
had the ability to affect price in the market as defined."); Benjamin E. Kozinn, Note, The Great
Copper Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a Problem in the Wake of Sumitomo Debacle?, 69

FORDHAM L. REv. 243, 256 (2000) ("Generally, 'market power' is the exercise of 'monopoly
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derivatives law treatise characterizes price manipulation as "the
elimination of effective price competition in a market for cash
commodities or futures contracts (or both) through the domination of
either supply or demand and the exercise of that domination
intentionally to produce artificially high or low prices."30 5 Additionally,
the treatise states the following:
Price manipulation is kindred to the exercise of monopoly power to
dictate prices that would be unachievable in a truly competitive
environment. The existence of price manipulation is largely a factual
question involving determinations whether the requisite domination or
monopoly exists, whether an artificial price is caused by the exercise
of that power and whether the dominant party specifically intended to
bring about that artificial price. 306
Notwithstanding the similarities between price manipulation and
antitrust causes of action, the two types of claims have important
differences. First, historically, price manipulation claims generally have
been limited to conduct related to trading activity, whereas the antitrust
laws have not been restricted to those circumstances. Second, price
manipulation claims involve an overriding focus on whether the
defendant (or defendants) specifically intended to cause an artificial
price (or prices), 30 7 whereas antitrust claims typically eschew evidence
related to a defendant's intent and instead focus on the market effects
of the potentially anticompetitive conduct. 308 Additionally, further
power,' a concept derived from antitrust laws." (quoting STEPHEN CRAIG PIRRONG, THE
ECoNOMICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY OF MARKET POWER MANIPULATION 18-19 (1996))).
305.

3 JOHNsON & HAZEN, supra note 65,

§ 5.02[3].

306. Id.
307. See Davidson,supra note 302, at 1289.
308. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cit. 1989) ("Stripping intent away brings the real economic questions to the fore at the same time as
it streamlines antitrust litigation. . . . [T]he evidence offered to prove intent will be even more
ambiguous than the economic data it seeks to illuminate."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 188-91 (1976) (discounting the probative value of intent evidence in
antitrust actions); see also Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953)
("Since the requisite intent is inferred whenever unlawful effects are found ... the contracts may yet
be banned by § 1 [of the Sherman Act] if unreasonable restraint was either their object or effect."
(citations omitted)). As mentioned, horizontal price-fixing schemes and other cartel-like behaviors
(for example, as exhibited by bankers rigging financial benchmarks) are most appropriately
combatted through application of the antitrust laws. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust
Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REv. 57, 110 (2013) ("[I]ntent has not featured prominently in many
modem antitrust cases, perhaps because intent is largely irrelevant to the market effects of a
particular restraint."). Intent is, however, relevant to civil antitrust claims for conspiracies to
monopolize and attempts to monopolize, as well as for criminal antitrust actions. See Maurice E.
Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J.L. EcoN. & POL'Y 801, 808-17 (2012). Some commentators
disagree with the modem trend to consider intent evidence as relatively unimportant in most civil
antitrust claims. See id at 817-48. But even if one accepts that intent has some degree of relevance
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illustrating the CEA's emphasis on ensuring that the prices of derivatives
be determined by the interactions of buyers and sellers in competitive
markets, the CEA prohibits wash trading, which is the name given to
taking both sides of prearranged, noncompetitive trades in futures and
other derivatives (also referred to as "self dealing" or "self trading").309
Additionally, market manipulation claims require proof that the price of
a derivative was artificial, whereas antitrust claims do not have any such
requirement. Antitrust claims judged under a rule of reason standard
only have to show that the conduct in question has a probability of
harming competition,310 which typically translates to evidence that
consumers were harmed either by supracompetitive prices or reduced
output.311 Even more, in situations involving per se violations of the
antitrust laws, such as price-fixing agreements and horizontal group
boycotts, there is no need to prove that the conduct in question had any
effect on prices.312 This is because activities that constitute per se
violations are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable under the
theory that such activities are highly likely to reduce or restrict
competition.3 13 Therefore, the antitrust laws broadly prohibit conduct
that is likely, and in some cases conclusively presumed, to restrain or
reduce competition (and thereby likely lead to, inter alia,
to all civil antitrust claims (and not just to conspiracies and attempts to monopolize), price
manipulation claims require proof of specific intent, which generally is much more difficult to
prove. The specific intent to cause an artificial price in a futures contract or derivative is the
"determinative element" of a price manipulation claim. 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65,
§ 5.05[l] (quoting Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1953)); see
CFTC v. Pamon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
309. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(1H2) (2012). The CFTC has stated that "the common denominator of
the specific abuses prohibited in Section 4c(a) . . .is the use of trading techniques that give the
appearance of submitting trades to the open market while negating the risk or price competition
incident to such a market." In re Collins, CFTC No. 77-15, 1986 WL 66165, at *7 (Apr. 4, 1986). In
addition to section 4c(a) of the CEA, CFTC Regulation 1.38, 17 C.F.R. § 1.38, also makes it
unlawful for anyone to enter into certain kinds of transactions that are considered noncompetitive or
believed to facilitate noncompetitive trading. See Scopino, supra note 44, at 263-68.
310. F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1986); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
311. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 477, 489 (1977); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.,
457 U.S.-332, 343-48 (1982); see Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d
256, 264 (2d Cir. 2001); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered an Antitrust Injury in
the Microsoft Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 832 (2001).
312. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (due to their "pernicious effect on
competition and the lack of any redeeming value" some types of business arrangements "are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable" and therefore per se violations); United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
313. N Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5; see NCAA v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Okla, 468 U.S.
85, 100-103 (1984) (stating that courts can presume harm from price fixing).
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supracompetitive prices), whereas market manipulation claims are more
exacting and require proof of an actual harmful price effect (in other
words, that an artificial price did, in fact, exist).
B. Antifraud Claims
Another of the primary purposes of the CEA and regulations
promulgated thereunder is to protect investors in the markets for futures
and other derivatives from fraud.314 As a general matter, the law uses the
concept of fraud as a broad catch-all to capture conduct that works an
injustice upon another without constituting actual theft or some other
specific type of legal wrong.315 The CEA and CFTC Regulations have
several antifraud provisions.3 16 Generally speaking, to establish liability
for fraud in a civil enforcement action, the CFTC must prove "three
elements: (1) the making of a misrepresentation, misleading statement,
or a deceptive omission; (2) scienter; and (3) materiality."3 17 Fraud is
more than just making bald-faced lies, as relevant judicial precedent
holds that fraud includes deceptive omissions, such as failing to mention
one's unsuccessful track record in derivatives trading. 1 Proving that the
defendant acted with a culpable mental state-that is, scienter-can be
satisfied by showing that the defendant acted recklessly or
intentionally. 1 Recklessness has been defined as highly unreasonable
314. See 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 3.02[2][B]; 13 MARKHAM, supra note 297,
17A:1.10 (discussing the background and history of the first federal commodity futures antifraud
provisions); Scopino, supranote 128, at 459-61.
315. See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1548-49
(2008) ("Legal prohibitions on fraud are exceedingly open textured, often consisting of no more
than the edict, 'Do not defraud others."') [hereinafter Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth]; Samuel
W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?,61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520-25 (2011). The extremely broad scope
that legal systems have given to the concept of fraud dates back hundreds of years. See Buell, The
Upside of Overbreadth, supra, at 1549 n.228 (citing, inter alia, Twyne's Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep.
809, 815-16 (K.B.)).
316. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6o (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 33.10 (2016) (prohibiting fraud in

§

connection with commodity options transactions).

317. CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Scopino,
supra note 268, at 655-56.
318. See CFTC v. Risk Capital Trading Grp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1245-46 (N.D. Ga. 2006)
(finding that failure to disclose investing track record in which the overwhelming majority of
customers had lost their investments was a material factual omission); CFTC v. Commonwealth Fin.

Grp., 874 F. Supp. 1345, 1353 n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("Plaintiffs suggest that it amounts to a
misrepresentation when salespeople emphasize the profits enjoyed by Commonwealth customers
without mentioning any of the losses. The Court agrees."); Scopino, supra note 128, at 461.

319. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 41,404 (July 14,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180); see Scopino, supra note 44, at 234 n.55, 250. Scienter
also is an essential element of a securities fraud claim under SEC Rule 1 Ob-5, which is the primary
antifraud provision of the securities laws. See Randall W. Bodner et al., Corporate Scienter After

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss2/12

50

Scopino: Expanding the Reach of the Commodity Exchange Act's Antitrust Con

2016]

COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT'S ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS

623

conduct that departs so greatly from the standard of care that it is "very
difficult to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was
doing." 320 It can be difficult for the CFTC to prove that a defendant
acted with a culpable mental state in some circumstances, including, but
not limited to, circumstances involving high-speed, automated trading
systems.31 To ensure that futures trading professionals do not deceive
their customers, section 4o(l)(B) of the CEA imposes fraud liability
under a negligence standard, without requiring scienter, to commodity
trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and their APs.322
The CEA also has "Price Reports Clauses" 323 that provide for a
somewhat unusual fraud-based market manipulation cause of action that
prohibits disseminating or spreading false rumors or reports about crop
or market information.3 2 4 For example, section 9(a)(2) of the CEA
makes the following act unlawful:
Any person . . knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered for
transmission through the mails or interstate commerce by telegraph,
telephone, wireless, or other means of communication false or
misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market
information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any
commodity in interstate commerce. 325

A claim for false reporting requires the CFTC to show that (1) a
defendant knowingly transmitted or delivered market reports or market
information through interstate commerce; (2) the reports or information
were knowingly false, misleading, or inaccurate; and (3) the reports or
information affected or tended to affect the price of a commodity in
interstate commerce. 326 The Price Reports Clauses "prohibit misleading
Janus, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1639, 1639 (2012) ("Scienter-or a culpable mental state-is
an essential element of any Rule 1Ob-5 securities fraud claim, including when the claim is against a
corporation.").

320. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,404 (citing Drexel
Burnham Lambert Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
321. See Scopino, supranote 44, at 250-52.
322. 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (2012); see Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 981, 993
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) "does not require a showing of scienter"); Messer
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 677 (1lth Cir. 1988) (stating that 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) "does not
require proof of scienter").

323. Verstein, supra note 70, at 262-63.
324. Scopino, supranote 268, at 657-58.
325. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2).
326. See CFTC v. Atha, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (citing United States v.
Valencia, 394 F.3d 352, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2004)); Scopino, supra note 268, at 658 ("False reports
claims have most of the hallmarks of standard fraud claims except that the misrepresentations are
not typically targeted at select people, but instead are generally sent to an exchange or market
information provider, and then communicated to the market as a whole.").
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'

price reports, quite apart from whether anyone was misled."3 2 7 In its
settlements with banks accused of manipulating LIBOR, the CFTC has
referred to the prohibition on false reports pursuant to section 9(a)(2).328
In particular, the CFTC argued that the banks made false, misleading,
and knowingly inaccurate reports concerning the cost of borrowing
unsecured funds (which is what LIBOR purports to represent) in
violation of section 9(a)(2).329 While section 9(a)(2) uses the word,
"knowingly," in connection with the dissemination of false, misleading,
or inaccurate reports, the CFTC in 2011 used authority granted to the
agency in the Dodd-Frank Act330 to promulgate a rule that prohibits
recklessly disseminating false, misleading, or inaccurate reports that
affect or tend to affect the price of a commodity.33
Additionally, in 2010, Congress included in the Dodd-Frank Act
statutory language granting the CFTC the same broad prohibition against
fraud-based manipulation.3 3 2 The Dodd-Frank Act amended section
6(c)(1) of the CEA333 by inserting language into the CEA that tracks
the SEC's catch-all prohibition against deceptive and manipulative
devices-section 10(b) of the CEA.33 4 Section 10(b) provided the SEC
with its basis for promulgating SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 35 its broad, multi-

327. Verstein, supranote 70, at 262.
328. See Scopino, supra note 268, at 658-60; Verstein, supranote 70, at 264 & n.257.
329. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Orders UBS to Pay
$700 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of Manipulation, Attempted Manipulation and False
Reporting of LIBOR and Other Benchmark Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.cfic.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6472-12; see also In re UBS AG, CFTC No. 13-09, 2012 WL
6642376, at *45-50 (Dec. 19, 2012) (treating the making of false, misleading, or knowingly
inaccurate reports as a violation under section 9(a)(2) of the CEA).
330. See 7 U.S.C. § 9(l)(C).
331. CFTC Regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(4) (2014). The rule states that it is unlawful to:
Deliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to be delivered, for
transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, by any means of communication
whatsoever, a false or misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market
information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in
interstate commerce, knowing, or acting in reckless disregard of the fact that such report
is false, misleading or inaccurate.
Id; see Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 41,398 (July 14, 2011) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
332. See Scopino, supra note 268, at 663-66.
333. 7 U.S.C. § 9; Scopino, supra note 268, at 663-64.
334. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 ("The language
of CEA section 6(c)(1), particularly the operative phrase 'manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance,' is virtually identical to the terms used in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.").
335. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
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purpose tool for combatting fraud and manipulation.3 36 On July 7, 2011,
the CFTC unanimously voted to adopt final Rule 180.1,337 which
implements "the statutory prohibition under CEA section 6(c)(1) against
using or employing 'any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance' in connection with any swap, or a contract of sale of any
commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to
the rules of any registered entity." 3 ' The CFTC modeled Rule 180.1
after Rule 1Ob-5.*
Courts have construed schemes involving securities manipulation
as a form of fraud by construing the word, "manipulative," as "virtually
a term of art when used in connection with securities markets," and
finding that "[i]t connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the
price of securities."340 In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
that "[t]he term refers generally to practices, such as wash sales,
matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors
by artificially affecting market activity."341 That is, "[t]he gravamen of
manipulation is deception of investors into believing that the prices at
which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural
34 2
Under
interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by manipulators."
implied
an
"constitute[]
can
activity
trading
law,
decisional
relevant

336. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399.
337. See 17 C.F.R. § 180.1; Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,398
(reporting the adoption of CFTC Rule 180.1); Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, Open Meeting on Five Final Rule Proposals under the Dodd-Frank Act (July 7, 2011),
http://www.cfic.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaevent_cftcdoddfrank0707 1i (showing a unanimous vote
on antimanipulation rules). The new antifraud and antimanipulation provisions became effective on
August 15, 2011. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,398. The CFTC had
issued its notice of proposed rulemaking on October 26, 2010, which was published in the Federal
Register on November 3, 2010. Id.
338. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399; see generally
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the

Urgent Need for Economic andEmpiricalAnalyses, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357 (2013).
339. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 ("Given the
similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b), the [CFTC] deems it
appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1 on SEC Rule lob-5.").
340. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
341. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
342. Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Schultz Inv. Advisors,
Inc., Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8650, 34-53029, 87 SEC Docket 4, 8-9 (Dec. 28, 2005)
(imposing a $100,000 fine and disgorgement of profits for a marking the close scheme).
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misrepresentation in violation of Rule lOb-5 and section 10(b)" because
"'[c]onduct itself can be deceptive' and liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 does not require 'a specific oral or written statement."' 3 43 In
this manner, courts have construed market manipulation schemes that
use trading activity to distort the price (or prices) of securities as
fraudulent conduct. 3' To the extent that the CFTC (in filing civil
enforcement actions) and courts follow this line of securities law
precedent with new Regulation 180.1, then the CFTC will be able to use
a fraud-on-the-market (that is, fraud-based manipulation) legal theory to
combat market manipulation. Congress appears to like using fraud-based
causes of action to target energy market manipulation-it granted both
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") and the FTC with
the authority to combat fraud-based manipulative schemes with language
that mirrors section 10(b) of the CEA and SEC Rule lOb-5.345
VI.

ANALYZING THE RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY TEXT

The decision by Congress to use the Dodd-Frank Act to amend the
CEA in a way that empowered the CFTC to police swap entities for
anticompetitive conduct was consistent with the overall objectives of
the CEA to promote fair and competitive markets for derivatives, as well
as with specific provisions of the CEA that reference antitrust
considerations. In analyzing whether CEA section 4s(j)(6) and the
more or less identically-worded Regulation 23.607(a) will be effective
in combating anticompetitive conduct in the markets for derivatives,
the appropriate starting point is an examination of the text of
those provisions.
Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York appears to
have written the only judicial decision interpreting the language of
section 4s(j)(6) of the CEA. In 2014, Judge Cote authored a decision in

343. VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citing and
quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)).
344. See Scopino, supra note 268, at 670-75.
345. See Theodore A. Gebhard & James F. Mongoven, Prohibiting Fraudand Deception in
Wholesale Petroleum Markets: The New Federal Trade Commission Market Manipulation Rule, 31

ENERGY L.J. 125, 127-36 (2010); Shaun Ledgerwood & Dan Harris, A Comparison of AntiManipulation Rules in U.S. and EU Electricity and Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal for a

Common Standard, 33 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4-10 (2012); Allison Murphy et al., The FERC Enforcement
Process, 35 ENERGY L.J. 283, 313-16 (2014). The CFTC is probably the only government agency
that has authority to bring fraud-based manipulation claims involving conduct in the financial
markets for energy derivatives (as opposed to the markets for electricity and physical energy
products, such as oil). See, e.g., Anthony E. Ghee, FERC Does Not Have Anti-Manipulation

Authority in FinancialMarkets, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 379, 390-401 (2013). But see
Gebhard & Mongoven, supra, at 137-39.
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the In re Credit Default Antitrust Litigation case that interpreted section
4s(j)(6) (and the corresponding language in the securities laws).3 46 Judge
Cote wrote "the antitrust considerations provisions impose a duty to
avoid actions that could have antitrust implications even if those actions
fall short of actually violating the antitrust laws."347 Judge Cote added,
"[i]n other words, the antitrust considerations provisions impose on
dealers obligations above and beyond what the antitrust laws themselves
require." 348 The decision dealt with the antitrust considerations
provisions only briefly, in response to an unsuccessful argument by the
banks that those provisions protected them from the application of the
antitrust laws.349 This Part scrutinizes the language of section 4s(j)(6)
and Regulation 23.607(a) to a greater degree than Judge Cote's decision
required, with the goal of understanding the reach, and likely
effectiveness, of these provisions.
At the outset, one observes that both Regulation 23.607(a) and
section 4s(j)(6) use the word "shall." Generally, use of the word "shall"
in statutes is normally (that is, in the absence of legislative history to the
contrary) construed as being mandatory and thereby imposing an
enforceable duty on the party or parties to whom the statute is
directed. 35 0 The repeated use of the word "any" (which means "[o]ne,
some, every, or all without specification")35 ' in section 4s(j)(6) of the
CEA and Regulation 23.607 is evidence of an intent for this provision to
have a broad scope. For example, the mandate that swap entities not
"take any action that results in an unreasonable restraint of trade"
ensures that every action causing such a result 3 2-an unreasonable
346. No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL 4379112 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).
347. Id. at *17.
348. Id
349. Id. at *16-17.
350. See, e.g., Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Barbour, 5 So. 3d 601, 610 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008);
Stewart v. Tunxis Serv. Center, 676 A.2d 819, 823-24 (Conn. 1996); Bergman v. Monarch Constr.
Co., 925 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio 2010); Commonwealth v. Baker, 690 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997);
State ex rel. Kern v. Santucci, 494 S.E.2d 911, 913-14 (W. Va. 1997).
351.

Any, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993). Further, the Oxford

English Dictionaryindicates the following with respect to the word "any":
With a preceding negative (explicit or implicit) it denies of a person or thing, without
limitation as to which, and thus, constructively, of every being or thing of the kind. It
thus becomes an emphatic negative, with its unqualified or uncompromising scope
brought into prominence; = None at all; none of any kind, quantity, or number, even the
minutest; not even one; as 'I could not think of any thing else,' 'he was forbidden to
enter any house,' 'to prevent any loss.'
Any, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), www.oed.com/oed2/00009997.

352.

As a verb, which is how the word is used here, "result" means "[t]o arise as a

consequence, effect, or outcome of some action, process, or design; to occur as a result to; to end or
conclude in a specified manner." Result, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.

com.proxy.library.comell.edu/view/Entry/164062?rskey-yXvdjC&result-2#eid
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restraint of trade -is prohibited.353 Likewise, the requirement that swap
entities not "impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading or
clearing" prohibits the imposition of every type of anticompetitive
burden that is above a certain materiality threshold.354
Thus, it appears that, with section 4s generally and 4s(j)(6) in
particular, Congress intended to impose a significant new regulatory
regime over swap entities that would not permit any type of actions that
are harmful to market participants or investors from slipping through the
cracks. For instance, with the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress did not just
prohibit fraudulent and manipulative acts by swap entities,355 as is the
case with some other categories of market participants, 3 56 Congress even
dictated that swap dealers and major swap participants must
communicate with their counterparties in a fair and balanced manner35 7
and not adopt any process or take any action that results in an
unreasonable restraint of trade.35 8 As mentioned, the CFTC implemented
many of the requirements of section 4s by promulgating the regulations
in Part 23 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which only
apply to swap entities. 35 9

31, 2016). As a noun, "result" means "[t]he effect, consequence, or outcome of some action,
process,

or design." Result, OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,

http://www.oed.com.

proxy.library.comell.edu/view/Entry/164061?rskey=yXvdjC&result-1&isAdvanced-false#eid (last
visited Dec. 31, 2016).
353. Absent, of course, those actions that would be "necessary or appropriate to achieve the
purposes of the [CEA]." 17 C.F.R. § 23.607(a) (2016).
354. Again, subject to the "necessary or appropriate" exception. Id.
355. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1)(A) (2012).
356. See id § 6o(1)(B) ("(1) It shall be unlawful for a commodity trading advisor, associated
person of a commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator, or associated person of a
commodity pool operator, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, directly or indirectly . . (B) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or participant or prospective client or
participant."); see also Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 981, 993 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that the language of 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) "focuses upon the effect a CTA's ([commodity
trading advisor's]) conduct has on its investing customers rather than the CTA's culpability, and so
does not require a showing of scienter"); Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 677 (1lth Cir.
1988) (stating that [7 U.S.C] "Section 6o(l)(B) does not require proof of scienter").
357. See Scopino, supra note 95, at 41-47 (stating, inter alia, that CEA Section 4s(h)(3)(C)
directed the CFTC to promulgate a fair dealing rule for SDs and MSPs, which the CFTC did with
Regulation 23.433); see also 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3)(C) (codifying Commodity Exchange Act
§ 6s(h)(3)(C)); CFTC Regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 23.433 (2016). As of yet, no lawsuits have been
brought invoking the fair dealing rule by alleging violations of section 4s(h)(3)(C) and Regulation
23.433, but, with time, as such cases are brought, the federal courts will begin providing an
interpretive gloss to these new statutory and regulatory provisions.
358. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)(6).
359. SeesupraPartIl.
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Adopting Any Processor Taking Any Action

"

One clause of Regulation 23.607(a) corresponds with identical
language in section 4s(j)(6) in stating that "[n]o swap [entity] shall adopt
any process or take any action that results in any unreasonable restraint
of trade." 360 The word "adopt" means, inter alia, "to accept formally and
put into effect." 361 The word "process" means, inter alia, "[tihat which
goes on or is carried on; a continuous action, or series of actions or
362
events; a proceeding; . . . a course or mode of action, a procedure."
Likewise, the word "action" means, inter alia, "[s]omething done or
performed, a deed, an act." 36 3 Collectively, the words "adopt,"
"process," and "action" are easily open to broad construction, which
means that swap entities should not, as a general matter, be able to
defend unreasonable restraints of trade by arguing that they had not
taken an action or adopted a process.
As mentioned, the prohibition against unreasonable restraints of
trade mirrors a bedrock prohibition from the country's antitrust laws. As
discussed above, the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract,
combination. . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
3
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
Courts have interpreted section 1 of the Sherman Act as only barring
unreasonable restraints of trade, notwithstanding the fact that the
statutory provision contains no such limitation.3 65 Congress, in using the
phrase, "unreasonable restraint of trade," in CEA section 4s(j)(6) (which
the CFTC included Regulation 23.607(a)) that mirrors, in relevant part, a
term of art from section 1 of the Sherman Act, likely intended for this

360. 17 C.F.R. § 23.607(a) (2016); see 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)(6).
361. Adopt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adopt (last
visited Dec. 31, 2016). "Adopt" is also defined as, inter alia, "[t]o take and follow" as in "a course
of action," and "to vote to accept" as in "to adopt a resolution." Adopt, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supranote 351.

362. "Process" is defined as "[a] series of actions, changes, or functions bringing about a
result," and "[a] series of operations performed in the making or treatment of a product." Process,
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 351. "Process" also can mean "[t]he

formal commencement of any legal action; the mandate, summons, or writ by which a person or
thing is brought into court for litigation." Process, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,

http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/viewlEntry/1 51794?rskey=vFeiQO&result-'l#eid
(last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
363. "Action" can also mean "[a] legal process, a lawsuit," and "[a] share in a joint-stock
company." Action, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.

cornell.edu/view/Entry/1938?rskeypD6gPU&result-1#eid (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
364. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
365. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Although the Sherman Act, by its
terms, prohibits every agreement 'in restraint of trade,' this Court has long recognized that Congress

intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.").
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provision to be applied in a similar manner.3 66 Accordingly, federal
courts tasked with interpreting this clause should look to jurisprudence
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. At a minimum, antitrust judicial
precedent makes clear that the establishment of, and participation in, a
horizontal price-fixing cartel is an unreasonable restraint of trade.3 67
Importantly, however, section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607(a) are
broader in scope than Sherman Act section 1 because section 1 requires
a contract, combination, or conspiracy, whereas section 4s(j)(6) and
Regulation 23.607(a) is triggered if a swap entity "adopts any process"
or "takes any action" that results in an unreasonable restraint of trade.3 68
As mentioned, the "adopt any process or take any action" clause is
extremely broad.3 69 Accordingly, courts interpreting section 4s(j)(6) and
Regulation 23.607 should keep that fact in mind when examining section
1 of the Sherman Act precedent, because section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation
23.607 appear to reach a broader range of facts and circumstances.
Also noteworthy is the fact that this clause targets any action that
results in any unreasonable restraint of trade. Courts have interpreted
similar provisions in the CEA and securities laws as focusing on the
results of people's actions, regardless of their intentions, thereby
allowing such claims to proceed without having to prove scienter, i.e., a
culpable mental state consisting of intentional or reckless conduct.3 70
Therefore, in analyzing whether a swap dealer violated section 4s(j)(6)
and Regulation 23.607(a), the issue should not be whether the alleged
perpetrator intended to restrain trade, but whether the conduct in
question had the likelihood of causing that result.3 7' This is, as
mentioned, consistent with civil antitrust causes of action, which
generally focus less on intent than on market outcomes. 37 2

366.

See 156 CONG. REC. S3348 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cantwell).

367.

See 1 JULIAN VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION:

DESK EDITION § 2.03[2][b][i] (2nd ed. 2016) (explaining that horizontal price fixing is per se illegal
under the antitrust laws).

368. See In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL
4379112, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014) ("For example, whereas the antitrust laws criminalize
'contract[s], combination[s] . . . or conspirac[ies], in restraint of trade . .. among the
several States,
or with foreign nations,' . . . the antitrust considerations provisions more broadly forbid 'adopt[ing]
any process or tak[ing] any action that results in any unreasonable restraint of trade."').

369.
370.

See supraPart VIA.
See 7 U.S.C. § 6o (2012); 15 U.S.C.

§ 77k (2012).

371. This would be consistent with the fact that, as mentioned, under antitrust law, it is not
necessary to establish actual competitive harm, just the probability. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists,

476 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1986); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
372. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113 (2d ed. 2000).
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Imposing Any MaterialAnticompetitive Burden

Regulation 23.607(a) dictates that swap entities not "impose any
material anticompetitive burden on trading or clearing." The term of art,
"material anticompetitive burden," is not used in antitrust law.
Accordingly, the meaning of the phrase, "material anticompetitive
burden," is ripe for interpretation by the federal courts or further
definition, via a rulemaking, by the CFTC. Generally speaking,
"anticompetitive conduct" is viewed as "[a]n act that harms or seeks to
harm the market or the process of competition among businesses, and
that has no legitimate business purpose." 3 7 The concept of materiality
has been the subject of a significant amount of decisional law, both
under the CEA and under U.S. securities laws, although typically in the
context of circumstances involving fraud on investors.37 4 in such
circumstances, a statement is material if "there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an
investment decision." 37 As a general matter, "material," means, inter
alia, "having real importance."37 6 Given the existing decisional law and
common understanding of the word, courts should be capable of
analyzing the facts of particular cases and determining if the
anticompetitive burden in question is "material." As an initial matter,
"impose" can mean to put or place authoritatively or commandingly. 3 77
"Burden" generally means "[a]
load of labour, duty, [or]
responsibility" 7 which could be compared with the word "restraint" in
the previous clause of Regulation 23.607. As mentioned, there is
substantial decisional law on what constitutes an unreasonable restraint
of trade,379 but even if the word "restraint" were taken in the colloquial
373.

Anticompetitive Conduct, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).

374. See, e.g., CFTC v. Rolando, 589 F. Supp. 2d 159, 168-69 (D. Conn. 2008) (discussing
materiality of misrepresentations).
375. CFTC v. Rosenberg, 85 F. Supp. 2d 424, 447 (D.N.J. 2000); see CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald
& Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328-29 (1lth Cir. 2002).
376.

Material,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/material

(last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
377.

See Impose, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxy.1ibrary.

(last visited Dec.
comell.edu/view/Entry/92591?rskey-5zEfdX&result-2&isAdvanced=false#eid
31, 2016). "Impose" is also defined as "[t]o establish or apply as compulsory; levy" and "[t]o apply
or make prevail by or as if by authority." Impose, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY, supranote 351, at 682 (providing the word "dictate" as a synonym).
378. Burden, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.

comell.edu/view/Entry/24885?rskey-oRESeD&result-1&isAdvanced-false#eid (last visited Dec.
31, 2016).
379. "Burden" also can be defined as, inter alia, "[a] duty or responsibility" and "[s]omething
that hinders or oppresses," as in "a burden on interstate commerce." Burden, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 365. Two synonyms for the word "burden" are "responsibility" and
"encumbrance." Burden, THESAURUS.COM, http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/burden (last visited
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sense, 38 0 it would appear to be a greater limitation (on trade or the
markets, etc.) than a burden. For section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607
purposes, the burden needs to be material and anticompetitive, as
381
discussed above, and it also needs to be on tradingor clearing.
"Trading" refers to circumstances in which market participantstraders-buy, sell, or execute agreements, contracts, or transactions by
placing and accepting bids and offers with other participants.382 As
mentioned, OTC trading refers to situations in which a derivative
contract is not traded on a formal exchange, but instead bilaterally
between counterparties. 38 3 Overall, in U.S. markets, many types of
derivatives must be traded on a DCM or SEF. 384
In addition to the exchange-trading requirements in the CEA and
CFTC Regulations, many types of trades in futures, swaps, and other
derivative contracts also must be cleared with a CFTC-regulated
derivatives clearing organization. 385 As mentioned, "clearing" refers
to several different functions performed by DCOs, which are
colloquially known as clearinghouses, clearing associations, or central
counterparties.3 86 Clearing is "a process that commences at the
point of execution of a trade and ends at maturity and settlement or
termination."3 8 7 Clearing involves the daily matching of trades (that is,
each long position must be matched with a short position), collecting and
maintaining performance margin requirements, monitoring open risk
positions, and settling accounts on a daily basiS 388 :
A clearinghouse is either a department within a futures exchange
or a separate corporation that provides a "financial guarantee" to
a trade. Clearinghouses exist to ensure the financial integrity of
Dec. 31, 2016).
380. "Restraint" means a "restriction" or "limitation." Restraint, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.comell.edu/view/Entry/164011?rskey-

VwWRJI&result-l#eid (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
381. See supra Part VI.B.
382. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § la(15)(A) (2012) (defining "trading facility").
383. See CFTC Glossary, supra note 93 (providing the definition of the term "over-thecounter").

384. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a).
385. Swaps subject to a CFTC clearing requirement are described in Part 50 of the
Commission's Regulations. For an explanation of the clearing requirement for swaps under section
2(h) of the CEA, see Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed.
Reg. 74,284, 74,284 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50).
386.
387.

1 JOHNsON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 1.05.
GORDON F. PEERY, THE POST-REFORM GUIDE TO DERIVATIVES AND FUTURES 102

(2012).
388. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE HANDBOOK OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS 59 (2006)
[hereinafter CBOT HANDBOOK OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS]; 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65,

§ 1.05.
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futures and options contracts traded on futures exchanges. They do
this by committing substantial capital as guarantors for futures and
options transactions. 389
A clearinghouse becomes-typically through novation of the
derivative contract-the buyer to each seller and the seller to each
buyer.390 In fact, "the substitution of the clearinghouse for the original
parties to each derivative contract improves market liquidity and
facilitates entry and exit from the market because, with a central
counterparty, one need not search for the original buyers and sellers to
liquidate open derivative positions."391
Therefore, with this understanding of trading and clearing,
Regulation 23.607 prohibits swap entities from placing material
anticompetitive burdens on trading-the buying and selling of swapsand clearing-the post-trade matching and guaranteeing of trades.392
C.

Unless Necessary or Appropriate

One common theme in the antitrust considerations in the CEAincluding section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607-is that unreasonable
restraints of trade and material anticompetitive burdens are permitted if
they are necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of the CEA.393
The word "necessary" means "[a]bsolutely essential" and "[n]eeded to
achieve a certain result or effect; requisite." 394 To achieve something
means to accomplish it successfully. 395 Therefore, an action is necessary
389. CBOT HANDBOOK OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS, supra note 388, at 59. The CBOT
Handbook of Futures and Options refers to clearinghouses and clearing from the perspective of
futures and options, but the description is generally accurate in regard to swaps as well. Further, the

CEA, 7 U.S.C. § la(15)(A), and CFTC Regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(d), define "derivatives clearing
organization" as an entity that (1) enables each party of a derivative contract to substitute the DCO's
credit for the credit of the counterparties; (2) arranges for the settlement or netting of the derivative

contracts on a multilateral (as opposed to bilateral) basis; or (3) provides services that mutualize or
transfer among clearing members the credit risk arising from such derivative contracts.
390. PEERY, supranote 387, at 102.
391. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 65, § 1.05[1].

392. Professor Greenberger maintains that "conflicts of interest ... allowed SDs to stifle
competition for clearing services and to charge unnecessarily high transaction fees to users of
swaps." Greenberger, supra note 241, at 247.
393.

See supra note 179 (listing the multiple provisions of the CEA that are concerned with

safeguarding the interests protected by the antitrust laws).
394.

Necessary, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 351. Another

definition of "necessary" is "[t]hat is needed" as well as "[i]ndispensable, vital, essential; requisite."
Necessary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/

view/Entry/125629?rskey-CckoKw&result=1#eid (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
395. The word "achieve" has been defined as follows: "[t]o perform or carry out with success;
accomplish" or "[t]o attain with effort or despite difficulty" or "[t]o accomplish something
successfully." Achieve, AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supranote 351.
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to achieve the purposes of the CEA if specific provisions of the CEA
compel or mandate the action. On the other hand, "appropriate" is less
restrictive, generally meaning "[s]pecially fitted or suitable" and
"proper."396 Use of the word "appropriate" in this clause seems to
envision a kind of balancing in which one analyzes particular
anticompetitive conduct by weighing the extent to which conduct harms
competition against the degree to which the conduct achieves the other
purposes of the CEA. A person found to be engaging in anticompetitive
conduct probably would bear the initial burden of showing exactly how
the anticompetitive conduct in question is "appropriate" in light of the
other purposes of the CEA, with the CFTC having the opportunity to try
to rebut that showing. Of course, the CFTC could help market
participants and clarify things greatly by promulgating rules that
specifically enumerated the kinds of anticompetitive actions that are
"appropriate" to achieve the other purposes of the CEA.
Overall, the repeated inclusion of such "necessary or appropriate"
clauses in the CEA antitrust considerations provisions makes sense, in
that certain aspects of financial regulation-for example, minimum
capital requirements-also inevitably lessen competition. That is, not
everyone can simply begin performing the role of various regulated
entities, from derivatives clearing organizations to FCMs--only those
who can afford to meet the various regulatory requirements can do so.
But while the "necessary or appropriate" clause is a limitation on the
application of the enforcement mechanism of the antitrust considerations
provisions of CEA section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607, it is by no
means a blank check to violate those provisions specifically or the
antitrust laws generally. Indeed, the idea that anticompetitive conduct is
permissible if necessary or appropriate to achieve other purposes of a
regulatory statute such as the CEA is consistent with decisional law
concerning the implied preemption of antitrust laws in highly regulated
parts of the economy.39 7

396.

Appropriate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxy.ibrary.

comell.edu/view/Entry/9870?rskey--akw5pV&result--1#eid (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). Another
dictionary defines the word "appropriate" as "[s]uitable for a particular person, condition, occasion,
or place; fitting." Appropriate,THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supranote 351.

397. Preemption of the antitrust laws by implication is disfavored. See United States v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975) (stating that implied exemption of federal
antitrust laws is permissible only when there is "a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between
the antitrust laws and the regulatory system"); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963). More importantly, Congress clearly intended for the antitrust laws to apply in full force to
the commodity futures, swaps, and derivative markets. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. E1347-48 (daily

ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).
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The extent to which anticompetitive conduct would be deemed
"appropriate" to achieve the other purposes of the CEA depends on what
those purposes are and how broadly they would be construed by the
CFTC and courts. The purposes of the CEA, outlined in section 3, are
as follows:
*

*
*
*
*

[P]roviding a means for managing and assuming price risks,
discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information through
trading in liquid, fair and financially secure trading facilities....
[D]eter[ring] and prevent[ing] price manipulation or any other
disruptions to market integrity ....
[E]nsur[ing] the financial integrity of all transactions subject to this
[Act] and the avoidance of systemic risk ....
[P]rotect[ing] all market participants from fraudulent or other
abusive sales practices and misuses of customer assets ....
[P]romot[ing] responsible innovation and fair competition among
boards of trade, other markets and market participants. 398

Absent CFTC Regulations specifying what is considered
"appropriate" to achieve the purposes of the CEA, a person engaging in
anticompetitive conduct in the U.S. derivative markets would
presumably have to show how their anticompetitive conduct achieved
one or more of these other purposes of the CEA and whether there were
any less anticompetitive means of achieving those purposes.
In conclusion, Judge Cote's intuition-that section 4s(j)(6) of the
CEA "impose[s] a duty to avoid taking actions that could have antitrust
implications, even if those actions fall short of actually violating the
antitrust laws" 399-appears
correct in that section 4s(j)(6) prohibits
unreasonable restraints of trade without requiring a combination or
conspiracy and, even more, prohibits not just restraints of trade, but also
material anticompetitive burdens. That said, the fact that the antitrust
considerations provisions in the CEA use a well-known antitrust term of
art-unreasonable restraint of trade-indicates that the type of conduct
prohibited by the CEA's antitrust considerations provisions should be
informed (although not controlled) by existing antitrust law precedent.
Indeed, the broad wording of the antitrust considerations in section
4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607 appears capable of being construed to
support a broad range of antitrust law-based CFTC enforcement actions,
but for the fact that these provisions only apply to swap entities.

398. 7 U.S.C. § 5(a)-(b) (2012).
399. In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014 WL 4379112, at
*17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4,2014).
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BEYOND SECTION 4s(J)(6) AND REGULATION 23.607: THE NEED
FOR A BROADER ANTITRUST CAUSE OF ACTION

Both the antitrust laws and the CEA are concerned with ensuring
that prices are determined through transparent, competitive market
forces. As discussed above, the antitrust laws aim, inter alia, to prevent
monopolists from charging supra-competitive prices, and the CEA's
prohibitions against price manipulation and wash trading aim to prohibit,
inter alia, schemes to cause artificial prices in futures, swaps, and other
derivatives.400 The regulatory framework for the derivatives markets is
premised on the idea that the price discovery function works best in
open, fair, and competitive markets.40 1 Additionally, the CEA directs the
CFTC to consider the U.S. antitrust laws when taking actions,402 and
contains recurring requirements that the entities providing the major
infrastructure for the derivatives markets-such as exchanges and
clearinghouses-to avoid harming competition.403 In the aftermath
of the financial crisis, Congress understandably sought to prevent
anticompetitive conduct in the U.S. markets for swaps by making sure
that the Dodd-Frank Act contained a prohibition against anticompetitive
behavior by large swap-dealing banks and other important participants in
the swaps markets. 4 0 As discussed above,405 several years after the

400. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
401. For example, Core Principle 9 states that an exchange "shall provide a competitive, open,
and efficient market and mechanism for executing transactions that protects the price discovery
process of trading in the centralized market of the board of trade." 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(9); see also Scott
D. O'Malia, Comm'r, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Keynote Address at the State of
the Industry 2014 Conference, Commodity Markets Council, We Can Do Better-It's Time to
Review Our Rules and Make Necessary Changes (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-32 ("[T]he Commission must protect the essential price discovery
and hedging function of the futures and swaps markets."). Likewise, the fact that businesses,
consumers, and even other markets participants can rely on the price discovery function of futures
exchanges has long been touted as one of the benefits of derivatives markets. See William L. Stein,
The Exchange-TradingRequirement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 VAND. L. REV. 473, 484
(1988) ("National and international businesses rely on prices discovered on exchanges to reflect an
equilibrium between supply and demand, not other artificial factors.... Moreover, businesses rely
on the prices discovered on the exchanges as being a reflection of the opinions and expectations of a
broad base of knowledgeable market participants."). Moreover, the CEA explains that derivatives
transactions are "affected with a national public interest by providing a means for managing and
assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information through trading in
liquid, fair and financially secure trading facilities" and that the purpose of the CEA is "to promote
responsible innovation and fair competition among boards of trade, other markets and market
participants." 7 U.S.C. § 5(a)-(b).
402. 7 U.S.C. § 19(b).
403. See, e.g., id. § 7(d)(19) (listing requirements for DCMs); id. § 7a-l(c)(2)(N) (listing
requirements for DCOs).
404. Id. § 6s(j)(6).
405. See supra Part M.A.
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passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the swaps market is still heavily
dominated by a handful of large, dealer banks,406 many of which have
rigged benchmarks for, inter alia, interest rates and foreign currencies
that affect the prices of OTC swaps and other derivatives.407
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, although Congress had
the correct instinct to amend the CEA in 2010 to add section 4s(j)(6) in
effort to prevent anticompetitive cartels in the financial markets, the
CFTC's existing enforcement regime could be improved with the
addition of a broader prohibition against anticompetitive conduct in the
markets for derivatives.40 8
A.

The CFTC Has the Requisite Authority

As a normative matter, Congress would amend the CEA to allow
for a broad prohibition against anticompetitive conduct in the markets
for derivatives because, inter alia, the limited nature of the grant of
antitrust enforcement authority in section 4s(j)(6) of the CEA probably
will severely limit that provision's usefulness as an enforcement tool.
Although congressional action would be preferred, unfortunately, it is
unlikely in the current political climate that Congress will act to expand
a Dodd-Frank Act provision, such as section 4s(j)(6).409 Therefore, the
CFTC should use its existing authority under the CEA to promulgate a
regulation that would expand the reach of the antitrust considerations in
Regulation 23.607.410
The CEA gives the CFTC sufficient authority for the agency to
promulgate a broad regulation prohibiting anticompetitive conduct
in the U.S. derivative markets. The CEA is littered with antitrust
considerations provisions that warn against unreasonable restraints of

406.

KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 126, at 2; Matthew Leising, Defusing Derivatives,

BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (June 21, 2016, 7:51 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/
derivatives-regulatio ("Critics say the new trading structure isn't as competitive as the government

first hoped."). In April of 2010 (a few months before the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law),
Robert E. Litan of the Brookings Institution argued that, for financial reform of the derivatives
markets to be effective, it would need to break the dominance that a handful of dealer banks on the

OTC derivatives markets, but he warned that doing so would be difficult because "the major dealer
banks have strong financial incentives and the ability to delay or impede changes to the status quo."
See LITAN, supra note 245, at 4, 28-32. Litan recommended that antitrust authorities be ready to

address "abuses by dealers and/or entities they control or in which they have significant financial
interest." Id. at 10-11.

407. See infra Tables 1-6.
408. See infra Part VI.A-E.
409. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 81.
410. A mentioned, the analyses and conclusions expressed in this Article are those of the
author and do not reflect the views of other members of DSIO, other CFTC staff, the CFTC itself, or
the United States.
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trade and material anticompetitive burdens.4 11 The repetition of these
antitrust considerations is evidence of a strong desire by Congress to
ensure that participants in U.S. derivative markets avoid harming the
competitive process. Lastly, the fact that some forms of misconduct that
are prohibited by the CEA, such as market manipulation and
noncompetitive prearranged trades, are analogous to antitrust law
violations, shows that a broad prohibition of anticompetitive conduct in
the markets for derivatives would be consistent with the overall statutory
framework that is governing these markets. Taken as a whole, these
references to antitrust concerns in the statutory architecture show that
one of the primary objectives of the CEA is to protect free and fair
competition in the markets for swaps and other derivatives, which would
support the argument that the CFTC has authority to promulgate a broad
regulation prohibiting any person from restraining competition in the
markets for derivatives.
Admittedly, market participants could launch a legal challenge to
any CFTC-promulgated regulation broadly prohibiting anticompetitive
conduct in the markets for swaps, futures, and other derivatives. The
challengers' argument likely would be that Congress could have given
the CFTC broad antitrust authority but instead limited the scope of the
antitrust considerations to swap entities, and that any attempt by the
CFTC to expand the reach of those antitrust considerations would
contradict the intent of Congress.412 The argument would be, in short,
that the specific provision in section 4s(j)(6) limiting antitrust
enforcement authority to swap entities trumps the general nature of
provisions such as sections 3(a) and 3(b) that do not explicitly mention
antitrust considerations.
While it is impossible to predict how a court would rule on any
challenge to a CFTC-promulgated regulation that broadly prohibited any
person from violating the antitrust considerations, one could argue that
courts should view the statute holistically, and that certain provisions of
the CEA clearly allow for the CFTC to promulgate a regulation to
411. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6s(j)(6) (antitrust considerations for swap entities); id. § 7(d)(19)
(antitrust considerations core principle for designated contract markets); id. § 7a-1(c)(2)(N)
(antitrust considerations core principle for derivatives clearing organizations); id. § 7b-3(f)(l 1)
(antitrust considerations core principle for swap execution facilities); id. § 19(b) (CFTC must
consider antitrust laws); id. § 24a(f)(1) (antitrust considerations core principle for swap data
repositories).
412. See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REv. 999,
1060 (2015) (describing "the familiar Chevron two-step approach, under which a reviewing court
defers to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers if, at step one, the court finds 'the
statute is silent or ambiguous' and then, at step two, determines that the agency's reading is a

'permissible construction of the statute"') (citing Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss2/12

66

Scopino: Expanding the Reach of the Commodity Exchange Act's Antitrust Con

2016]

COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT'S ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS

639

protect competition in the markets. Taken together, CEA sections 3(a),
3(b), 8a(5), and 15(b) provide the CFTC with authority to promulgate
such a regulation. More specifically, sections 3(a) and 3(b) show that
Congress wanted a regulatory framework for the markets that enabled
market participants to efficiently and effectively manage price risks and
discover prices while competing fairly with one another. If financial
institutions repeatedly form cartels to rig the prices of financial
instruments, managing price risks, and even the price discovery function
of the markets for derivatives, will be much less effective and efficient.
Such misconduct is hardly the "fair competition" that Congress wanted
in the markets, as evidenced by section 3(b), and, even more, financial
cartels would threaten to undermine confidence about the integrity of the
markets. While the language of sections 3(a), 3(b), and 15(b) might be
somewhat ambiguous, modeling a regulation after the text of the
antitrust considerations for swap entities and infrastructure providers
would be a reasonable way for the agency to achieve the objectives
described in sections 3(a), 3(b), and 15(b) in the face of repeated
collusive schemes to rig the prices of derivatives.413 Importantly, nothing
in the CEA would appear to prohibit the CFTC from addressing harmful
anticompetitive conduct by promulgating a regulation or regulations
based on the text of the statutory antitrust considerations.
Accordingly, the CFTC could argue that such a regulation is
supported by the language of several provisions of the CEA and
reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives of, inter alia, sections 3(a)
and 3(b). The CFTC could argue that, in the years since Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Act, the risk for potential anticompetitive conduct
appears to be greater than previously had been believed, as evidenced by
the numerous collusive schemes that have been discovered and the fact
that the markets for some types of swaps and other derivatives remain
highly concentrated, thereby making collusion easier than in less
concentrated markets. Promulgating a regulation to broadly prohibit
anticompetitive conduct would be particularly appropriate if, after
studying the situation in light of recent events, the CFTC determined that
such a regulation would protect the price discovery function of the
markets and promote fair competition among derivatives market
participants who are trying to manage their price risks.
By promulgating a regulation to prohibit any person from engaging
in anticompetitive conduct in the markets it regulates, the CFTC would
413. That is, responding to repeated instances of harmful anticompetitive conduct in the
markets by promulgating a regulation modeled after the antitrust considerations provisions in the
CEA pursuant to the authority provided in sections 3(a), 3(b), 8a(5), and 15(b) would be a
"permissible construction" of the CEA.
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be fulfilling its congressionally-delegated responsibility under sections
3(a) and 3(b) to ensure that market participants are competing fairly with
each other and that people and businesses can use the markets for
derivatives to manage price risks. This would not be the first time that
the CFTC has promulgated regulations that were not required under a
strict reading of the CEA's language. In the past, the CFTC has
promulgated regulations that went beyond the scope of the literal text of
the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the CEA when the agency has
believed that doing so was permitted by a reasonable interpretation of
the CEA and reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives of the
statute.4 14 Finding that Congress, with the CEA, granted the CFTC
authority to promulgate a regulation prohibiting any person from
violating the antitrust considerations would be consistent with the
principle that Congress should broadly delegate authority to agencies
with technical expertise because expert agencies are in a better position,
vis-A-vis Congress and the courts, to understand how best to address
potential and actual problems in markets that they regulate.4 15
B.

The Antitrust ConsiderationsCore PrinciplesAre Insufficient

In addition to section 4s(j)(6), the CEA has antitrust considerations
core principles for providers of derivatives market infrastructure.4 16
These core principles are insufficient, by themselves, to prevent
414. See, e.g., Investment Company Institute v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of agency in connection with challenge to the
promulgation of regulations rescinding certain exemptions for market intermediaries despite the fact
that agency's action was not explicitly required by the Dodd-Frank Act); Confirmation, Portfolio
Reconciliation, Portfolio Compression, and Swap Trading Relationship Documentation
Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 55,904, 55,905 (Final
Rule, Sept. 11, 2012) (promulgating final rules despite objections that many of the specific
provisions in the rules were not required by the Dodd-Frank Act and that such provisions are not
"reasonably necessary" to achieve the goals of the CEA); Core Principles and Other Requirements
for Swap Execution Facilities, Fed. Reg. 33,483-84 (Final Rule, June 4, 2013) (responding to
commenter argument that the minimum trading functionality requirement was not mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act by stating that the regulations were consistent with the relevant statutory provisions
and promoted the goals provided in section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act).
415. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission'sAuthority, 107 HARV. L. REv. 963, 962, 1018 (1994) (stating, in
regards to the SEC, that "Congress created the [SEC] as an expert agency with the capacity to
address significant problems affecting the nation's securities markets" and that Congress "wanted to
establish an agency that would specialize in securities-related matters and build expertise not easily
captured within the legislature"); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135-37 (2000); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative
Forebearance,125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1553 (2016); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REv. 421, 442, 444 (1987) (describing the post-New Deal
tendency to give federal agencies "a large measure of autonomy").
416. See supra Part II.
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anticompetitive conduct in the markets for derivatives. Indeed, the
benchmark rate-rigging scandals have occurred while the statutory
antitrust considerations core principles were in effect governing the
behavior of DCMs and DCOs. (As mentioned in Part II, the Dodd-Frank
Act created new regulated categories of market infrastructure providers,
SEFs and SDRs, and added antitrust considerations core principles to
govern them). The fact that the antitrust considerations core principles
did not prevent the anticompetitive conduct discussed in this Article is
not entirely surprising. First, the antitrust considerations core principles
for DCMs, DCOs, and SEFs have no impact on swaps and other
derivatives that are not traded or cleared on those DCMs, DCOs, and
SEFs, as was (and still is) the case for some types of OTC derivatives
during the relevant time period. Indeed, as mentioned in the beginning of
this Article, OTC derivatives are those that are traded OTC, which
means not traded on organized exchanges, such as DCMs.417 Second, the
core principles require DCMs, DCOs, SEFs, and SDRs, all of which
have self-regulatory functions, not to take any actions that result in
unreasonable restraints of trade or impose material anticompetitive
burdens in the markets for derivatives, and this directive would seem to
require DCMs, DCOs, SEFs, and SDRs to implement rules and
procedures to prevent anticompetitive conduct by members on their
facilities. But an enforcement regime that relies solely on each
individual DCM, DCO, SEF, and SDR to avoid taking any actions that
result in unreasonable restraints of trade or that impose material
anticompetitive burdens on the markets will be unable to capture
anticompetitive behavior by market participants that are not DCMs,
DCOs, SEFs, or SDRs. This is the same problem that limits the
usefulness of section 4s(j)(6), which prohibits anticompetitive conduct
but only covers the 100 or so swap entities in existence.
As mentioned above, the CFTC generally enforces compliance with
core principles by market infrastructure providers through periodic
examinations, followed by recommendations as to how the market
infrastructure providers could better meet the requirements of the core
principles.4 18 Even assuming that the antitrust considerations core
principles implicitly require DCMs, DCOs, SEFs, and SDRs to
implement internal rules prohibiting their members from engaging in
anticompetitive conduct, on the grounds that in some circumstances a
DCM, DCO, SEF, or SDR could be viewed as indirectly taking an action
that resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade or material
417. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 133-78 and accompanying text.
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anticompetitive burden by failing to have rules and procedures that
would prevent anticompetitive conduct by their members, a regulatory
gap would still exist because the internal rules of any given DCM, DCO,
SEF, and SDR would fail to capture anticompetitive conduct that occurs
across multiple DCMs, DCOs, SEFs, SDRs, and elsewhere. For
example, suppose that a particular DCM promulgated an internal
rule prohibiting anticompetitive conduct by its members in language
identical to the antitrust considerations core principle. The DCM's
internal rule would not reach anticompetitive conduct that stretches
across multiple DCMs or DCOs. While it is beneficial to have
each DCM, DCO, SEF, and SDR promulgate internal rules to
prohibit anticompetitive conduct, such individual rules would be
ineffective against broader anticompetitive schemes that stretch across
multiple exchanges, clearinghouses, and markets. With each individual
DCM, DCO, SEF, and SDR monitoring for anticompetitive conduct
only on their own facilities, broader schemes that involve conduct on
multiple venues and platforms will fall through the cracks. This is a
regulatory gap that the CFTC could fill by promulgating a broad, CFTCenforced prohibition against anticompetitive conduct (and attempted
anticompetitive conduct).
The antitrust considerations core principles also are insufficient
because, while it is important to have SROs and market infrastructure
providers with self-regulatory functions police markets for improper and
abusive conduct, history has shown that a regime that relies on market
infrastructure providers and SROs alone-without parallel enforcement
authority by a government regulator-is much less likely to be effective
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that exchanges and
market infrastructure providers could be hesitant to take actions that
might displease their members or negatively impact their profitability. 4 19
Accordingly, the CEA and CFTC Regulations contain their own
prohibitions against price manipulation and fraud, as opposed to simply
requiring DCMs, DCOs, SEFs, and SDRs to promulgate their own
internal rules against such improper conduct. To provide real
deterrence, language mirroring that of the antitrust considerations core
principles needs to be contained in a regulation that is enforced by the
federal regulator for these markets. The best way to ensure that the
objectives of the antitrust consideration provisions are met is for the
419. History provides a lesson in this regard. The Grain Futures Act, which relied primarily on
exchange self-regulation to prevent market manipulation and other wrongdoing, was a failure. See
Markham, supra note 3, at 303-08; Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Scienter Requirement and Wash
Trading in Commodity Futures: The Knowledge Lost in Knowing, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1625, 1629
n.18 (1995).
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CFTC to promulgate a unified, broadly-worded prohibition against
actions that result in unreasonable restraints of trade and material
anticompetitive burdens.
C.

The Focus on Swap Entities Is Overly Narrow

By their terms, section 4s(j)(6) of the CEA and Regulation
23.607(a) only apply to swap entities, i.e., swap dealers and major swap
participants. 420 This means that, for the CFTC to state a claim under
Regulation 23.607(a), the agency must prove that the defendants are
swap entities. As a result, the CFTC can only enforce Regulation 23.607
against the 105 business entities that are provisionally registered swap
entities.42 This limitation is similar to section 4o of the CEA, which is
an antifraud provision that only applies to commodity pool operators
("CPOs"), commodity trading advisors ("CTAs"), and their associated
persons ("APs").4 22 The CFTC could not (successfully) bring a civil
enforcement action against a person under section 4o unless that person
was a CPO, CTA, or AP of such. 4 23 Because of the limited scope of
section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607, even business entities that are
other types of CFTC registrants, such as FCMs, CPOs, CTAs, and
introducing brokers, do not fall within the ambit of section 4s(j)(6) and
Regulation 23.607. The same is true for non-swap entity business
organizations that are affiliates or subsidiaries of swap entities.
As discussed above, anticompetitive conduct can be facilitated by
other types of market participants, such as interdealer brokers or trade
associations.4 24 Indeed, the tables in the Appendix show that some of the
business entities that have settled government enforcement actions and
private lawsuits involving anticompetitive conduct in the markets for
derivatives are not swap entities. 4 25 Some of the perpetrators are not
even CFTC registrants. For example, the conspiracies to rig LIBOR and
related benchmark interest rates relied on the participation of several
interdealer brokers, and the business entities in question, ICAP and two
RP Martin-affiliated business entities, were not CFTC registrants.426 And

§ 23.607(a)

(2016); see 7 U.S.C.

§ 6s(a)

(2012).

420.

17 C.F.R.

421.

See Swap Dealer (SD) and Major Swap Participant(MSP) Directory, supranote 72.

422. See 7 U.S.C. § 6o.
423. In certain circumstances, the CFTC could potentially use the CEA's controlling person
liability provision. See infra notes 437-42 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.

425. See infra Tables 1-12.
426. See infra Tables 1, 10. Some other ICAP affiliates have registered as SEFs. See Trading
Organizations:Swap Execution Facilities (SEFs), U.S. COMMODiTY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,

http://sirt.cfic.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=SwapExecutionFacilities (last visited Dec. 31 2016).
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in the In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litigation private lawsuit,
which resulted in a $1.86 billion settlement for plaintiffs, one of the
settling defendants was a derivatives market trade association; another
was a provider of market data.427 Further, in reaching settlements with
government authorities in benchmark interest rate-rigging cases, some
banks have attributed misconduct to foreign subsidiaries that are not
CFTC registrants.4 28 Of the three Barclays business entities that have
settled benchmark interest rate-rigging cases with the CFTC, only one
was a swap dealer.4 29
As mentioned, Regulation 23.607 was not in effect when much of
the conduct in question occurred and therefore could not have been used
to combat many of those misdeeds, but the facts of the benchmark
rate-rigging scandals and the list of entities that settled benchmark raterigging cases in the tables in the Appendix show that, because section
4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607 only apply to swap entities, they are
unlikely to capture all participants in derivatives market cartels. 43 0 Thus,
while Congress may have believed in 2010, when it passed the DoddFrank Act and added section 4s(j)(6) to the CEA, that a prohibition that
only targeted anticompetitive conduct by swap entities would be
sufficient to protect the markets, recent history has shown that a broader
prohibition is needed.
Further, de minimis dealers-swap-dealing financial institutions
that engage in less than $8 billion notional in swaps trading-also fall
beyond the scope of Regulation 23.607.41' The de minimis limit is
supposed to remain at $8 billion notional in swaps until December 2017,
at which point the threshold is supposed to fall to $3 billion.43 2 One
could easily imagine a circumstance in which three provisionally
registered swap dealers (with each dealer transacting in greater than $8
billion notional in swaps annually) entered into a cartel to fix benchmark
interest rates with two de minimis dealers (each with as much as $7.9
billion notional in swaps annually), two interdealer brokers, and a trade
association. In such circumstances, more than half of the cartel would be
beyond the reach of Regulation 23.607. Indeed, even expanding
Regulation 23.607 to cover all CFTC registrants would be overly narrow
because some of the misconduct in the benchmark rate-rigging scandals
427. See infra Table 7 (listing ISDA and two Market-affiliated entities as among those that
settled private U.S. lawsuits).
428. See infra Table 10.
429. See infra Table 10.
430. See infra Tables 1-12.
431. See CFTC Regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg) (2016).
432. Political pressure is being applied on the CFTC by members of Congress to keep the de
minimis threshold at $8 billion. See Roland, supranote 103.
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has been perpetrated by business entities and bank employees that do not
appear to fit within the scope of any existing registrant category. As
mentioned, the interdealer brokers who settled LIBOR-rigging cases
with the CFTC, ICAP, and two RP Martin business entities, were not
CFTC registrants.43 3 Likewise, the definition of AP covers derivatives
salespeople and their supervisors, 434 but it is unclear if that definition
would capture all of the bank LIBOR submitters and other bank
employees who were involved in the benchmark rate-rigging
conspiracies. Therefore, the best approach would be for the CFTC to
promulgate a regulation mirroring the language of the antitrust
considerations that would prohibit all persons-regardless of CFTC
registration status-from engaging in actions that result in unreasonable
restraints of trade or material anticompetitive burdens in the markets
for derivatives.
The requirement that one engage in a minimum of $8 billion
notional in swaps annually before being considered a swap dealer has
another consequence in that this threshold appears to have prevented
individuals (natural persons) from becoming swap dealers. Thus far, in
any event, it would seem that there have not been any individuals who
have otherwise met the definition of swap dealer and also engaged in
more than $8 billion notional in swaps annually, as no individuals have
registered as swap dealers.435 Add this to the fact that section 4s(j)(6)
and Regulation 23.607 do not apply to the APs or principals of swap
entities, 43 6 and the existing regime appears to be squarely focused on
targeting large financial institutions (swap entities) rather than the
individuals who cause those institutions to engage in anticompetitive
conduct. Admittedly, the same is true of the status quo: as is evident
from the tables in the Appendix to this Article, the CFTC has not gone
after a single individual in connection with the schemes to rig LIBOR
(and related benchmark interest rates), forex benchmark rates, or
ISDAfix. 4 37 The CFTC has been chronically underfunded, 4 38 and this

433. See infra Table 10.
434. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(aa).
435. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
436. Dual and Multiple Associations of Persons Associated with Swap Dealers, Major Swap
Participants and Other Commission Registrants, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,788, 20,788 (Apr. 8, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 3, 23) ("Although APs of other [CFTC] registrants are generally required
to register with the [CFTC], APs of SDs and MSPs are not required to register as such." (footnotes
omitted)).
437. See infra Tables 1-5.
438. See Alan Pyke, Key Dodd-FrankAgency Is Being Undermined by Budget Cuts, THINK
88
PROGRESS (Nov. 3, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/11/03/2 1191/key-dodd-frankagency-undermined-budget-cuts.
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might be impairing the agency's ability to bring numerous enforcement
actions against the employees of business entities accused of illegal
market conduct. David Meister, a former director of the CFTC's
Division of Enforcement, stated in an interview in 2013 that, as a result
of the CFTC's inadequate funding, the agency had, on at least one
occasion, only brought an enforcement action against a business entity
(namely, J.P. Morgan Chase) and not gone after the individual
employees responsible for the business entity's illegal actions.439
The focus on business entities, both in section 4s(j)(6) and in
enforcement policy, is unfortunate because unless actual individuals are
held accountable for corporate wrongdoing, executives will be tempted
to simply let the business entities that employ them take the fall for their
wrongdoing."o The need to hold individuals liable is also important
because "[w]hile the culture of organizations is of central importance,
culture is the product of individual behaviour."" Even more, this focus
contradicts an emerging trend in this area to hold individual employees
accountable for the wrongdoing that is perpetrated by their financial
institution employers pursuant to the employees' orders and actions.442
Indeed, civil and criminal U.S. government authorities have recently
evidenced a desire to target individuals within business entities who
break the law to provide for accountability and deterrence to the actual
human culprits of corporate wrongdoing." 3

439. See Jean Eaglesham, CFTC Backs Off Lacking Funding, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 1, 2013, at
Cl.
440. See Caroline Binham & Philip Stafford, FCA Hits FirstIndividuals with Libor Fines, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fe5732ae-a227-11e4-aba2-00144feab7de.
html ("The UK financial watchdog has fined and banned the former chief executive and former
chief compliance officer of interdealer broker RP Martin in its first penalties for named individuals
over the Libor scandal."). Note that these punishments not only applied to individuals but also to
individuals who worked at an interdealer broker (a non-swap entity). See id Therefore, even the
business entity that had engaged in cartel-like behavior would be beyond the reach of Regulation

23.607.
441.

JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE REAL BusINEss OF FINANCE 260 (2015).

442. In September of 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice emphasized the importance of
holding individual corporate executives and employees responsible if they directed their
corporations and business entities to violate the law. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates,
Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div. et al., Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/
download; see Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Dept. Sets Its Sights on Executives, N.Y. THmES,

Sept. 10, 2015, at Al; Gretchen Morgenson, Fixing Banks by Fining the Bankers, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
7, 2016, at BU1.
443. For example, some have criticized the SEC, which, like the CFTC, can bring civil
enforcement actions to combat wrongdoing in the securities markets, for failing to civilly prosecute
high-level executives of banks and financial entities and hold them accountable for misconduct that

occurred during the financial crisis. See David Dayen, The SEC Nails a Minnow While the Whales
Go Free, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 6, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/1 14188/fabrice-tourre-
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One CEA provision could, however, help the CFTC to target
individuals who cause swap entities to violate section 4s(j)(6) and
Regulation 23.607. Section 13(b)4 4 of the CEA provides for what
has invariably been called "control person" or "controlling person"
liability." Under section 13(b), controlling person liability applies if the
individual had "general control" over the primary violator (for example,
in a business organization, such as a swap entity, that violated a CEA
provision(s)), and the individual either lacked good faith or knowingly
induced the acts constituting the violation. 446 "A fundamental purpose of
section 13(b) is to allow the [CFTC] to reach behind the corporate entity
to the controlling individuals of the corporation and to impose liability
for violations of the [CEA] directly on such individuals as well as on the
corporation itself." 44 7
Unfortunately, however, controlling person liability is far from a
complete solution to the fact that section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607
only apply to swap entities. First, it is unclear if a court would find that
all of the different bank employees involved in the benchmark raterigging conspiracies who were LIBOR-rate submitters, derivatives
traders, vice presidents, and the like, had general control over their banks
for purposes of controlling person liability. Many of the judicial
decisions analyzing controlling person liability were relatively easy
cases, involving individuals who were owners or chief executive officers
(CEOs) of the business organizations that had violated the CEA under
their explicit direction."' As such, it is difficult to predict with certainty
how courts would rule regarding control person liability for the different
goldman-sachs-trial-sec-nails-minnow; Michael A. Santoro, Big Fish, Little Fish, and the S.E.C.,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/big-fish-little-fish-andthe-s-e-c. But see David Woodcock, Individuals in the Cross Hairs? What This Means for
Directors?,HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://corpgov.

law.harvard.edu/2016/03/17/individuals-in-the-cross-hairs-what-this-means-for-directors
(arguing
that, rather than being a new initiative, "the SEC's focus on individuals had actually been quite
commonplace over the years").
444. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b) (2012).
445. See, e.g., CFTC v. So. Trust Metals, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1131 (S.D. Fla. 2016)
(discussing "controlperson liability"); CFTC v. Commonwealth Fin. Grp., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1345,
1356-58 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (discussing "controllingperson liability").
446. So. Trust Metals, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 3d. at 1131 (citing, inter alia, CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald
& Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002)).
447. CFTC v. PMC Strategy, LLC, 903 F. Supp. 2d 368, 379 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (quoting In re
JCC, Inc., CFTC No. 89-4, 1994 WL 183817, at *10 (May 12, 1994)). Congress passed section
13(b) in 1982 at the request of CFTC who noted that, at the time, although the CEA held business
organizations liable for the acts of their employees and agents, the opposite was not true. 13
MARKHAM, supranote 297, § 4:23.
448. See, e.g., So. Trust Metals, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 3d. at 1131 (involving the founder, CEO,
director, and largest shareholder); PMC Strategy, LLC, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 379 (involving the CEO
who "was responsible for all of the corporation's acts").
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bank employees involved in the benchmark rate-rigging scandals. For
the CFTC, bringing a civil enforcement action against individual bank
employees for their banks' violations of section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation
23.607 under a controlling person liability legal theory would represent
additional litigation risks for the agency. The CFTC could very well
succeed in such efforts, but the need to meet the requirements of
controlling person liability could be obviated if the CFTC simply
promulgated a broad regulation prohibiting any person from causing
unreasonable restraints of trade or material anticompetitive burdens in
the markets for derivatives because in those circumstances the bad actors
would be directly, not vicariously, liable for their actions.
Even more problematic, because section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation
23.607 only govern swap entities, these provisions do not address
anticompetitive behavior by market participants that trade in derivatives
other than swaps, such as futures and options. The OTC swaps market is
not the only part of the derivatives trading landscape where the markets
are moderately or highly concentrated, or where consolidation is
decreasing the number of business entities operating in certain capacities
in the markets and thereby increasing the risk for collusive behavior by
dominant market participants. 4 4 9 For instance, recent years have seen the
number of FCMs-that is, futures brokers--decrease in number, from
189 in February of 2005 to 72 in January of 2016.450 The CEA and
CFTC Regulations provide the regulatory framework and rules for the
markets for swaps and other types of derivatives, so it is unsound to
allow a regulatory gap that would prevent the markets for other types of
derivatives from receiving the same type of protections from
anticompetitive conduct as are afforded the swaps markets. The CFTC
should promulgate a rule that prohibits anticompetitive conduct by any

&

449. See, e.g., Philip Stafford, Tullett Prebon-ICAP Deal Sparks Oil Trading Competition
Concerns, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/Oedcl4fO-2c7e-lle6-bf8d-26294ad
519fc#axzz4AxPzbSL4?ftcamp=engage%2Femail%2Fnewsletters%2Fsmart brief%2Fsmartbriefne
wsletterscontrafcf/o2Fauddev&segid=0800933.
450. See Financial Data for FCMs, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,
http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/FinancialDataforFCMs/index.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2016)
(providing links to lists of the existing FCMs-such as Goldman Sachs & Co., Goldman Sachs
Execution & Clearing LP, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,
BNP Paribas Prime Brokerage Inc., and BNP Paribas Securities Corp-and their related financial
data, with the most recent list containing information as of January 31, 2016); Gregory Meyer
Philip Stafford, Futures Brokers Feel Strain from Low Interest Rates and Red Tape, FIN. TIMES

(Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/28749888-eOb7-11e4-a4e2-00144feab7de ("Three
quarters of assets held by US registered brokers on behalf of their customers-ranging from framers
to fund managers-are concentrated with the 10 biggest industry players, including Goldman Sachs,
JP Morgan Chase and Soci6td Gdndrale.").
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person, even if the person is not a swap entity, and in any market for
derivatives, even if those derivatives are not swaps.
Of course, one alternative solution would be to broaden the scope
of persons categorized as swap entities by expanding the definitions of
the terms, swap dealer, and major swap participant. Classifying more
persons as swap entities would correspondingly cause more persons to
fall within the ambit of Regulation 23.607. This would be an
inappropriate and clumsy way to address the issue, however, because the
CEA subjects swap entities to a host of regulatory requirements
concerning recordkeeping, swap data reporting, and more. 451 Thus,
although widening the concept of swap entities would subject more
persons to Regulation 23.607, it also would subject them to many other
statutory and regulatory requirements. If the problem is the prevalence
of anticompetitive conspiracies in the markets for derivatives, the best
solution is to broaden the scope of liability for anticompetitive conduct,
not regulate more business organizations as swap entities. Indeed, the
concept of what constitutes a swap entity would have to be contorted a
great deal to be made broad enough to capture, for example, the
interdealer brokers that have settled benchmark rate-rigging cases, such
as ICAP and RP Martin.
Lastly, Regulation 23.607 is overly limited in its scope because the
regulation does not, by its terms, address attempts to adopt any process
or take any action that results in an unreasonable restraint of trade or
impose any material anticompetitive burden on clearing or trading. In
practice, this deficiency might be mitigated somewhat by the fact that,
generally speaking, the antitrust laws have been interpreted as not
requiring proof of harm to competition but a probability that such harm
would occur. 452 Additionally, courts might construe Regulation 23.607
as applying to attempts to take actions that result in unreasonable
restraints of trade or impose material burdens on the markets, despite the
lack of explicit language to that effect,453 given that, by and large, when

451. See supra Part II (summarizing the regulatory requirements on swap entities).

452. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1986); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
453. For example, the SEC's primary tools to combat fraud and market manipulation, section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, do not mention attempts to employ a
manipulative or deceptive device, but courts have interpreted them as covering attempts. See SEC v.
Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1297, 1298-1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversing grant of summary judgment
against individual accused of attempting to manipulate stock prices through trading on an initial
public stock offering); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) ("In the first
place, we are not convinced of any difference in substance between a successful fraud and an
attempt. The statutory phrase 'any manipulative or deceptive device,' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), seems
broad enough to encompass conduct irrespective of its outcome.").
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the law prohibits successfully completing a specific act, attempts to
successfully complete that act also are unlawful.4 54 Despite these two
facts, however, the lack of an explicit prohibition against attempts to
cause unreasonable restraints of trade and material anticompetitive
burdens raises the possibility of a gap in the existing regulatory
framework. As such, the CFTC's promulgation of a broad rule explicitly
prohibiting both successful and attempted material, anticompetitive
conduct in the markets for derivatives would be a structural
improvement to the current law and regulations.
D.

Antifraud and AntimanipulationDo Not Equal Antitrust

Another reason that the CFTC should promulgate a broad rule
prohibiting anticompetitive conduct in the markets for derivatives is
because the current CFTC enforcement approach has been to
characterize the collusive banker and trader conduct as a form of fraud
or a scheme to manipulate the prices of swaps and other derivatives.
While those two kinds of claims have worked well for the CFTC so far,
they are imperfect vehicles for targeting anticompetitive behavior.4 55 The
CFTC's reliance on fraud-based manipulation and price manipulation
claims is understandable because, aside from section 4s(j)(6) (which
prohibits anticompetitive conduct by entities that meet the criteria
necessary to be considered regulated swap entities) and specific
prohibitions targeting particular types of disruptive trading practices, the
CFTC generally only has the authority to combat schemes to manipulate
the prices of derivatives by bringing fraud-based manipulation or
market-power price manipulation civil enforcement actions.4 56 Although
454.

See generally GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE

CRIMINAL LAW (2010); Gideon Yaffe, CriminalAttempts, 124 YALE L.J. 92, 95 (2014) ("For good
reason, attempts to commit crimes are themselves crimes in every mature legal system. A bungled

robbery, a missed shot, a beating that fails to kill despite the perpetrator's best effort, a would-be
rape fought off by the intended victim, a smuggling stopped at the border, and many more failed
efforts besides possess the marks of wrongful conduct . . . ."). Professor Yaffe primarily addresses
criminal wrongdoing, but the same principle generally applies to misconduct in the financial
markets that is also punished civilly. For example, attempts to manipulate financial markets and
attempts to defraud customers in those markets, as with successful market manipulations and
fraudulent schemes, are properly the subject of civil enforcement actions by financial regulators.
455. Again, as mentioned previously, much of the misconduct in the bank benchmark-rate-

rigging cases occurred before June 14, 2012, when Regulation 23.607 went into effect, so the CFTC
could not have brought claims pursuant to Regulation 23.607 for pre-June 14, 2012 conduct. See
Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Duties Rules, 77 Fed.
Reg. 20,128, 20,128 (Apr. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23).
456. Although section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607 provide the CFTC with the authority to
combat anticompetitive conduct by the 105 entities that are provisionally registered as swap dealers
and major swap participants, but this is a small subset of the participants in the swaps and derivative

markets. There also are provisions of the CEA and CFTC Regulations that prohibit specific types of
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the law generally conceptualizes fraud, price manipulation, and antitrust
claims as relatively broad, open-textured prohibitions against certain
types of misconduct, the harms that antifraud and antimanipulation legal
theories seek to redress are distinct from those that are of central concern
to antitrust law. 57 Generally speaking, fraud is conceptualized as
employing "means of appropriating property and similar interests of
others without violating the basic prohibition on theft," 4 58 and price
manipulation speaks to situations in which traders engage in activities
with the specific intent to distort the prices of derivative financial
instruments,45 9 whereas antitrust law's overarching objective is to protect
competition, not individual competitors.460 Put another way, antitrust
actions frequently focus on whether competition in the markets has been
restrained or prevented, or is likely to be restrained or prevented.4 61
Fraud, on the other hand, often involves examining whether other people
have been tricked or misled.4 62 Lastly, price manipulation cases require
analysis into whether a trader or other market participant intended to
cause the prices of derivatives to deviate from the prices that would have
existed under normal market forces and therefore become artificial.4 63
In keeping with the fact that different purposes and theories
underlie these distinct types of claims, antifraud, antimanipulation, and
antitrust causes of action are not interchangeable. 4 6 Fraud claims are not
ideal mechanisms to combat price-fixing cartels and other antitrust
violations because such claims generally require proof of a
misrepresentation, whereas a misrepresentation is not required for an
antitrust claim.4 65 More importantly, fraud claims are ineffective tools
disruptive trading practices, such as wash trading (self-dealing).
457.

See supra Part V.A for a discussion of market manipulation causes of action, and supra

Part V.B for a discussion of antifraud legal theories, as compared to antitrust legal theories. This is
not to say, of course, that there is not some measure of overlap. That is, some types of conduct could

violate several of these prohibitions.
458. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth,supra note 315, at 1548.
459. Markham, supra note 3, at 356-57.
460. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962).
461.
462.

See supraPart III.
See supraPart V.B.

463. See supraPart V.A.
464. See infra Table 1.
465. See CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002) (describing
the elements of fraud in the markets for futures and other derivatives). In certain circumstances,

failing to disclose information can constitute a misrepresentation. See CFTC v. Risk Capital Trading
Grp., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1245-46 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (finding that failure to disclose investing
track record in which the overwhelming majority of customers had lost their investments was a

material factual omission); CFTC v. Commonwealth Fin. Grp., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1345, 1353 n.10
(S.D. Fla. 1994) ("Plaintiffs suggest that it amounts to a misrepresentation when salespeople
emphasize the profits enjoyed by Commonwealth customers without mentioning any of the losses.
The Court agrees."). Some commentators believe that deception should not be able to provide the
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against conduct that materially harms competition in the markets for
derivatives but that does not involve deceit, misrepresentations, or other
deceptive acts. 4 66 Likewise, price manipulation claims require evidence
that the defendant specifically intended to cause an artificial price in
swap, futures contract, or other derivative, and intent-let alone the
specific intent467 to affect a price-is widely considered to be of little
importance in most civil antitrust claims, which focus on the market
effects of the anticompetitive conduct in question. 4 68 Even more, the
difficulty in proving, among other things, specific intent has made price
manipulation claims so hard for the CFTC to successfully litigate that
basis for antitrust claims. See 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION $ 782b (2d ed. 2002); Note,
Deception as an Antitrust Violation, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1235, 1241-44 (2012). In any event, while

the facts of some antitrust cases might happen to involve acts of deception, proof of deceit or a
misrepresentation is not required to state a civil antitrust claim.
466. For example, Professor Andrew Verstein is correct in arguing that the price reports
clauses of the CEA are an excellent mechanism to combat the submission of false reports that

impact benchmark interest rates. See Verstein, supra note 70, at 262-63. But cartels of swap dealing
banks and/or other large oligopolistic derivative market participants could engage in antitrust
violations without submitting false reports. See KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 126, at 6-7, 13-14

(alleging that swap dealing banks are engaging in anticompetitive conduct by, inter alia, threatening
not to extend credit to market participants who entered dealer-only swap trading platforms, to
preserve their dominance in the markets for swaps).

467. See Scopino, supra note 44, at 257-58 ("Specific intent is a mental state that exists when
people desire to accomplish a specific result with their actions, as opposed to simply intending to do
the underlying actions. . . . Specific intent is generally considered a difficult mental state to prove,
as it involves ratcheting up the degree of specificity required in connection with proving what the
defendant allegedly intended to do." (footnotes omitted)).
468. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1989); POSNER, supra note 308, at 188-91 (discounting the probative value of intent evidence in

antitrust actions); see also Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953)
("[T]he requisite intent is inferred whenever unlawful effects are found, . . . the contracts may yet be
banned by § 1 [of the Sherman Act] if unreasonable restraint was either their object or effect."

(citations omitted)). As mentioned, horizontal price-fixing schemes and other cartel-like behaviors
(for example, as exhibited by bankers rigging financial benchmarks) are most appropriately
combatted through application of the antitrust laws. See Nachbar, supra note 308, at 108. ("[Ilntent
has not featured prominently in many modem antitrust cases, perhaps because intent is largely
irrelevant to the market effects of a particular restraint."). Even if one accepts that intent has some
degree of relevance to all civil antitrust claims (and not just to conspiracies and attempts to

monopolize), price manipulation claims require proof of specific intent, which generally is much
more difficult to prove. The specific intent to cause an artificial price in a futures contract or
derivative is the "determinative element" of a price manipulation claim. 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN,

supra note 65, § 5.05[1] (quoting Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 479 (7th
Cir. 1953)); see CFTC v. Pamon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). But
making specific intent the most essential element in antitrust claims would threaten to relegate the

market effects of anticompetitive behavior to a secondary, or ancillary, role in such causes of action,
which seems unwise given the importance of understanding the allegedly improper conduct's effect
on competition. Such a determination can only be made pursuant to an economic analysis of the
relevant market, including the barriers to entry to the market, the effects of defendant's behavior on
competition, and the like.
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price manipulation has been called "unprosecutable crime,"4 69 which
makes price manipulation claims a poor tool for combating just about
any kind of misconduct by derivative market participants.470 Unlike
antitrust law violations, price manipulation claims historically have been
restricted to conduct associated with trading activity. Further, price
manipulation claims require proof that the price (or prices) of a
derivative is artificial, whereas proof that an actual price effect is not
needed to prove a violation of the antitrust laws. Instead, antitrust claims
require proof that the activities in question either are likely to harm
competition-and consequently likely to injure consumers-or fall
within the ambit of a per se violation (in which case they are
conclusively presumed unreasonable regardless of any price impact). For
the reasons stated above, analysis of the existing enforcement tools that
are available to the CFTC reveals the existence of regulatory gaps that
could be filled by the promulgation of a broad rule prohibiting any
person from causing unreasonable restraints of trade or material
anticompetitive burdens in the markets for derivatives. Such a
prohibition also would be consistent with existing CEA provisions and
CFTC regulations, which seek to protect the price discovery function of
the markets for derivatives. 471 For example, neither fraud nor price
manipulation legal theories would be likely to be effective at combatting
situations in which a group of swap dealers and their accomplices
engaged in a horizontal group boycott-a per se violation of the antitrust
laws-to prevent other competitors from entering the market for a
particular type of swap or financial instrument.
The CFTC could, of course, try to fit unlawful anticompetitive
conduct that does not involve swap entities into enforcement actions
grounded in fraud or price manipulation but applying antifraud or price
manipulation legal theories to instances of misconduct that involve harm
to competition (and therefore are better targeted with antitrust claims)
runs the risk of distorting the precedent and legal doctrine. For example,
a judge analyzing what is supposed to be a fraud case will inevitably
look for evidence of deceit or similar trickery, not harm to competition.
But deceit likely would be an ancillary issue, at best, in circumstances
where several financial institutions conspired to boycott derivatives
market competitors or otherwise block competitors from entering the
market for particular types of swaps.
469.

See Markham, supra note 3, at 356.

470. Congress gave the CFTC broad authority to combat fraud-based manipulation in large
part because of difficulties associated with pursuing price manipulation claims. See Scopino, supra
note 268, at 655-60.
471. Seesupra Part II.
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This is not to say that there is anything wrong with the
government's approach in going after the banks that rigged benchmark
rates in recent years. The CFTC is correct in using the legal tools
available-fraud-based manipulation and price manipulation claims-to
stop the rigging of benchmarks that impact the prices of swaps and
derivatives in circumstances where the facts support such causes of
action. Indeed, the CFTC's settlements with banks over the manipulation
of benchmark interest rates show that fraud-based and price
manipulation claims were appropriate based on the facts of those cases
as revealed in the settlements. But that might not always be the case
because, as explained above, one can engage in behavior that violates
the antitrust laws without violating prohibitions against fraud and
price manipulation.47 2 Both of the existing CFTC approaches-fraudbased manipulation and price manipulation claims-require proof of
matters that are largely irrelevant to some antitrust legal theoriesmisrepresentations and specific intent. As such, using antitrust causes
of action under the CEA would provide for a more straightforward
and direct paradigm for bringing CFTC civil enforcement actions to
stop collusive schemes by bankers to rig financial benchmarks and
standards that wholly or partially determine the value of derivative
financial products.
The CFTC, which was the first agency to launch a full-scale
investigation into the rigging of benchmark interest rates, has proven
itself in recent years as being a small but aggressive regulator with both
the willingness and capability to launch large-scale, complicated
investigations and enforcement actions against entities that (allegedly)
scheme to manipulate and distort the prices of swaps and derivatives.473
One potential problem is that the CFTC has been chronically
underfunded and therefore might not have the resources to devote to
antitrust-style enforcement actions.4 74 The CFTC's lack of funding is not
a new problem, however, and the agency has managed to bring
groundbreaking market manipulation cases despite this handicap.

472.

See supra Part VII.

473.

In 2008, the CFTC became the first regulator to begin investigating whether banks were

rigging benchmark interest rates. See Richard Blackden, Libor Scandal Ripples Across the Atlantic,

TELEGRAPH (UK) (July 12, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/9395403/
Libor-scandal-ripples-across-the-Atlantic.html; Timeline: Libor-fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6,
2013, 11:51 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18671255; see also Editorial, Another
Banking Scandal, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 2013, at A28 (stating that the CFTC "emerged from the
financial crisis as the most aggressive market regulator").
474. See Lauren Tara LaCapra, U.S. Commodities Regulator Has Lonely Oil Department,
REuTERs (May 19, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-finance-sumnmit-cftc-oil-

idUSKCN0YA2HO.
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Further, armed with a broad regulation mirroring the antitrust
considerations language in the CEA, the CFTC might bring many of the
same enforcement actions as it has in the past, only without the need to
shoehorn cartel-like conduct by bankers, brokers, and others into a price
manipulation claim (that requires proof of specific intent) or characterize
such conduct as a form of fraud (that requires proof of a
misrepresentation). In short, the CFTC could target anticompetitive
conduct in the markets for derivatives in a more intellectually honestand appropriate-manner by using language derived from the antitrust
considerations provisions. Accordingly, the financial markets would be
better off if the CFTC used the full extent of its authority under the CEA
to promulgate a broad regulation prohibiting any person from engaging
in anticompetitive conduct in the markets for derivatives.
E.

One More Set of Eyes (with Expertise) Could Help

As mentioned, the broad array of persons and entities that can
enforce the antitrust laws, from private individuals to state attorneys
general, is beneficial because it reduces the possibility that harms to
competition will escape notice or punishment as might be the case if
antitrust enforcement was confined to one agency, which might become
captured or fail to spot specific problematic actions. Instead, the existing
U.S. antitrust legal framework assures that there are "many sets of eyes
on potential [antitrust] problems."4 75 Cognitive regulatory capture has
been described as circumstances in which regulators "internalis[e], as if
by osmosis, the objectives, interests and perception of reality of the
vested interest they are meant to regulate and supervise in the public
interest."47 6 The potential for regulatory agency capture or missed
opportunities by banking (and other) regulators is not just an imagined
problem.4 77 In particular, officials with the Federal Reserve Bank of
475. Huffman & Heidtke, supra note 208, at 97-98 (quoting commentators who have referred
to the "decentralized and largely uncoordinated" enforcement of antitrust laws in the United States
as being a "crazy quilt of enforcement mechanisms"); see also Skapinker, supra note 208 (arguing
that "[b]ecause regulators sometimes fail to do what they should" other parts of government and
society, such as "legislative committees, the media, consumers, campaigners [and] researchers"
need to monitor global banks and other large businesses for wrongdoing).
476. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1417-28 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting William H.
Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises 106 (presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City's symposium on "Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System," Aug. 21-23, (2008)),
http://www.1se.ac.uk/fimg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmngdps/dp619.pdf).
477. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To LIMIT IT 71, 75-80 (Daniel

Carpenter & David A Moss eds., 2014); Lawrence G. Baxter, "Capture" in FinancialRegulation:
Can We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 181-88
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New York knew in 2007 that banks were probably manipulating their
LIBOR submissions, but rather than notify criminal authorities or
publicize suspected benchmark interest rate-rigging schemes, they
simply notified their counterparts with the Bank of England to suggest
that the process for setting L BOR needed to be reformed. 78 The British
authorities did not act on the revelations of benchmark rate-rigging until
the CFTC began investigating and pursuing the matter.479 Some have
blamed the failure of British regulators to combat benchmark-rigging
schemes earlier on regulatory capture, as evidenced by the United
Kingdom's "light touch" approach to financial regulation that was then
in vogue. 480 Likewise, concerns have been raised about the possibility of
(2011).
478. See HOu & SKEIE, supra note 19, at 7; Neil Barofsky, The GeithnerDoctrine Lives on in
the Libor Scandal, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 8, 2013, at 7 (referring to Geithner and the "captured
regulations who had blindly advanced bankers' self-serving calls for a 'light touch' before the
crisis"); Ben Protess, House Panel Questions Geithner on His Handling ofBarclays'Rate-Rigging,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at B5; Jia Lynn Yang & Danielle Douglas, Under Geithner, NY Fed
Was Quiet About Barclays, WASH. POST, July 25, 2012, at Al (stating that "regulators at the
[CFTC] and the Justice Department worked largely without the Fed's help to build a case against
Barclays," which was the first bank charged with rigging benchmark interest rates, and "culminated
in a massive scandal rocking the banking industry on both sides of the Atlantic"); Shahien
Nasiripour, Geithner Grilledover Libor Revelation, FIN. TIMES (July 25, 2012), https://next.ft.com/
content/c3dc960a-d67d-11el-bd9c-00144feabdcO ("The New York Fed has previously said it was
aware of potential rigging in 2007, but the April 2008 call serves as the earliest indication made
public that banks were submitting dishonest information to the panel that determines the London
interbank offered rate."); Timeline: Libor-fixing Scandal, supranote 473 (detailing dates when U.S.

and U.K. authorities were alerted to, or discussed, the fact that banks might not be submitting
accurate Libor numbers).
479. See Blackden, supranote 466; Timeline: Libor-fixing Scandal, supranote 473.
480. See Philip Augar, Opinion, The Forex Debacle-A Scandal to End All Scandals, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2014, at 9; ("Regulators now understand that light-touch regulation is no way to
run a market and are getting tough in the questions they ask and the deterrents they impose.");
Brooke Masters et al., Osborne Brings down the Curtain on Era of Light-Touch Regulation, FIN.

TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at 1 ("George Osborne comprehensively jettisoned the City tradition of selfregulation yesterday with announcements on sweeping reforms that will further restrict the banking
industry's ability to chart its own fate.... The crackdown shows how the Libor scandal and misselling of products have stripped the banks of any remaining trust they enjoyed among
politicians."); Floyd Norris, Rethinking 'Light-Touch'Regulation; High & Low Finance, INT'L N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2014, at 15; Ian Macwhirter, We Are Paying Every Dayfor Grand Theft Banking,
HERALD (SCOTLAND) (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.heraldscotland.com/opinion/13189161.We are
payingeverydayforgrandtheft banking; Jill Treanor, Farwell to the FSA-And the Bleak
Legacy of the Light-Touch Regulator, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2013, 8:06 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2013/mar/24/farewell-fsa-bleak-legacy-light-touch-regulator; Liam
Vaughan & Gavin Finch, Rigged Libor Shows Flaw of Self-Regulation, TREASURY & RISK (Dec.
13, 2012), http://www.treasuryandrisk.com/2012/12/13/rigged-libor-shows-flaw-of-self-regulation;
see also New Face, Same Problems, ECONOMIST (Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.economist.com/

news/britain/21 68 9 60 8 -veteran-takes-over-troubled-banking-regulator-new-face-same-problems
("The FSA's 'light touch' was much trumpeted during the financial boom of the early 2000s but
proved wanting when a host of banks ran into trouble in 2007 and 2008."). Although the days of
"light touch" regulation in the United Kingdom are supposed to be in the past, in early 2016 the
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U.S. banking regulators being captured. 48 ' To be clear, the fact that a
regulatory agency is captured does not mean that the regulators act with
evil motives, as other reasons, such as international competition to be
global financial centers, can lead regulators to establish regulatory
frameworks that are accommodating to the regulated industry.48 2
Although the CFTC is not immune from possible capture, having the
CFTC also monitor the markets for OTC swaps and other derivatives for
anticompetitive conduct would lessen the possibility that regulatory
capture would cause illegal, collusive conduct to escape notice because
there would be one additional agency that industry would have to
capture, and there would be one more "set of eyes" checking for
potential harms to competition in these markets.
In light of the broad array of potential plaintiffs that can bring civil
antitrust claims, adding the CFTC to this mix is an incremental step, but
one that would be efficient and potentially provide significant benefits to
antitrust enforcement in the financial markets. Empowering the CFTC to
bring civil enforcement actions under the antitrust considerations in
section 4s(j)(6) and elsewhere in the CEA would be more efficient than
the current system, in which the DOJ and FTC are the only federal
agencies that enforce the antitrust laws because the CFTC, as the
primary regulator of the markets for swaps and other derivatives, is most
likely to be the first agency to detect-and the best agency to
comprehend the full implications of-anticompetitive behavior in the
markets it regulates. Giving the CFTC broad antitrust authority is
warranted because, from an institutional perspective, the CFTC is the
agency that is in the best position to assess the facts of a given case and
select the most suitable type of enforcement action-antifraud, price
Financial Conduct Authority was called "weak, toothless, and anemic"-among other things-by
members of Parliament. See Rozi Jones, FCA Called "Weak, Toothless and Anaemic" in AP
Debate, FIN. REP. (UK) (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.financialreporter.co.uk/finance-news/fea-calledweak-toothless-and-anaemic-in-mp-debate.html.
481. See Jake Bernstein, Federal Reserve Announces Sweeping Review of Its Big Bank
Oversight, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:15 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/bill-givessenate-power-to-approve-new-york-fed-president; Ian Katz & Matthew Boesler, Fed Weighs Steps
to Prevent 'Regulatory Capture' by Banks, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2015, 11:49 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-20/fed-said-to-weigh-steps-to-prevent-regulatory-captureby-banks (quoting Cornell Law Professor Robert Hockett as stating that "cognitive capture [is] like
a kind of Stockholm Syndrome where you identify with or come to see through the eyes of the party
you're regulating").
482. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 476, at 1393-98; see also id. at 1418-19 ("[F]inancial
regulators are inclined to identify with the views and experience of industry officials because (i)
regulators 'operate within a relatively narrow, insulated and expertise-based' field of work that they
share with 'sophisticated repeat players' in the financial industry, and (ii) regulators and industry
officials frequently have similar educational and professional backgrounds and are therefore 'likely
to share social, educational, or experiential ties."').
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manipulation, or antitrust-for the circumstances. The current, limited
scope of the CFTC's antitrust enforcement authority increases the risk
that misconduct like the cartels to rig benchmark interest rates or stifle
competition in the credit default swaps market will not be detected,
investigated, or stopped.
Given that the antitrust laws already can be enforced by the DOJ,
FTC, states, and private citizens, the addition of one more federal
agency-the CFTC-to the two existing federal antitrust regulators (the
DOJ and FTC) in circumstances involving the markets for derivatives is
a reasonable, incremental improvement to the existing regulatory
framework. The concept of having more than one federal agency with
overlapping authority (to varying degrees) to bring enforcement actions
to combat particular types of wrongdoing is not without precedent. For
example, as mentioned, Congress granted the CFTC, FERC, and FTC
the ability to bring fraud-based market manipulation claims-modeled
after Rule 1Ob-5-to combat manipulative schemes in the energy
markets. 48 3 Having another agency monitoring the markets for
derivatives for anticompetitive conduct also is beneficial because, as
mentioned previously, antitrust decisional law in recent years has
increased the obstacles that private plaintiffs must overcome to pursue
antitrust claims, thereby reducing the ability of private litigation to play
a role in curbing anticompetitive behavior.4 84
A regulation permitting civil enforcement actions based on the
language in section 4s(j)(6) of the CEA and the antitrust considerations
core principles also could provide the CFTC with grounds for using
flexible injunctive remedies that are appropriate in antitrust cases.
Because the CEA grants the CFTC broad authority to seek injunctions
for statutory and regulatory violations,485 civil enforcement actions
brought pursuant to the authority of the CEA's antitrust considerations
could seek antitrust-style injunctive remedies for anticompetitive
conduct, such as ordering the breakup of a large financial entity (or
entities).4 86 This would be consistent with antitrust law jurisprudence,
483.

See supranotes 324-31 and accompanying text.

484. See discussion supra notes 210-28 and accompanying text; see also Rogers, supra note
210, at 73-80.
485. See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2012). See generally 13A JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES
REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION, & OTHER CLAIMS

§ 25:4,

Westlaw (database updated 2016)

(explaining "CFTC Injunctive Actions").
486. Generally speaking, there has been some discussion by U.S. banking regulators, such as
Dallas Federal Reserve Bank President Richard Fisher and Minneapolis Federal Reserve President
Neel Kashkari, about the possibility of breaking up "too big to fail" banks on the grounds that they
represent systemic risk to the financial system, but there has not been discussion of breaking up
banks as a remedy to anticompetitive conduct in the derivatives markets. See Binyamin Appelbaum,
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which generally indicates that the breakup remedy-although rare-is
available. Remedies such as the breakup of a company or the mandatory
divesture of certain business lines have not been used in fraud-based and
price manipulation cases brought under the CEA.4 87 Thus, another
advantage of having the CFTC promulgate a broad regulation
prohibiting anticompetitive conduct is that it could provide the grounds
for antitrust-style injunctive remedies to address activities that result in
unreasonable restraints of trade or impose material anticompetitive
burdens in the derivative markets.4 88
In sum, the CEA's existing enforcement regime has regulatory gaps
because situations involving harmful, anticompetitive conduct in the
U.S. derivative markets that lack evidence of specific intent to create
artificial prices, that do not involve misrepresentations, and that are not
committed by one of the 105 swap entities are beyond the CFTC's reach.
In these situations, the anticompetitive conduct would neither be
captured by the CEA's antifraud or antimanipulation prohibitions nor by
section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607. The CFTC could refer a case to
the DOJ, FTC, or even a state to bring an antitrust action in such
circumstances, but it likely would take time and resources to try to
convince another part of government to act, with no guarantee that one
would do so. More importantly, such a referral process seems inefficient
and unnecessary. This approach would require the CFTC to combat most
anticompetitive conduct (conduct not committed by swap entities) only
with the help of another part of the government, even though numerous
provisions of the CEA clearly show that Congress wanted to prohibit
unreasonable restraints of trade and material anticompetitive burdens in
the markets that the CFTC regulates.

FederalReserve Executive Says Banks 'Are Still Too Big to Fail,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2016, at Bl;
Christopher Matthews, Break Up the Banks! Dallas Fed PresidentCallsfor the End of "Too Big to

Fail," TIME (Mar. 22, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/03/22/break-up-the-banks-dllas-fedpresident-calls-for-the-end-of-too-big-to-fail; Neil Roland, Fed's Kashkari Plan Could Have
'Significant Impact' on US. Banking Policy, Experts Say, MLEX (Feb. 24, 2016), http://
mlexmarketinsight.com; see also Richard W. Fisher, President & Chief Exec. Officer, & Harvey

Rosenbaum, Exec. Vice President & Dir. of Research, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, Presentation at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Fifteenth Annual International Banking Conference: Break

Up the Big Banks: The Key to Economic Prosperity and Improved Financial Stability (Nov. 16,
2016), https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/news/speeches/121115rosenblum.pdf.
487. Antitrust-style injunctive remedies also are presumably available under CFTC civil
enforcement actions brought pursuant to Regulation 23.607 but, as mentioned, that regulation only

applies to registered swap entities, which limits its applicability.
488. To be clear, the CEA does not allow for treble damages as is the case with the antitrust
laws, but the CEA grants federal courts with authority to provide a broad range of equitable relief to
require persons and entities that are violating the CEA or CFTC Regulations to bring their behavior
into compliance. See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-l(a)-(c).
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The need for preventing anticompetitive conduct in the derivative
markets would not be much of a concern if cartel-like behavior was rare
in these markets, but that is not the case. In addition to the fact that the
U.S. markets for many categories of OTC swaps and other derivatives
are oligopolistic, serious concerns regarding the problematic culture and
incentives in banking4 89 and other financial institutions make it possible,
if not likely, that the collusive, anticompetitive behavior revealed in the
benchmark rate-fixing scandals will arise again to trouble the markets
for derivatives in the future, albeit quite possibly in a somewhat different
form.4 90 Given that the markets for swaps and other derivatives are
vitally important to the economy, it is essential that U.S. authorities
ensure that these markets are free from conduct that harms competition.
Accordingly, the time has come for the CFTC to promulgate a regulation
that broadly prohibits anticompetitive conduct by participants in the U.S.
markets for futures, swaps, and other derivatives.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, global regulatory and competition authorities have
uncovered multiple schemes in which groups of banks colluded to rig
benchmarks for the purpose of (among other things) benefitting
the banks' trading positions in swaps and other derivatives. The
benchmark rigging was facilitated by the fact that the markets for many
types of OTC swaps and other derivatives are highly concentrated
and dominated by a small group of banks and other institutions.4 91
Longstanding problems involving the incentives and corporate culture
inside banks and other financial entities, along with concerns about
the capture of banking regulators, make it possible, if not likely, that
banks or other market participants could engage in new, anticompetitive
schemes in the markets for derivatives in the future. Accordingly, it
would be an incremental, structural improvement to the current
antitrust regulatory framework if the CFTC promulgated a regulation
489. See supraPart H.A.
490. For example, banks could engage in other types of conduct in derivatives markets that
could potentially raise concerns about anticompetitive conduct or monopoly power. See, e.g., Henry
Sanderson et al., JP Morgan Rattles Traders with LME Aluminum Stockpile, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
17, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/ee2dec66-eb72-11e5-bb79-2303682345c8#myft:notification:
daily-email ("JP Morgan Chase is holding more than half of the aluminum on the London Metal
Exchange, [the world's largest options and futures markets on base and other metals] a multibilliondollar position that has rattled rival traders and raised questions in London's tight-knit metal market
about its influence on prices. The bank's S2bn-plus physical stockpile of aluminum ... has been
blamed my many traders for pushing up the price of near-term contracts that are about to expire,
even though the industry is in its seventh year of a major supply glut.").
491. See supra Part VII.D.
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enabling it to bring civil enforcement actions against any person that
engages in conduct, or attempts to engage in conduct, that results in
unreasonable restraints of trade or imposes material anticompetitive
burdens on the derivative markets.492
The central purpose of the CEA is to ensure that the markets for
derivatives are transparent, fair, and competitive so that they can serve
their price discovery function. The CEA's concern for competition is
evident from the fact that the statute prohibits noncompetitive,
prearranged wash trades and, more importantly, market manipulation,
which is analogous in many respects to forms of anticompetitive conduct
that are prohibited by the antitrust laws. Numerous other provisions of
the CEA, however, also refer to the antitrust laws and seek to prevent
anticompetitive conduct in derivative markets. The totality of the CEA
provisions that reference antitrust principles and considerations provide
the CFTC with sufficient authority to promulgate a regulation
prohibiting anticompetitive conduct in the markets for derivatives.
The U.S. antitrust laws have proven to be effective tools to combat
anticompetitive conduct in a wide array of markets. Recognizing this
fact, Congress included in the Dodd-Frank Act a provision-section
4s(j)(6) of the CEA-that empowered the CFTC to promulgate a rule to
prohibit anticompetitive conduct by swap entities. But the scope of
section 4s(j)(6), and its implementing Regulation 23.607, is too narrow
to effectively police the derivative markets for anticompetitive conduct
because there are only 100 or so provisionally registered swap entities,
which means that many market participants are beyond the reach of
section 4s(j)(6) and Regulation 23.607.
As the U.S. government's primary regulator of, and expert on, the
markets for derivatives, the CFTC is in the best position to spot
problematic, anticompetitive conduct in the markets that it regulates.
Unfortunately, at present, the CFTC can only attack horizontal
price-fixing cartels and other types of anticompetitive conduct by
non-swap entities if the cartel participants engage in activities that
fit within the ambit of fraud-based claims or market-power price
manipulation claims.4 93 But these two types of claims are poorly suited
for addressing some types of anticompetitive conduct, given that fraudbased claims require proof of a misrepresentation and price manipulation
claims require proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent
to cause an artificial price. Antitrust claims do not require proof of
either a misrepresentation or a defendant's specific intent to cause an
492.
493.

See supra PartVH.
See supra Part VII.D.
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artificial price. Indeed, a person could engage in anticompetitive conduct
that would be prohibited by the antitrust laws without making
misrepresentations or without acting with the specific intent to cause an
artificial price.
Accordingly, the CFTC should draft a broad regulation prohibiting
persons from taking any actions, or attempting to take any actions, that
result in unreasonable restraints of trade or impose material
anticompetitive burdens on the markets for derivatives. The regulation
should cover any person-not just swap entities-that engages, or
attempts to engage, in the prohibited conduct.4 94 The CFTC would be
more than able to effectively use such broad antitrust authority because
the agency already litigates complex market manipulation claims that
bear many similarities to antitrust actions. This approach would be more
efficient than requiring the DOJ's Antitrust Division or the FTC to
develop the expertise needed to understand the markets for OTC swaps
and other derivatives. The time has come for the CFTC to have the
ability to bring civil enforcement actions against anyone who causes, or
attempts to cause, unreasonable restraints of trade or imposes, or
attempts to impose, material anticompetitive burdens on the markets
for derivatives.

494. See supra note 445 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX

TABLE 1: SETTLEMENTS WITH THE CFTC FOR ALLEGEDLY
RIGGING LIBOR AND RELA TED INTEREST RATE BENCHMARKS49 5
No.

PeriodofAlleged
Misconduct

Entity Name(s)

Settlement
Amount
(in millions)

Settlement
Dote

Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC, &
49 6
Barclays Capital Inc.*

At least 2005 to at least
2009

$200

June 27, 2012

2

Citibank, N.A., Citibank Japan Ltd.
Citigroup Global Markets Japan
Inc.* 497

pring 2008 to August
2010

$175

May 25, 2016

3

Deutsche Bank AG* 49 8

t least 2005 to early
2011

$800

Apr. 23, 2015

4

ICAP Europe Limited4 99

$65

Sept. 13, 2013

5

Lloyds Banking Group plc & Lloyds
500

$105

July 28, 2014

6

Rabobank

&

1

6_

abobank 50 1

_________

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc &
7_RBS Securities Japan Limited*5 2

to at least January 2011

Mid-2006 to 2009
Atal2Ol$475
least mid-2005 to
early 2011
From at least mid-2006
to 2010

At least September
RP Martin Holdings Limited & Martin
503
2008 to at least August
Brokers (UK) Ltd.
09____
2009
UBS AG & UBS Securities Japan Co. At least January 2005
5
to at least June 2010
9Ltd.*
8

Oct. 29, 2013

$1.2

May 15, 2014

$700

ec. 19,2012

495. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Orders Citibank, N.A.
and Japanese Affiliates to Pay $175 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of Yen LIBOR
and Euroyen TIBOR, and False Reporting of Euroyen TIBOR and U.S. Dollar LIBOR (May 25,
2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7372-16. Asterisk (*) indicates that one or
more of the financial entities listed is a provisionally registered swap dealer or an affiliate of a
provisionally registered swap dealer.
496. In re Barclays PLC, CFTC No. 12-25, 2012 WL 2500330, at *1-2, *26 (June 27, 2012).
497. In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 16-17, 2016 WL 3035031, at *1, *17 (May 25, 2016).
498. In re Deutsche Bank AG, CFTC No. 15-20, 2015 WL 1874880, at *1, *27 (Apr. 23,
2015).
499. In re ICAP Eur. Ltd., CFTC No. 13-38, 2013 WL 5409329, at *1, *36 (Sept. 25, 2013).
500. In re Lloyds Banking Grp. plc, CFTC No. 14-18, 2014 WL 378395, at *1, *19 (July 28,
2014).
501. In re Cooperatieve Centrale RaiffeisenBoerenleenbank B.A., CFTC No. 14-02, 2013 WL
5872872, at *1, *37 (Oct. 29, 2013).
502. In re Royal Bank of Scotland plc, CFTC No. 13-14, 2013 WL 485759, at *1, *28 (Feb. 6,
2013).
503. In re RP Martin Holdings Ltd., CFTC No. 14-16, 2014 WL 2003211, at *1, *24 (May 15,
2014).
504. In re UBS AG, CFTC No. 13-09, 2012 WL 6642376, at *1, *51 (Dec. 19,2012).
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TABLE 2: FINANCIAL ENTITIES THA TSETTLED WITH THE CFTC
FOR ALLEGEDLYRIGGING FOREIGN EXCHANGE
RATE BENCHMARKSos
Periodof
Alleged

Settlement
Amount

Misconduci

(in millions)

1 Barclays Bank PLCs06

2009-2012

$400

May 20, 2015

2 Citibank, N.A.so?

2009-2012

$310

Nov. 11, 2014

2009-2012

$275

Nov. 11, 2014

2010-2012

$310

Nov. 11, 2014

5 Royal Bank of Scotland plcs 1 o 2009-2012

$290

Nov. 11, 2014

6 UBS AG 11

$290

Nov. 11, 2014

Entity Name

No.

3 HSBC Bank plc
4

50

.P.MorganChaseBank,

N.A.509

2009-2012

Date ofSettlemen

TABLE 3: FEDERAL RESERVE SETTLEMENTS WITH BANKS ON
MAY 20, 2015 IN CONNECTION WITH FOREX TRADING
IMPROPRIETIESFROM2008 TO 2013512
Entity Name

No.

Fine (in millions)

1
2

Bank of America
Barclays Bank PLC

$205
$342

3

Citigroup Inc.

$342

4

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

$342

5

Royal Bank of Scotland

$274

6

UBS AG

$342

505. See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, supranote 495. All of the
financial entities listed in Table 2 are provisionally registered swap dealers or affiliates of
provisionally registered swap dealers.
506. In re Barclays Bank PLC, CFTC No. 15-24, 2015 WL 2445059, at *1, *13 (May 20,
2015).
507. In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-03, 2014 WL 6068386, at *1, *10 (Nov. 11, 2014).
508. In re HSBC Bank plc, CFTC No. 15-07, 2014 WL 6068390, at *1, *12 (Nov. 11, 2014).
509. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-04, 2014 WL 6068387, at *1, *10 (Nov.
11,2014).
510. In re Royal Bank of Scotland plc, CFTC No. 15-05, 2014 WL 6068388, at *1, *9 (Nov.
11,2014).
511. In re UBS AG, CFTC No. 15-06, 2014 WL 6068389, at *1, *10 (Nov. 11, 2014).
512. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (May 20, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/enforcement/20150520a.htm. All of the financial entities listed in Table 3 are
provisionally registered swap dealers or affiliates of provisionally registered swap dealers.
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TABLE 4: OFFICEOF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
SETTLEMENTS IN NOVEMBER OF 2014 IN CONNECTION
WITH FOREX TRADING IMPR OPRIETIES
FROM 2008 TO 2013513
No.

Entity Name

Fine (in millions)

1
2
3

Bank of America
Citibank, N.A.
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

$250
$350
$350

TABLE 5: FINANCIAL ENTITIES THAT SETTLED WITH THE CFTC
FOR ALLEGEDLY RIGGING ISDAFIX 514

No.

Entity Name(s)

Time Periodof Settlement
Alleged
Amount Settlement Date
Misconduct
(in millions)

Barclays PLC,
Barclays Bank
At least January
PLC, & Barclays 2007 to June 2012
Capital Inc. 15

2

Citibank N.A. 5 16

anuary2007to
anuary 2012

$250

May 25, 2016

513. See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, supra note 495; Press
Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Fines Three Banks $950 Million for FX
Trading Improprieties (Nov. 12, 2014), https://occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2014/nr-occ2014-157.html. All of the financial entities listed in Table 4 are provisionally registered swap
dealers or affiliates of provisionally registered swap dealers.
514. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 513. All of the
financial entities listed in Table 5 are provisionally registered swap dealers or affiliates of
provisionally registered swap dealers.
515. In re Barclays PLC, CFTC No. 15-25, 2015 WL 2445060, at *1, *18 (May 20, 2015).
516. In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 16-16, 2016 WL 3035030, at *1, *19 (May 25, 2016).
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TABLE 6: FINANCIAL ENTITIES THAT SETTLED (IN 2016) A
PRIVATE U. S. LAWSUIT ALLEGING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD
RIGGEDISDAFIX FROMJAN 1, 2006 TO JAN. 31, 2014517
Settlement Amount
.i milins
(mn mdhlons)

Entity Name(s)

No.

$52
$30
$42
$50
$50
$50
$50

Bank of America Corp.
Barclays PLC
Citigroup Inc.
Credit Suisse Group AG
Deutsche Bank AG
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Royal Bank of Scotland plc

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

TABLE 7: FINANCIAL ENTITIES THAT SETTLED (IN2015) A
PRIVATE US. LA WSUIT ALLEGING RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION

IN THE CREDIT DEFA ULT SWAPS MARKET FROM
JANUARY], 2008, TO DECEMBER 31, 2013518
Entity Name(s)

No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

517.

9

Bank of America Corp. & Bank of America, N.A.*m
Barclays PLC*
BNP Paribas SA*
Citigroup Inc., Citibank, N.A., & Citigroup Global Markets Inc.*
Credit Suisse Group AG*
Deutsche Bank AG*
Goldman Sachs Group Inc.*
HSBC Bank PLC & HSBC Bank USA, N.A.*
JPMorgan Chase & Co. & JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*
Morgan Stanley*
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC & Royal Bank of Scotland NV*
UBS Group AG & UBS Securities N.V.*
International Swaps and Derivatives Associations (ISDA)
Markit Group Ltd. & Markit Group Holdings Ltd.

Bob Van Voris, BofA, Other Banks Pay $324M to Resolve Rate-Rigging Claims,

CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 4, 2016, 2:51 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/

banking/article75591222.html; Zacks Equity Research, Major Banks Sued for ISDAfix Rigging,
Settle Casesfor $324M, YAHOO! FrN. (May 4, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/major-banks-

sued-isdafix-rigging-193007650.html. All of the financial entities listed in Table 6 are provisionally
registered swap dealers or affiliates of provisionally registered swap dealers.
518.

See Bume, Banks Finalize $1.86 Billion Credit-Swaps Settlement, supra note 278; see

also In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., 13md2476 (DLC), 2016 WL 2731524, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016); In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13md2476 (DLC), 2014
WL 4379112, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014); In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig.
Settlement, GARDEN CrrY GRP. LLC, http://www.cdsantitrustsettlement.com/index.php (last visited

Dec. 31, 2016).
519. Asterisk (*) indicates that the financial entity is a provisionally registered swap dealer or
an affiliate of one.
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TABLE 8: FINANCIAL ENTITIES THAT SETTLED LEGAL
BENCHMARK-RIGGING CASES WITH EUROPEAN COMMISSION
IN 2013 FOR BEHA VIOR THAT ALLEGEDLY OCCURRED
FROM2005 TO 2010520
No.

Entity Name

Settlement Amount (in millions)

I

Barclays PLC*S 2 1

2

Citigroup Inc.*

3

Deutsche Bank AG*

E725

4

JPMorgan Chase & Co.*

679.9

5

Royal Bank of Scotland Group*
RP Martin Holdings Ltd.

6

0 (whistleblower credit)
E70

7

Societe Gen6rale*

8

UBS AG*

6391
6247,000
6227
0 (whistleblower credit)

TABLE 9: SYSTEAICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS THAT SETTLED
CFTC, EUROPEAN COMASSION, OR PRIVATE LEGAL ACTIONS
INVOL VING ALLEGATIONS OF BENCHMARK RIGGING OR
RESTRAINING COMPETITION5 22
No.

Entity Name

1

Bank of America

2

Barclays

3

BNP Paribas

4

Citigroup

5

Credit Suisse

6

Deutsche Bank

7

Goldman Sachs

8

HSBC

9

JPMorgan Chase

10

Morgan Stanley

11

Royal Bank of Scotland

12

Societ6 Generale

13

UBS

&

520. European Commission Press Release IP/13/1208, supranote 7; see also Vanessa Mock
David Enrich, EU Fines 6 Firms on Rates, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2013, at Cl. Financial entities
involved in the case that were not part of the settlement include HSBC Holdings PLC, ICAP PLC,
and Cr6dit Agricole SA. See id.
521. Asterisk (*) indicates that the financial entity is a provisionally registered swap dealer or
an affiliate of one.
522.

See FIN. STABILITY BD., 2015 UPDATE OF LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT

BANKS (G-SIBs) at 2 (2015), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-of-list-of-globalsystemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf. Note that all of the financial entities listed above are
provisionally registered swap dealers or affiliates of provisionally registered swap dealers.
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TABLE 10: REGISTRATION STA TUS OFFINANCIAL ENTITIES
THAT SETILED BENCHMARK-RIGGING CASES WITH THE CFTC523
NFA
ID No.

Entity Name

No.

1 Barclays PLC
2 Barclays Bank PLC

None

0443033 [SDAfix; LIBOR
0209452

RegistrationStatus

Benchmark RateRigging Case

ISDAfix;

LIBOR;

forex

'

Swap Dealer
Futures Commission

3 Barclays Capital Inc.

0228758 ISDAfix; LIBOR

Merchant; Commodity
Pool Operator;
Commodity Trading

Advisor
Swap Dealer

5 Citibank Japan Ltd.

0443420 LIBOR

None

6 Citigroup Global Markets

0443456 LIBOR

one

7 Deutsche Bank AG

0210678 LIBOR

Swap Dealer

8 HSBC Bank plc

0209445 Forex

Swap Dealer

9 ICAP Europe Limited

0468262 LIBOR

None

Japan Inc.

.

4 Citibank, N.A.

ISDAfix; forex;
'
0187177
LIBOR

10 IPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 0229152 Forex

Swap Dealer

11 Lloyds Banking Group plc

0467813 LIBOR

None

12 Lloyds Bank plc

0466833 LIBOR

Swap Dealer

13 Rabobank

0469701 LIBOR

None

14 Royal Bank of Scotland plc 0272448 Forex; LIBOR

Swap Dealer

0458078 LIBOR

None

16 RP Martin Holdings Limited 0477360 LIBOR

None

0468662 LIBOR

None

0338960 LIBOR; forex

Swap Dealer

15

S Securities Japan

Limited

17 Martin Brokers (UK) Ltd.

AG

18 U

UBS Securities Japan Co.

0454358 IBOR

Ltd.

523.

one
IN

See BackgroundAffiliation Information Center, NAT'L FUTURES Ass'N, https://www.nfa.

futures.org/basicnet/Welcome.aspx (last visited Dec. 31, 2016) (search by NFA ID Number for each
entity). For information on NFA ID Numbers, see NFA Directories, NAT'L FUTURES Ass'N,
https://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa-registration/nfa-directories.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2016).
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TABLE 11: PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED SWAP DEALERS THAT
SETTLED A BENCHMARK-RIGGING CASE WITH THE
CFTC OR EUROPEAN COMMISSION (OR WHOSE
AFFILIATES HAVE DONE SO)52 4
No.

Entity Name(s)

1
2

Bank of America, N.A.
Barclays Bank PLC

3

BNP Paribas SA

4
5
6

7

8

Citibank, N.A., Citigroup Energy Inc., Citigroup Global
Markets Inc., & Citigroup Global Markets Limited
Europe
Credit Suisse International & Credit Suisse Securities

Limited

Deutsche Bank AG
Goldman Sachs & Co., Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Goldman
Sachs DO Brasil Banco Multiplo SA, Goldman Sachs Financial
Markets LP, Goldman Sachs International, Goldman Sachs
Japan Co. Ltd., Goldman Sachs Mexico Casa de Bolsa SA DE
CV, Goldman Sachs Mitsui Marine Derivative Products LP,
Goldman Sachs Paris Inc. Et. CIE, J Aron & Company, & J
Aron & Company Singapore PTE

HSBC Bank PLC, HSBC Bank USA, N.A.

12
13

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., JPMorgan Securities LLC,
JPMorgan Securities PLC, & JPMorgan Ventures Energy
Corporation
Lloyds Bank PLC
Morgan Stanley & Co. International PLC, Morgan Stanley
Co. LLC, Morgan Stanley Bank International Limited, Morgan
Stanley Bank, N.A., Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.,
Morgan Stanley Capital Products LLC, Morgan Stanley Capital
Services LLC, Morgan Stanley Derivative Products Inc.,
Morgan Stanley Case de Bolsa SA DE CV, & Morgan Stanley
MUFG Securities Co. Ltd.
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC
Societe Generale SA & Societe Generale Newedge UK Limited

14

UBS AG

9

&

10

11

524.

See Swap Dealer (SD) andMajor Swap Participant(MSP) Directory, supranote 72.
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TABLE 12: FINANCIAL ENTITIES THAT, EITHER BY THEMSELVES
OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH AFFILIA TED BUSINESS ENTITIES,
SETTLED THREE OR MORE LEGAL ACTIONS ALLEGING
BENCHMARK RIGGING AND/OR OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE
CONDUCT INVOL VING DISTINCT FINANCIAL

PRODUCTS AND/OR MARKETS1 2 5
No. ofDistinct
No.

Entity Name FinancialProducts

Settlement Case Descriptions

or Markets
LIBOR and/or related interest rate benchmarks;

1

Barclays PLC

4

Foreign exchange benchmarks; ISDAfix
benchmark; credit default swaps antitrust.
LIBOR and/or related interest rate benchmarks;

2

itibank, N.A.

4

foreign exchange benchmarks; ISDAfix
benchmark; credit default swaps antitrust.

3

Deutsche

Bank AG

3

LIBOR and/or related interest rate benchmarks;

ISDAfix benchmark; credit default swaps antitrust.
LIBOR and/or related interest rate benchmarks;

4

5

Chase & Co.
Royal Bank of
Scotland

4

foreign exchange benchmarks; ISDAfix
benchmark; credit default swaps antitrust.

4

LIBOR and/or related interest rate benchmarks;
foreign exchange benchmarks; ISDAfix
benchmark; credit default swaps antitrust.

Group Plc

LIBOR and/or related interest rate benchmarks;

6

S AG

3

foreign exchange benchmarks; credit default
swaps antitrust.

525. This Table seeks to identify which financial entities settled three or more government
enforcement actions or lawsuits involving allegations that the financial entities in question had
participated in separate cartels to rig distinct benchmarks or otherwise engage in activities that
restrained competition in distinct markets. For example, a financial entity that settled enforcement
actions with three different countries involving the rigging on LIBOR-related interest rate
benchmarks would not appear on this chart if all three settlements involved the same activities, i.e.,
the rigging of LIBOR-related interest rate benchmarks. On the other hand, a financial entity would
appear on this Table if it had settled one government enforcement action involving allegations that it
manipulated LIBOR and similar interest rate benchmarks, another government enforcement action
involving allegations that it had manipulated foreign exchange benchmarks, a private lawsuit
concerning the alleged rigging of ISDAfix, and a private lawsuit involving alleged restraint of trade
in the credit default swaps market.
See supra Tables 1-9. Note that all of the financial entities listed in Table 12 are
provisionally registered swap dealers or affiliates of provisionally registered swap dealers.
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FIGURE 1: THREE BROAD CATEGORIES OF WRONGDOING

Although conduct that violates antifraud, price manipulation, and
antitrust claims overlaps to some extent, there are important differences
among these categories of misconduct. Fraud is a broad catch-all that
covers any means of misappropriating another person's money, property,
or other interests without violating the basic prohibition against
theft. Generally speaking, under the U.S. antitrust laws, unlawful
anticompetitive conduct involves acts that harm competition (or that
have the propensity to harm competition), such as when firms that
normally would be competitors band together and agree to fix prices,
boycott specific firms, or divide sales territories or allocate customers.
Price manipulation claims target conduct that causes the prices of
futures, swaps, and other derivatives to become artificial, which means
that the prices do not reflect the natural interplay of supply and demand.
The price manipulation circle is smaller than the others because price
manipulation claims have been narrowly construed as only applying to
actions in which the perpetrators specifically intended to make the prices
of derivatives artificial.
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